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i 
Abstract 
Seongwon Yoon 
 
Distorted Security Discourses 
The ROK’s Securitisation of the Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2003–2013 
 
Keywords: securitisation, security discourse, discursive chasms, North Korea’s 
nuclear threat, South Korea, Roh Moo-Hyun, Lee Myung-Bak 
 
South Korea’s security discourse on the nuclear threat posed by North Korea has 
been dichotomised by its position within the political spectrum between the 
progressives and conservatives. By drawing upon Securitisation Theory (ST), this 
study challenges the current security discourse in South Korea, which has divided 
and misled the public as well as securitising actors. This study examines the 
security discourses of the Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) and Lee Myung-bak 
(2008–2013) administrations, since they represent the archetypes of the 
progressives and conservatives respectively. The results of the analysis suggest 
that the current security discourses that have been prevalent in South Korea do 
not correspond with reality and, subsequently, the discourses were not able to 
deal with real challenges that the nuclear threat posed. This research also 
explains the root cause of the distorted security discourses by applying a 
‘discursive chasm’ as a preliminary concept, which indicates a discursive 
structure that fundamentally impedes the performance of securitising actors’ 
articulation, and that distorts the discursive formation (securitisation processes). 
The chasms consist of three elusive discourses: first, a discourse on threats that 
cannot simply be said to be either imminent or not imminent (nuclear weapons 
as materiality and discourse); second, a discourse on the other that cannot easily 
be defined (the difficulty of representation of North Korea); and third, a discourse 
on measures that cannot easily be realised (intangible extraordinary measures). 
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PART I. Conceptualising Security Discourse 
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1.  
Introduction 
1.1 Does today’s discourse reflect reality? 
 
1.1.1 Today’s security discourse 
As far as the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is concerned, the security 
discourse of the Republic of Korea (ROK: South Korea) has always been split 
into two political spectrums: conservatives and progressives (or liberals). The 
conservatives have generally insisted that true peace is not possible unless the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea) relinquishes its 
nuclear programme. They have argued that the nuclear issue must be given top 
priority in terms of inter-Korean relations, otherwise all efforts to make overtures 
to the DPRK will come to naught (Kim 2005; Cheon 2008; Park 2010; Kang 2011; 
Jang 2014; Terry 2014). On the other hand, the progressive bloc has often argued 
that it would be possible to solve the DPRK’s nuclear issue while at the same 
time improving inter-Korean relations through the process of dialogue and 
cooperation (Smith 2000; Bleiker 2001; Bleiker 2005; Fuqua 2007; Hoare 2008; 
Moon 2012; Delury and Moon 2014). 
We all know from the experiences of the last couple of decades that the 
ROK’s North Korea policies, irrespective of whether they were based on 
conservative or progressive values, were not that successful in solving the 
DPRK’s nuclear issues (Gladstone 2016; Perry 2016; Samore 2016). However, 
it is also true that the ROK’s discourse has been seriously affected by the 
dichotomous viewpoints and, accordingly, each political group has tried to win 
over the populace by arguing that their own policy is better. For instance, the Kim 
Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) administrations are said 
to be progressive, whereas the Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye 
(2013–2017) administrations are regarded as conservative. In other words, at 
least at a discursive level, for nearly two decades, South Korean audiences have 
been exposed to the competing discourses on finding a solution to the DPRK’s 
nuclear issues. 
 
 
3 
The conservative government argued that their own security discourses 
focused solely upon the nuclear issues, while stigmatising the progressive regime 
as policymakers that virtually desecuritised the DPRK’s nuclear threat (Kim 2007; 
Ha 2013). On the contrary, the progressive side criticised the conservative camp 
for abandoning peaceful inter-Korean relations while being bent on securitising 
the DPRK’s nuclear weapons (Moon 2012; Paik 2013; Lee 2014b). What is 
interesting is that the progressives’ propensity to underline the importance of 
dialogue or reconciliation between the two Koreas has allowed them to be seen 
as pacifists or doves (Likewise, the conservatives can be seen as 
confrontationists or hawks). Another point is that even though neither political 
camp was able to show compelling security discourse that could denuclearise the 
DPRK, at least conservatives could argue that they prioritised the nuclear 
problem while progressives pushed it aside (MoU 2011; Ha 2013). To summarise, 
Seoul’s policies towards Pyongyang is one of the most important standards that 
makes a division between the conservatives and progressives and, accordingly, 
when it comes to security discourse in South Korea, the ‘left-right’ political 
structure has been robust and prevalent (KINU 2013b) (Figure 1.1).1 
It would not be easy to succinctly define the words conservatism and 
progressivism in the political philosophy sense. However, both, as political 
ideologies, represent the ideas of the political elites (Heywood 2012). From this 
vantage point, the respective origins of such ideologies can be found by 
identifying some important political figures. As far as North Korean issues are 
                                            1 Even Ahn Cheol-soo, one of the main progressive leaders regarded as a probable candidate in the future South Korean presidential race, argued that he has ‘economic progressivism and national security conservatism’ (Lee 2011d). This clearly shows the strength of today’s security discourse in the ROK. 
 
Figure 1.1 The ROK’s security discourse 
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concerned, modern acceptance of the words conservatism and progressivism 
used in South Korean society dates back to the 1940s, during which time the 
Korean peninsula was divided. The Koreans in the north, the Soviet-sheltered 
regime, sought communist revolution in the south and unification under the 
communist flag. The Korean War (1950–1953) was the culmination of the effort. 
Against this backdrop, and since Rhee Syngman (1948–1960), the first president 
of the ROK, ROK conservatism has been firmly based on anticommunism. During 
Rhee’s presidency, the term ‘peaceful unification’ was deemed to be pro-
communist ideology. Rhee himself actively sought to liberate the north by force 
before and during the Korean War (Stone 1952; Shin 2006). 
While Rhee represents the contemporary origin of the conservatism of the 
ROK, Cho Bong-am, the former leader of the Progressive (Jinbo) Party, is seen 
as the root of progressivism in terms of inter-Korean relations. Rhee regarded 
him as the most dangerous political rival, particularly after Cho earned over 30 
per cent of the vote in the third South Korean presidential election in 1956. In 
1959, Cho was executed on charges of espionage and conspiring with the DPRK. 
However, 52 years later, in 2011, the South Korean Supreme Court vindicated 
Cho by overruling the death sentence, saying that ‘Cho played a crucial role in 
shaping [the ROK’s] progressive politics. The Jinbo Party … cannot be seen as 
a political party established to overthrow the nation’ (Kim 2011). Even though 
Cho’s peaceful unification policy could not be anchored in the ROK security 
discourse at the time, even among the centrist party leaders (Kim 2016), the 
principle of peaceful unification now became the central tenet of Seoul’s North 
Korea policy, irrespective of the political spectrum. 
Today’s security discourse and the cases of Rhee and Cho show that there 
are at least two traits of the ROK’s security discourse on the DPRK. First, to 
reiterate, Seoul’s security discourse has always revolved around the threat posed 
by North Korea. Within this context, conservativism has stood for anticommunism 
(Ban-gong or Myeol-gong), whereas the word progressivism was used to 
symbolise the ‘pro-North leftist’ (Chinbuk Jwapa). Second, in most cases, 
conservativism has generally adopted an aggressive posture on progressivism 
within the context of South Korean security discourse. Ever since the Korean War, 
which ‘resolved nothing; only the status quo ante had been restored’ (Cumings 
1989: xix), a negative image of North Korea as a sworn enemy has been 
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reinforced by Pyongyang’s successive provocative actions, including the 
Rangoon bombing in 1983, the bombing of KAL (Korean Air) Flight 858 in 1987 
and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, just to name a few.2 Given these 
circumstances, it seems natural that conservatism has been central to South 
Korea’s security discourse. 
 
1.1.2 The purpose and scope of the thesis 
Mere facts themselves cannot be altered. However, what are portrayed as facts 
are not always facts, particularly when they are linked to discourses. This is 
because, as Terrell Carver (cited in Pierce 2008: 279) pointed out, discourse is 
‘a representation of what we want the world to be like, rather than a 
representation of how the world is’.3 Therefore, it would be natural to think that 
decision-makers could manoeuvre facts and convey them to the public by way of 
discourses in order to strengthen their political power (Howarth et al. 2000; Van 
Dijk 2009). It is often said that political actors are responding not only to given 
objective information regarding an issue, but also to some pre-existing images. 
In other words, they deal with information using their own cognitive structure or 
identities. Therefore, the same phenomenon can be differently construed. 
(Boulding 1959; Holsti 1962; Jervis 1976; Mercer 2005; Mercer 2010). 
This ‘fact-discourse’ logic offers us an opportunity to have reasonable 
suspicions as to whether today’s discourse entirely reflects reality. Given that the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue is too important to be addressed with such a dichotomous 
perspective, a discourse analysis (DA) based on a critical viewpoint, appears 
essential. In light of this, it seems reasonable that the common discursive ground 
that each political bloc shares with each other must come to the fore together with 
differences. From a practical viewpoint, a critical analysis of discourse on the 
Korean Nuclear Crisis could shed light on the real mechanism of convergence 
and divergence of such discourse. In this way, DA could be a cornerstone, laying 
the foundation for more durable and less incompatible discourse. What should be 
                                            2 On 9 October 1983, North Korea failed to murder South Korea’s president Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988) while he was visiting Burma. Instead, several South Korean cabinet members, presidential advisers and ambassadors were killed by an explosion. On 29 November 1987, KAL 858 was destroyed in mid-air on its way from Abu Dhabi to Seoul after two highly trained North Korean espionage agents planted a powerful bomb inside the aircraft. The 115 victims were mostly young South Korean men. The Yeonpyeong incident will be discussed later. 3 The concept of discourse will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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done first and foremost then is to draw the contour of each bloc’s discursive 
configuration with the help of more sophisticated theoretical and methodological 
instruments. 
However, the aim of this thesis is not to reveal a fundamental reason for 
policymakers’ differing perceptions of threat, as that could only be achieved using 
rigorous political psychology. This study aims to make the seemingly disparate 
security discourses of the ROK administrations between the conservatives and 
progressives understood more clearly. The security discourse of the South 
Korean policymakers will be delineated in this thesis by means of DA and 
pertinent methods.4 Here is what needs to be more carefully considered and what 
seems to be more important: in the process of political justification by way of 
discourses, one might find some contradictory or distorted points from each 
administration’s position on the issue of security, and we might also discover 
some cases in which the discourses have been blurring or trespassing on the 
other’s discursive domain. Even policymakers could not be aware of such 
discursive inconsistency. Eventually, these things need to be proven by carrying 
out a practical analysis, so that one can discover to what extent today’s security 
discourse reflects reality. 
This study delimits the analytical scope into the Roh Moo-hyun (Roh) and 
Lee Myung-bak (Lee) administrations. The reasons for this are as follows: firstly, 
when it comes to inter-Korean relations, the two administrations ideally represent 
the progressive and conservative political entities, respectively. Although the Kim 
Dae-jung and Park Geun-hye administrations might also represent the 
progressive and conservative blocs, given that President Kim Dae-jung was 
under relatively less pressure from the nuclear issue because he was able to 
bask in the post-Geneva Agreed Framework (AF)5 period for most of his tenure, 
and that President Park Geun-hye is still incumbent at the time of writing, dealing 
with Presidents Roh and Lee would accord with a clear time frame for the thesis. 
In the case of President Kim Young-sam (1993–1998), many experts still have 
doubts about his real ideological disposition because he vacillated greatly 
between the conservatives and progressives in terms of inter-Korean relations 
(Lee 2004; Lee 2012a; Han 2013; Byeon 2014). 
                                            4 The methods and methodology will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 5 For the contents of the AF, see Chapter 4. 
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Secondly, and more importantly, one should narrow the scope of the 
research to make the method operational so that researchers can find appropriate 
numbers of sources with which to address analytical concerns. Narrowing down 
research problems and analysing a small dataset are essential (Schneider 2013b; 
Silverman 2013). Nonetheless, the scope of this thesis does not mean that it 
excludes discursive sources of other periods that have impacted on relevant 
issues; broad contexts and related discourses may be needed occasionally.  
 
 
1.2 Conceptual framework: securitisation 
 
1.2.1 Why Securitisation Theory and what is it? 
This study began with the current narratives of the DRPK’s nuclear issue: the 
ROK’s security discourse that has been prevalent on the one hand, and the 
ROK’s unsuccessful North Korea policies on the other. Then, the underlying 
questions that need to be taken into account may be as follows: in order to be 
sustainable, to what extent have recent ROK administrations’ ‘securitised’ 
discourses on the DPRK been adequately consistent with reality? Why have 
neither perspectives—conservatives or progressives—been successful in 
deterring Pyongyang from developing its nuclear capabilities? If the two 
perspectives’ security discourses are different, to what extent, and in what ways, 
are they different? What if the discursive differences between the two are unclear? 
Which analytical or practical points should be addressed in that case? By delving 
into each political bloc’s discourse, the reality and limitation of the ROK’s security 
discourse could be revealed. In that case, the security discourse of each 
administration might not be as consistent as expected. 
Against this backdrop, this research adopts Securitisation Theory (ST) as a 
conceptual framework for analysis of the ROK security discourses.6 There are 
two reasons for this. One is for methodological appropriateness, and the other is 
for theoretical application. With regard to the methodological concerns, as this 
thesis focuses on the role of discourses and the agents who made such 
discourses, the discursive concepts, such as speech acts, ideas and language 
                                            6 ST will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Therefore this chapter briefly deals with its concept and the context in which it will be used in the thesis. 
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should be central to the process of analysis. In this sense, ST appears optimal in 
that its core argument is that a form of security is discursively constructed (Buzan 
et al. 1998; Buzan and Hansen 2009). According to ST, ‘security has a particular 
discursive and political force and is a concept that does something rather than an 
objective condition’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 213–214). Given that methodology 
‘sits between broader theoretical debates and actual hands-on research work’ 
(Schneider 2014), ST seems an appropriate theory that fits in with DA as methods. 
In terms of theoretical application, this research could enlarge the scope of 
ST. ST is still evolving as a security concept on the one hand; at the same time, 
however, ST has built its own territory upon the field of security studies, and has 
provided considerable insights into contemporary studies as an alternative 
framework (Balzacq 2011; Stritzel 2012; Donnelly 2013; Bourne 2014; Stritzel 
2014). 
With regard to theoretical application of the ROK security discourse, a 
number of studies have been concerned with the ROK governments’ security 
perceptions of the DPRK’s nuclear issues, but most seem predicated on the 
assumption that the perception could be separated by the conservative-
progressive division. 7  Apart from researchers who used the traditional 
International Relations (IR) theories, such as realism and liberalism, several 
attempts applying constructivism as a theoretical tool have also been developed 
based on the previous dichotomy (Son 2006; Kim and Lee 2011; Kim 2012; Paik 
2013). From the theoretical point of view, this research applies and challenges 
ST. This study applies ST to the ROK’s security discourse case by means of DA, 
aiming to analyse the two administrations’ discourses while keeping its distance 
from the ideological stereotype. At the same time, this study challenges ST by 
investigating its utility as a theoretical framework. 
The concept of securitisation is derived from the so-called ‘Copenhagen 
School’ (CS). According to the CS, securitisation refers to the discursive 
construction of threat. Put differently, it refers to ‘the articulation of an existential 
threat that requires urgent action’ (Bourne 2014: 271). The CS argued that 
security is a speech act by saying security; that is to say, to block a threatening 
development, a state representative claims the right to use extraordinary means 
by declaring an emergency condition. In sum, security cannot be defined in 
                                            7 For the literature review regarding theoretical viewpoints, see Chapter 2. 
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objective terms; therefore, it is a self-referential practice (Buzan and Hansen 
2009). This is why ST is known for its speech act concept from the viewpoint of 
language theory. A discursive approach on security differs from an objective 
conception that regards the absence of concrete threats as important. In this light, 
the CS offered a constructivist counterpoint to the materialist threat analysis 
(Buzan and Hansen 2009). 
ST sees securitisation as ‘a more extreme version of politicisation’ (Buzan 
et al. 1998: 23). The CS categorised public issues into three main types. In the 
non-politicised stage, the issue is not under the spotlight because policymakers 
do not manage it. However, government decision and political resource 
allocations are needed if the issue is politicised. In the securitised stage, the issue 
requires emergency measures and justifies governmental actions that are not 
possible within the normal purview of the political procedure (Buzan et al. 1998: 
23-24) (Figure 1.2). 
There are several key components in ST. Firstly, a speech act is made by 
a securitising actor who ‘securitise[s] issues by declaring something existentially 
threatened’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 36). It can be said that securitising actors 
include heads of state, governments, political opposition parties, the media, 
pressure groups, and so on, although a practical range of analytical focus can 
vary. Secondly, a securitising actor creates a securitising move by declaring 
something an existential threat. Thirdly, a perceived existential threat must be 
countered by extraordinary measures (Salter and Mutlu 2013b). Lastly, a 
 
 Figure 1.2 Securitisation spectrum 
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securitising actor takes extraordinary measures in order to protect some 
important principles. These principles could vary with the occasion. In most cases, 
particularly in relation to the political and military security sectors, the principles 
might be the state’s sovereignty or state itself. The CS recognises the principles 
as referent objects: ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that 
have a legitimate claim to survival’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23–24). In sum, ST argues 
that something becomes a security problem through a securitising actor’s 
discursive practice because the actor considers it an emergency condition that 
could threaten important principles. 
 
1.2.2 How does Securitisation Theory work in the ROK context? 
Let us return to the practical issues: the ways the ROK has described the DPRK’s 
nuclear issues. This may not be that simple, because the issue is inextricably 
bound up with the ROK’s representation of the DPRK, as well as its perception 
of nuclear threat itself. For instance, Seoul’s policymakers have to ask 
themselves the following questions when dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear 
problem: what is North Korea? How should it be defined? Is it our enemy (an anti-
government entity) or compatriot? Is it really driven by irrational ideological zeal? 
Would it be possible or viable to separate the DPRK regime from its citizenry in 
dealing with inter-Korean relations? All these questions are closely connected to 
discourse, as these cannot be squarely based on mere facts. These issues are 
in need of a relevant agent’s definition of the social structure. To sum up, Seoul’s 
security discourse on Pyongyang’s nuclear threat cannot be based solely upon 
material factors regarding nuclear weapons. A set of meanings, representations 
and statements would be needed in some manner (Baker and Ellece 2011). 
In what way, then, can ST be applied to the ROK’s security discourse? As 
aforementioned, ST argues that what decides a crucial security object of a 
country is dependent upon a securitising actor’s speech act. Once a socially 
important issue is recognised as an imminent threat amongst the public (or an 
audience) by linguistic means, a securitising actor can easily convert that issue 
into an action step (Donnelly 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013b). This thesis follows 
that logic. It acknowledges the importance of speech acts by which securitising 
actors engage in security practices, and in that sense, this study pays attention 
to the role of speech acts made by securitising actors in the process of forming 
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security discourse in South Korea. A systematic analysis of each securitising 
actor’s speech acts could be a starting point for a relatively more neutral 
understanding of the ROK security discourse. Accordingly, each administration’s 
speech act pattern would also be revealed in an objective way. 
However, there are at least two caveats when applying ST to the ROK 
context. First, the key concepts of ST such as existential threats, referent objects 
and extraordinary measures may not be as clear in the ROK security discourse 
as the CS expected. For example, it seems that Seoul’s discourse has not made 
it clear whether Pyongyang should be part of existential threats as a source of 
the nuclear threat, or subsumed under the category of referent objects as a 
compatriot that must be embraced. If the ROK’s representation of the DPRK is 
not clear, its definitions of threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures 
would subsequently be ambiguous. Put differently, given that identity is a 
perspicuous representation or interpretation of the other (Campbell 1998; Bleiker 
2001; Hansen 2006), it can be said that the ROK securitising actors have not 
been able ‘to fully attain their identity’ (Howarth et al. 2000: 10) and, accordingly, 
their securitising attempts might have faced some challenges. 
Secondly, it appears unclear whether the ROK security discourse is 
politicisation or securitisation.8 As noted above, the prevalent security discourse 
in today’s South Korea has given us an impression that the conservatives 
prioritised the nuclear issue while the progressives relatively pushed it aside in 
order to implement an inter-Korean reconciliatory process. Does this mean that 
the conservatives securitised the nuclear threat, whereas the progressives just 
politicised it? A detailed investigation of each administration’s speech act would 
reveal the truth about whether today’s discourse truly reflects the reality. In other 
words, it would reveal whether the conservatives significantly carried out 
extraordinary measures as part of their securitising moves while the progressives 
did not. What is certain so far is that the ROK has not devised extraordinary 
counter-measures effectively able to deter the DPRK from developing nuclear 
capabilities and, therefore, Seoul’s security discourse could not be called a true 
sense of securitisation, particularly as ST generally ‘defines securitisation as a 
successful speech act’ (Stritzel 2007: 358). In that sense, the ROK discourse 
                                            8  See Figure 1.2. For the theoretical criticism of the ST framework regarding concepts of politicisation and securitisation, see Chapter 3. 
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might have fallen under the category of a securitising move somewhere between 
politicisation and securitisation, regardless of whether the discourse was based 
on the conservatives or progressives. Put differently, the issue is not so much 
whether securitisation has taken place in general, but rather about how the terms 
and framing of securitising moves have developed in the form of securitisation. 
In summary, several points need to be examined in order to elucidate the 
traits of the ROK’s securitisation. Firstly, the securitising actors’ speech act 
patterns need to be delineated. This will be used as a starting point for analysing 
the ROK’s security discourse. Secondly, the ways in which the securitising actors 
described the ST’s key concepts—an existential threat (nuclear weapons; enemy 
or the other, meaning North Korea), referent objects and extraordinary 
measures—in the process of their securitising moves need to be clarified, to 
identify each securitising actor’s securitisation attempt in a concrete manner. 
Thirdly, if Seoul’s security discourse is stuck somewhere between politicisation 
and securitisation, the cause of the stalemate needs to be elucidated. In these 
ways, fundamental reasons may be identified for the ROK securitising actors’ 
discursive dilemma. 
 
 
1.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
To reiterate, the underlying questions that this study has raised are as follows: in 
order to be sustainable, to what extent have the recent ROK governments’ 
‘securitised’ discourses on the DPRK been adequately consistent with reality? 
Why have neither perspectives—conservatives and progressives—been 
successful in deterring Pyongyang from developing its nuclear capabilities? If the 
two political blocs’ security discourses are different, to what extent and in what 
ways are they different? What if the discursive differences between the two are 
unclear? Which analytical or practical points should be addressed in that case? 
The research questions and hypotheses of the thesis stand on the basis of 
these underlying questions. What is important is that an audience will always be 
in a vortex of dichotomous and conflicting discourses without knowing the real 
difference of each political bloc’s security discourse. Not surprisingly, each 
government of the ROK, regardless of its political ideologies, started with 
excessive confidence that it could deal with the DPRK’s nuclear issues together 
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with an improvement of inter-Korean relations (Roh 2003a; Lee 2008a; Lim 2008; 
Park 2011a; Han 2013). In order to come to power, it is natural for politicians to 
assure the public that they can solve a specific security issue, but at the same 
time, it is very important for the audience to question whether the government’s 
security discourse is justifiable or contradictory. In that respect, the fundamental 
goal of this research lies in laying the foundation for a set of criteria, whereby an 
audience can recognise to what extent the securitising actors’ discourses reflect 
reality. Against this backdrop, the main question behind this research is as follows: 
 
How did the securitising actors of the ROK (Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Lee 
Myung-bak) articulate the nuclear threat of the DPRK in the process of 
securitising moves, and why were their articulations of the discourses ultimately 
inconsistent with real challenges? 
 
The main question can be subdivided into several supplementary research 
questions as follows: 
 
[Speech acts pattern] 
1-1. To what extent and how were the DPRK nuclear-related issues described in 
each actor’s speech act pattern? 
1-2. In what context and how were the core terms ‘nuclear’ and ‘North Korea’ 
used in each actor’s articulation of relevant discourses? 
1-2a. What other relevant keywords were used in each actor’s articulation?  
1-2b. In what ways were the keywords used in each actor’s articulation? 
 
[The characteristic of securitisation] 
2-1. What were the existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary 
measures for the discourses of each actor? 
2-2. Did articulations of the threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures 
differ clearly between the actors? 
2-2a. If so, in what sense and to what extent did they differ, and to what extent 
does ST provide a good framework for understanding this? 
2-2b. If not, what factors made the actors’ articulation ambiguous and 
overlapping? 
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Among the sub-research questions, the ‘speech acts pattern’ will elucidate 
to what extent the DPRK nuclear-related issues were articulated by Presidents 
Roh and Lee, respectively. This study will also extract important keywords, which 
are relevant to the nuclear issues, by means of corpus-assisted DA, so that one 
can recognise in which way each actor used the keywords. In addition, other than 
the keywords, as ‘nuclear’ and ‘North Korea’ are among the core terms for the 
analysis, the context in which the two terms were used will be separately 
examined in detail. In this way, the general speech act pattern of each actor could 
be observed in an objective manner, and this would be utilised as a cornerstone 
towards more qualitative discussion. 
The sub-questions of the ‘characteristic of securitisation’ part will be centred 
on the analyses of the three key components—existential threats, referent 
objects and extraordinary measures—which constitute the ST framework. 
Additional corpus-assisted DA along with other supplementary methods, such as 
interviews and documentary analysis, will be used for completion of the 
discussion. As Jackson and Sørensen (2013: 224) rightly pointed out, ‘the identity 
of key decision makers is uncovered through textual sources, including archives, 
journals, newspapers, memoirs, and textbooks’. These works would reveal to 
what extent and in what sense each actor’s articulation of the three components 
were different (or similar). Moreover, it would show some fundamental factors 
that made each actor fall into a discursive dilemma, which may reflect some 
reasons why the securitising moves of the ROK were not effective enough to 
deter the nuclear threat of the DPRK. 
The research hypotheses emanate from the current discourse and the 
previous questions regarding reasons for the discursive dilemma. As was the 
case for the research questions, the structure of the thesis hypotheses also 
consists of the speech act pattern and the characteristic of the ROK securitisation. 
Given today’s practical discourse and the theoretical framework, the hypotheses 
can be deduced as follows:  
 
[A. Speech acts pattern] 
H.A-1. The progressive securitising actor will be less likely to articulate the DPRK 
nuclear issue. 
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H.A-2. The conservative securitising actor will be more likely to articulate the 
DPRK nuclear issue. 
 
[B. The characteristic of securitisation] 
H.B-1. If Presidents Roh and Lee’s articulation of existential threats, referent 
objects and extraordinary measures are clearly different, there would be few 
impediments, either based on a material or a discursive structure, to forming the 
ROK’s securitisation. 
H.B-2. If Presidents Roh and Lee’s articulation of existential threats, referent 
objects and extraordinary measures are not clearly different, there would be some 
impediments, either based on a material or a discursive structure, to forming the 
ROK’s securitisation. 
 
Hypotheses A deal with each actor’s speech acts pattern. In this case, the 
progressive securitising actor (H.A-1) means President Roh, and the 
conservative actor (H.A-2) is President Lee. According to the current discourse 
in South Korea, it is highly likely that the hypotheses would be proven right. If this 
is the case, the position of the current discourse would be strengthened. This is 
because, as mentioned, the conservatives seem to have paid a great deal of 
attention to the DPRK nuclear issue, while the progressives appeared reluctant 
to articulate that issue. In this light, an analysis of the speech act pattern would 
reveal to what extent each actor actually articulated the pertinent issue, so that a 
proper and active discussion among securitising actors and audiences could 
occur. 
Hypotheses B cover a detailed discussion of each actor’s securitising move, 
which is based upon analysis of the key components of ST. As noted, the 
concepts of an existential threat, a referent object and an extraordinary measure 
are constitutive of ST, and security discourses can be analysed with a focus on 
these concepts. What this means is that the fewer impediments to a securitising 
move there are, the more likely securitising actors are to articulate a clearer 
component of ST. That is, the articulation of the components of Presidents Roh 
and Lee differ enough to be divided into two disparate traits, it may be considered 
that each securitising actor has a different level of securitising moves (non-
politicisation, politicisation and securitisation) (H.B-1); however, if not, it is likely 
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that there may have been some impediments to forming such a distinct 
securitising move (H.B-2).9 
The obstacles, if indicated through the analysis, could either arise from 
material causes, discursive factors or a mixture of both. In this case, an audience, 
as well as policymakers, could notice that the ostensibly disparate discourses 
between the two main political blocs have actually become entangled with each 
other, and that this reflects a discursive reality whereby one-sided discourse 
cannot stand alone. A detailed discussion will show ways in which each 
securitising actor’s articulation of the ST components are convergent or divergent. 
The rest of the thesis, therefore, will focus on investigating the ROK security 
discourse to find out whether its discursive patterns substantiate or invalidate the 
above hypotheses. 
                                            9 For an explanation of the impediments, this research uses a term referred to as a ‘discursive chasm’, which is a preliminary concept. For an illustration of this, see Chapter 2. 
 
Figure 1.3 Outline of the thesis 
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The next two chapters discuss the theoretical and methodological concerns 
of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction of the historical and 
conceptual context for the thesis. It also elaborates on ways in which IR theories 
such as realism, liberalism and constructivism have been used an attempt to 
describe and solve the ROK’s protracted security dilemma or its perception of the 
Korean Nuclear Crisis. Chapter 3 suggests the necessity for a discursive 
approach in dealing with security issues along with concepts of discourse and 
security discourse upon which the theoretical proposition of the ST is predicated. 
It then specifies the necessity for a discursive approach to security studies by 
applying this to the ROK’s case. A detailed description of the methods used in 
the research is also provided in this chapter. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with empirical 
cases that include the Roh and Lee administrations. These chapters reconstruct 
each administration’s security discourse regarding the DPRK’s nuclear issue by 
applying the ST framework. Through the reconstruction process, the 
characteristics of each administration’s security discourse may be identified, as 
well as each securitising actor’s speech act pattern. From the results of the 
previous two chapters, Chapter 6 analyses the discursive similarities and 
differences of the two administrations in a more direct manner. This chapter will 
demonstrate that discursive chasms matter in terms of the construction and 
implementation of the ROK’s security discourse. The conclusion, Chapter 7, 
sums up the theoretical and analytical points of the thesis and looks at 
implications for the synthesis of discursive and material positions in security 
studies (Figure 1.3).  
 
 
18 
2.  
Theoretical Concerns: Theories Revisited 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: one is to show how this research is situated in 
the literature—literature review—in terms of IR theoretical viewpoints, and the 
other, which might also be part of the literature review, is to manifest historical 
and conceptual contexts of the thesis that provide the essential background for 
understanding the process from which the research questions have arisen. 
However, the fundamental reason for doing this is beyond such a review. By 
implementing the comprehensively retrospective work, the limit of scholarly realm 
that is oftentimes frustrated by academic myopia and pedantic arguments may 
be recognised. In addition, not to mention the failure of realism to predict the 
imminent collapse of the former Soviet Union, relatively new theories stemmed 
from postmodernism have also not provided a practical foothold upon which world 
policymakers could set up a policy direction. Meanwhile, even though IR theorists 
have exerted all their intelligential skills in order to achieve better analyses and 
projections, at least regarding the case of the Korean Nuclear Crisis, it appears 
that, in reality, much debate generated by numerous scholars seems to have 
headed for oblivion. 
Of course, not all of this is the fault of theorists. Perhaps it is because 
modern IR simply cannot be free from theorisation so long as it is concerned with 
‘social science’. Nonetheless, tracking the previous theoretical analyses and 
considering the historical background provides room for more academic 
contemplation, although it could be seen as another Sisyphean task. It may be 
better to put the historical contexts before the theoretical review in the interest of 
the logical progress of the thesis: it would be impossible to draw on IR theories 
as an analytical framework without contexts such as historical background. 
History provides theorists not only with examples to illustrate theories, but also 
with a positional spur whereby they can analyse cases from a different 
perspective (Trachtenberg 2009). The literature review in relation to the 
methodological part will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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2.1 Historical and conceptual contexts 
Ever since the end of the Cold War, South Korea’s perception of North Korea has 
been structured around the nuclear issue. Therefore, the debate on the ROK’s 
security policy has also focused on the question of whether a specific measure 
can efficiently block North Korea’s nuclear development. The nature of the North 
Korean threat could be either material or ideational. The threat could emerge from 
North Korea’s threatening capability itself or could snowball from South Korea’s 
threat perception. One cannot be sure which factors are superior in terms of their 
explanatory power. This reflects almost exactly why various theories and 
methodologies have argued for a prolonged period without agreement in relation 
to a specific IR issue. While the policymakers are vacillating about choosing a 
‘better’ solution (or theory) to solve the issue, and arguing over which would be a 
better perception of the DPRK’s intention, North Korea’s material threat itself has 
clearly increased due to the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and the deployment 
of new missile delivery systems (Wit 2015). 
There may be no need to explain the historical issues verbosely because 
many of the books and articles on the Korean nuclear issues have already dealt 
with them. For those able to read Korean, A Chronological Table of Inter-Korean 
Relations (1948–2013) published by the Korea Institute for National Unification 
(KINU 2013a) might be optimal for checking up on important facts, as it includes 
almost all major events that have taken place between North and South Korea 
as well as relevant parties, including the US, China, Russia and Japan. It also 
introduces major discourses: government statements, intergovernmental 
agreements, media reports, and so forth. The KINU’s research series entitled 
International Politics of North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and South Korea’s 
Responsive Strategy (Bae et al. 2011) and North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and 
South Korea’s Responsive Strategy (Jeong et al. 2014) provide helpful 
introductions to the ROK’s perceptions of the nuclear crisis. Lee Kang-deok, in 
his book The Truth of Nuclear North Korea (2012a) assorted the issue into 
several related matters, such as the DPRK’s nuclear capability, development of 
its missile systems, Light-Water Reactor (LWR) and the history of Six-Party Talks 
(SPT) on North Korea’s nuclear programme. Byeon Jong-heon’s book Inter-
Korean Relations and the Unification of the Korean Peninsula (Byeon 2014) 
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narrates the history with a broader time span, which tries to integrate the ROK’s 
perceptions of the nuclear issues into a unification discourse. 
The existing literature written by government officials shed light on these 
issues, inasmuch as all of them have played an integral role in the historical 
processes. Although it would be naïve to rely on what they say in their books as 
most tend to justify their actions, scholars can at least suppose what might be 
close to ‘facts’ by combining and comparing their different speeches. Despite 
some controversies over reliability of biographies and autobiographies, these are 
still important and valuable sources, particularly when it comes to the inside 
history (Burnham et al. 2008). In the light of this, former Assistant Foreign Minister 
Lee Yong-Joon’s book North Korea’s Nuclear Programme: A Rule for the New 
Game (2004) may be a primer for those who want to understand the process of 
North Korea’s nuclear issues from a diplomat’s viewpoint. His opinion seems 
quite conservative, but at the same time readers can learn, through his books, 
the focal points of the nuclear issues since the late 1980s. The books 
Peacemaker: Twenty Years of Inter-Korean Relations and the North Korean 
Nuclear Issue by Lim Dong-won (2008), former head of the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS), and Peace on the blade by Lee Jong-seok (2014b), former 
Unification Minister, might be two of the most important memoirs in terms of 
describing the history of nuclear talks with the DPRK. Both men, representing 
progressive governments, were core architects of policy on North Korea, 
therefore their opinions can also be seen as rather skewed. 
Nonetheless, the memoirs have many primary sources that could be used 
as crucial substance to interpret historical issues. In this sense, it is safe to say 
that these kinds of autobiographies are no longer a tertiary source, but instead 
may be a semi-primary source as a mixture of primary documents and the 
individual’s life. Former Deputy Prime Minister Han Wan-sang’s book The Korean 
Peninsula Hurts (Han 2013) is also helpful in order to come to grips with the origin 
of the ROK government’s complicated perception of the DPRK, as Han minutely 
delineated the cognitive structures of the Kim Young-sam administration. The 
autobiography, The President’s Time 2008–2013, written by former South Korean 
president Lee Myung-bak (2015), revealed sensitive diplomatic issues, including 
inter-Korean relations and summit diplomacy, whereby readers can infer his and 
his counterparts’ real perceptions of the DPRK. If these had not been included in 
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the book, the revealed facts would have been classified for up to thirty years after 
his retirement.10 
It is relatively rare to find literature written in English that shows the ROK’s 
perception of the North’s nuclear issue (Son 2006; Kim and Kang 2010; Kwon 
and Chung 2012; Moon 2012; Kim 2014b). The Korean Journal of Defence 
Analysis published by Korea Institute for Defence Analyses is one of the most 
important academic sources introducing changing South Korean perspectives of 
the North Korean nuclear threat (Park 2008; Park 2011b; Kim 2012; Park and 
Kim 2012; Hwang 2015; Kim 2015b). Understanding North Korea: indigenous 
perspectives is an edited book, published in English, by South Korean scholars. 
The book is comprised of chapters on North Korea’s political system, economic 
and social transformation, foreign policy, and so forth (Han and Jung 2014). 
However, the authors seem to be in favour of active engagement with North 
Korea and, therefore, irrespective of whether their arguments are right or wrong, 
it lacks a sense of academic neutrality given the various perspectives on North 
Korea in South Korean society. 
Although many efforts have been made to analyse the level of the DPRK’s 
threat and its real intention, and to form an appropriate strategy for preventing 
North Korea from becoming a nuclear state, many of those efforts were basically 
predicated upon the US’s perspective (Sigal 1999; Snyder 1999; Cha and Kang 
2003; Harrison 2003; Carpenter and Bandow 2004; Cumings 2004; Wit et al. 
2004; Cha 2012). There is some doubt as to whether these books reflected 
Seoul’s dilemmatic position in a serious manner, acknowledging a fundamental 
discursive dilemma between the very existence of the DPRK regime as an illegal 
political entity and the existence of North Korea as an object of peaceful 
unification. 
However, these sources are still important for an understanding of how the 
Korean Nuclear Crisis has developed and, more importantly, for portraying the 
broader context within which the complicated security discourses of the ROK’s 
policymakers were produced. The US perspective, the DPRK-US or the ROK-US 
relations themselves indicate that South Korea’s perception of North Korea is 
inextricably linked to the international system that lays the foundation for 
                                            10 Lee’s memoir engendered controversy. According to South Korean Yonhap News, several civic activists accused Lee ‘of violating the law on the management of presidential records’ and leaking official secrets through the publication of his memoir (Kim 2015c).  
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theoretical analysis of the issue. The international system, whose explanatory 
power permeates IR theories, even to several poststructuralists, including ST 
theorists, underlies numerous theoretical concepts, such as alliance, deterrence, 
bandwagoning, free rider, intersubjectivity, and so on. The point here is that a 
wide-ranging understanding of relations between theories and practical issues is 
needed to fathom why the ROK’s perceptions of the DPRK’s nuclear programme 
appear to be intricate. Indeed, much of this literature can be categorised either 
into different IR theories or theoretical eclecticism. As this literature will be 
reviewed later in this and following chapters, let us return to the historical issues 
in terms of the ROK perceptions of the DPRK and its nuclear programme. 
 
2.1.1 A brief history 
At least in terms of South Korea’s security perception, ‘the end of history’, 
expounded in Francis Fukuyama’s declaration, turned out to be a phantasm in 
the early 1990s. For South Korea, ‘the end of history’ merely meant the start of a 
nuclear nightmare and the start of a war of statements against one of the most 
peculiar communist countries in the world. Indeed, the end of the Cold War and 
subsequent events—the establishment of diplomatic ties between the ROK and 
the Soviet Union (September 1990), the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a 
patron of the North Korean regime (December 1991), the appearance of the 
Yeltsin era, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and China 
(August 1992)—seemed to make Pyongyang more obstinate towards its nuclear 
ambitions. According to Don Oberdorfer (1998), in April 1982, an American 
surveillance satellite photographed a suspect object that appeared to be a 
nuclear reactor vessel at Yongbyon, sixty miles north of Pyongyang. However, 
suspicions that the North Korean regime has a clandestine nuclear programme 
began in earnest in 1989 (Bluth 2011a; Kang 2011). 
This is important for understanding the DPRK’s nuclear ambition, as that 
year numerous and tumultuous democratic upheavals exploded across the 
Eastern European states, and the East German regime started to falter in the 
wake of the removal of Hungary’s border fence, which ultimately led to German 
reunification the following year. Accordingly, North Korea was under mounting 
pressure from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Regardless of whether North 
Korea’s nuclear ambition was real, its movement toward developing a nuclear 
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programme was reinforced throughout this period. More to the point, North Korea 
tried to solve its energy supply shortage and security concerns at the same time 
by building reactors. Meanwhile, both the US and ROK governments were 
confronted with a critical security threat, as intelligence reports indicated that 
North Korea has a reprocessing facility in Yongbyon where it could separate 
weapons-grade plutonium from fuel. 
At the same time, however, South Korean political leaders saw the peaceful 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe as a new opportunity to realise 
unification on the Korean peninsula. In terms of Seoul’s perceptions of 
Pyongyang, that both conservatives and progressives in South Korea 
acknowledge the significance of ethnic nationalism (danil minjok) is worthy of 
notice. For example, while Presidents Rhee Syngman (1948–1960) and Park 
Chung-hee (1961–1979) ‘used ethnic nationalism as the rhetorical basis of’ their 
anti-communist ideology (Shin 2006: 101), President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993) 
used the same concept to bring about a rapprochement with North Korea by 
claiming that ‘only when the torch of nationalism is alive can Koreans achieve 
national unification’ (Shin 2006: 186). President Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) 
also stressed the importance of ethnic nationalism, as he declared in his 
inauguration that ‘neither allies nor ideology can surpass the bonds of ethnicity’ 
(Koh 2001). For President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003), it was also nationalism 
that motivated him to pursue unification (Jeon 2007). 
South Korea’s confusion over securitising moves towards the North Korean 
nuclear threat became conspicuous in the Kim Young-sam administration during 
which the first Korean nuclear crisis occurred. In terms of North Korea policy, 
from the very beginning, the Kim Young-sam administration held a conciliatory 
approach to elicit North Korea’s positive response and they also encouraged the 
US to intervene in the nuclear issue. Unfortunately, Kim’s ambition of being a 
precursor to the unified Korea came to nothing less than a fortnight after his 
inauguration, when Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 March 1993 (Lee 2004; Lim 2008; Bluth 2011a). 
To make matters worse, when Kim Young-sam repatriated Lee In-mo, 11  an 
                                            11 Lee In-mo was ‘a North Korean spy dispatched during the early days of the Korean War (1950–53) and became a partisan when he missed the chance to go back before the cease-fire agreement was signed. […] When the government in Seoul released spies and partisans in exchange for letters rejecting communist ideology and pledges to become loyal South Korean citizens, Lee and 62 other communists refused and opted to remain in prison’ (WorldTribune 2005). 
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unconverted long-term political prisoner, to North Korea as a conciliatory gesture, 
Pyongyang used this only to strengthen its political propaganda. Kim Young-sam 
felt a deep sense of betrayal. Shortly after the North’s declaration of its withdrawal 
from the NPT and the Lee In-mo event, Kim Young-sam turned hard-line on 
Pyongyang, adding that he could never shake hands with someone holding 
nuclear weapons (Kim 1993). In addition, Kim Young-sam’s perspective on 
negotiations between the US and the DPRK also changed rapidly from supportive 
to spoiling tactics, as seen from the Geneva Agreed Framework (AF) case that 
the Kim Young-sam administration tried to thwart (Wit et al. 2004; Han 2013). At 
that time, even several American diplomats complained that ‘it was harder to talk 
to the South Koreans than it was the Northerners’ (Seong 2008). 
Since the Kim Dae-jung administration, a fierce rivalry for discourses on the 
superior North Korea policy has deepened between conservative and 
progressive groups. Moon (2012: 18) explained that Kim Dae-jung ‘was a liberal 
in that he strongly believed that the international system is not anarchical’, and 
naturally, ‘harmony and co-operation becomes all the more possible when the 
identity of the counterpart is recognised and respected’. This is the philosophical 
foundation of his Sunshine Policy.12 The engagement policy was possible in part 
because he thought that South Korea was superior to the North in terms of its 
defence ability, including its alliance with the US, economic strength, ideology of 
democracy and so forth. Lim Dong-won (2008), a key architect of the Sunshine 
Policy, stressed that the engagement policy is not an appeasement one; if 
anything, it is an offensive one that could only be used by the strong. Moon (2012: 
26) also said that ‘the most prominent component of the Sunshine Policy was 
strategic offensive’. 
This might come from the increasing confidence of South Korea as a 
regional power in the world. As noted by Shim and Flamm (2013: 402–403), 
‘South Korea is increasingly able to manoeuvre between its supposedly more 
powerful neighbours and thus is capable of influencing regional affairs according 
to its own interests and preferences’. The Sunshine Policy reflected this 
perception. The Sunshine Policy was expanded by President Roh Moo-hyun and 
                                            12  The Kim Dae-jung administration’s Sunshine Policy was officially named the ‘Policy of Reconciliation and Co-operation’. President Kim Dae-jung was known to be possessive of the term Sunshine Policy, and he used this term in public in September 1994 for the first time while he was addressing the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C. (Shin 2003). 
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his government. Both the Kim Dae-jung and Roh administrations tried to advance 
the liberalism or functionalism that develops different levels of cooperation 
between the two Koreas particularly in regard to less sensitive sectors such as 
economic, social and cultural exchange. Gradually, step by step and year by year, 
they wanted to alter the DPRK’s traditionally rigid attitudes toward the outside 
world. They believed that the improved material interdependence (e.g. economic 
co-operation) could ultimately bring about collaboration in political and military 
sectors. 
The Lee Myung-bak administration’s North Korea policy began with its 
perception that the two former administrations’ policies toward the DPRK had 
failed. Again, North Korea’s nuclear issue dominated almost all the security 
matters for the Lee administration. They argued that the two former 
administrations ‘ultimately failed to bring about a shift in the North’s attitude’ (Park 
2011b: 322). The Lee administration pursued a principle of reciprocity or a policy 
of strictly conditional engagement, and disparaged the previous two 
administrations as naïve and a dangerous unconditional engagement (Gelézeau 
et al. 2013). The Lee administration’s policy on North Korea, however, could 
neither modify the North’s regime nor deter its provocations. During Lee’s term, 
North Korea carried out two nuclear tests (in May 2009 and February 2013), three 
ballistic missile tests (in April 2009, April 2012 and December 2012), and two 
unparalleled military attacks (the Cheonan sinking and shelling of Yeonpyeong).13 
Cheon Seongwhun (2008: 49) argument that the Lee administration’s ‘firm 
measures undoubtedly will deter the North Korean regime’s risky adventurism’ 
has proved to be wrong, and it became clear that coercive diplomacy itself could 
not provide a solution. 
The Park Geun-hye administration (2013–2017) began with a seemingly 
less coercive policy towards the DPRK, titled trustpolitik, in order to break the 
stalemate and to head off further armed conflicts in the peninsula.14 On the one 
hand, the concept trustpolitik was linked to IR realism in that it underlined the fact 
that North Korea had to pay a heavy price for its military and nuclear threats, but 
                                            13 North Korea sank a South Korean corvette, Cheonan, which led to 47 people being killed in March 2010; two South Korean soldiers were killed and 13 others injured after North Korea fired dozens of artillery attacks on the South Korean Yeonpyeong Island in November of the same year. It was the North’s first artillery attack on the South’s territory since the 1950–1953 Korean War. 14 President Park, South Korea’s first female president, was removed from office in 2017 after the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment motion passed in parliament. 
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on the other, Park argued that ‘even as Seoul and its allies strengthen their 
posture against North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, they must also be prepared 
to offer Pyongyang a new beginning’ (Park 2011a: 13–18). However, Park did not 
suggest a concrete measure regarding how Seoul could offer Pyongyang ‘a new 
beginning’ while Pyongyang continued to develop its nuclear capabilities. After 
all, her trustpolitik became the strongest ever coercive measure as Pyongyang 
carried out its fourth and fifth nuclear tests (Park 2011a; Song 2016). 
The political and historical context shown above implies three points that 
need to be considered before analysing the speech acts of Presidents Roh Moo-
hyun and Lee Myung-bak, beginning with the powerful role of the South Korean 
presidents. Ever since the Rhee Syngman administration, South Korea’s security 
discourse has revolved around the speech acts of the presidents. The potent and 
influential power of the presidential speech emanates from the so-called ‘imperial 
presidency’ in South Korea.15 The imperial presidency allowed South Korean 
presidents not only to predominate the foreign policy making process but also to 
rule ‘over the bureaucracy, the National Assembly, and civil society’ (Jaung 2010: 
63). The second point to be considered is the role of ethnic nationalism. As 
aforementioned, regardless of political or ideological preferences, all South 
Korean presidents were, in a sense, in favour of ethnic nationalism. The principles 
of hongik ingan, the unofficial national ideology of Korea, has reminded South 
Korean political leaders of the single bloodline and the same fate between the 
two Koreas.16 The third point relates to the role of divisive political ideologies. The 
election of Kim Dae-jung reignited the division between conservatism and 
progressivism in terms of North Korea policy, as the Kim Dae-jung administration 
meant the return of progressive government in South Korea after a long thirty-
seven-year-period of conservative rule.17 This meant that both Presidents Roh 
Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak could not help being caught in a vortex of 
ideological conflict in dealing with North Korean-related issues. 
                                            15 In the case of Park Geun-Hye’s impeachment, South Korea’s Constitutional Court pointed out that the ROK’s Constitutional system could be deemed an imperial presidency as it allowed every president unbridled authority. 16 Hongik ingan literally means devotion to the welfare of humankind. It is regarded as the traditional political ideology initiated by Dan-gun, the legendary founder of the first ever Korean kingdom Gojoseon (2333 – 108 BC). 17 It would be fair to say that South Korean security discourse had been controlled by conservative governments before the election of Kim Dae-jung, in that the first progressive government, taken by the Minjoo (Democratic) Party, lasted less than one year (15 June 1960 – 16 May 1961). 
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In essence, regarding North Korea policy, a strain on relations between 
conservatives and progressives continued. However, even though there is a 
political or ideological predilection in terms of seeing North Korea (Shin 2006; Kim 
2012), can we say that the conservatives securitised the DPRK’s nuclear threat 
and the progressives did the opposite? Would it be correct to believe that one 
can evaluate the political leaders’ security policy based on such political 
ideologies? It is interesting that even the scholars belonging to the mainstream 
of each political bloc in South Korea seem to have accepted this kind of division 
(Kim and Lee 2011). This view seems to be linked to another dichotomy between 
IR realism and liberalism/constructivism in terms of applying theories to the 
practical policy of the ROK, meaning that the conservative government applied 
realism while the progressives preferred the latter. This thesis, however, basically 
challenges these propositions. The next sections deal with this issue in detail. 
 
2.1.2 Theoretical intricacies: origin, process and solution 
The Korean Nuclear Crisis has different origins in terms of the theoretical view, 
and the different theoretical perspectives constitute the whole process of the 
crisis. Anticipation of a latent possibility of the DPRK’s reform and openness as 
well as its denuclearisation is differently predicted by each theory. The theoretical 
intricacies of this problem can be categorised into three parts: origin, process, 
and solution. 
First, as earlier elaborated, the DPRK’s nuclear adventure is virtually an 
outgrowth of the demise of the Communist bloc along with the liberalisation of 
Eastern Europe in 1989, during which time no one could deny the influence of 
the ‘Gorbachev Doctrine’ comprised of glasnost (openness), perestroika 
(restructuring), and Gorbachev’s ‘constructivist’ thinking, which rejected the 
conventional and traditional traits of nuclear weapons (Schmidt 2012; Agius 
2016). This Copernican change caused by ideational revolution in modern 
international relations ironically triggered an intractable and material ‘realist’ 
structure on the Korean peninsula, in which the DPRK and the US formed an 
asymmetric confrontation, which may, in turn, represent strategic studies that 
essentially focus on military dynamics. North Korea’s nuclear strategy seems to 
tie in closely with what Brad Roberts (2000: 4) defined as asymmetric strategies:  
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[…] the means by which the militarily weaker state tries to bring whatever advantages it has to bear on the critical weak points of the stronger party. Those advantages are seen to include a propensity to run high risks, a reputation for ruthlessness, and a willingness to utilise massively destructive weapons to realise local gains. 
In short, while realism pulled back after the collapse of bipolarity from the global 
perspective, at least during the first decade following the end of the Cold War, it 
remained strong at a regional level, especially on the Korean peninsula and its 
surrounding region. 
Second, the rise of China and the relative decline of the US have become a 
crucial point in the process of development of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons 
programme. In other words, the negotiation matrix of the DPRK’s 
denuclearisation has become complicated as China continues to increase its 
influence on the process of the issue. This may be viewed as another facet of 
realism that considers polarity, balance of power, power transition and so forth. 
Indeed, the rise of China and its increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific region 
has been a case study among many IR scholars (Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 
2005; Chung 2007; Ikenberry 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Brooks and Wohlforth 
2016). Simultaneously, however, a latent bipolar system between the US and 
China, which connotes a revival of realism, might be altered when the US and 
the ROK’s constructivist effort to persuade China is effective. According to 
Richard N. Haass (2014), former Director of Policy Planning for the US 
Department of State, ‘the priority must be to persuade China that the demise of 
North Korea need not be something to fear’. 
This could be possible only when the Chinese government changes its 
current perceptions. Unlike Washington and Seoul, it has been acknowledged 
that Beijing does not want a sudden collapse of the DPRK that might lead to 
conflicts between the US, South Korean and Chinese forces. China wants neither 
a large influx of North Korean refugees nor an advance of US troops, now based 
in South Korea, on its doorstep. Although China reprimanded North Korea for its 
nuclear weapons, it cannot pressurise North Korea to denuclearise as harshly as 
do South Korea and the US for the aforementioned reasons, and, more to the 
point, because of the necessity for a constant economic development, 
unthwarted by an unstable situation, including the DPRK’s collapse and its 
concomitant problems (Yu et al. 2016). In any case, China’s perception of the 
DPRK, regardless of whether it is a strategic asset or liability, would be a critical 
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variable in terms of working out the puzzle of the DPRK’s nuclear issue (Moore 
2008; Kim 2010; Fitzpatrick 2013; Plant and Rhode 2013; Taylor 2013a). Here, 
as before, realists’ and constructivists’ core concepts, such as balance of power 
and configuration of state identity (or national interests) coexist as competing 
frameworks, as each struggles to produce a better analytical template for 
explaining why the North Korean nuclear issue is complex. 
Third, given the complicated structures of the origin and process of the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue, a key to solving or analysing this issue must be based on 
a comprehensive understanding. The division of the Korean peninsula is an 
outgrowth of the power politics that visibly occurred after the end of World War II. 
As Cumings (2007) pointed out, the US is not free from responsibility for the 
division of Korea, and neither is the former Soviet Union. That is, the ideological 
conflicts between the superpowers have been projected onto the politics at each 
side of the peninsula. Each Korea actively chose a bandwagoning strategy for its 
security and profit (Schweller 1994), thus the political elites consolidate their 
positions in each part of the peninsula while demonising each other as communist 
and imperialist. In this process, ideological conflicts and negative projection on 
the other has been institutionalised, which might be interpreted as a formation of 
a state identity of constructivism (Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996; Checkel 1998; 
Wendt 1999). 
Having outlined the theoretical intricacies of this issue, the discussion can 
be abridged as follows: first, the origin of ideological antagonism on the peninsula 
began with the power politics that represent realism, and the antagonistic 
perceptions of each other that connote constructivism was consolidated during 
the Cold War period. Second, in the post-Cold War period, the rise of China 
formed another kind of realist power politics that has influenced the process of 
negotiations regarding the DPRK’s denuclearisation. Meanwhile, by persuading 
Chinese policymakers, South Korea and the US have tried to alter China’s 
security interests on the peninsula, which implies constructivism. Third, the end 
of the Cold War, which suggested that many constructivist perspectives could not 
prevent the two Koreas from perpetuating each state’s ideological identity, during 
which the North has developed its realistic and constructivist options—nuclear 
weapons and Seon-gun (military-first) ideology—while the South has been 
struggling with the creation of new perceptions of the North and with making 
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‘better’ security policy, whereby it effectively denuclearises North Korea. Indeed, 
a comprehensive theoretical understanding that contemplates the intricate origin 
and process is needed, so that a more viable and applicable solution can be 
found. 
From the above discussion, some interim conclusions about the ROK’s 
perception of the Korean Nuclear Crisis can be made as follows:  
(1) the ROK’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons cannot be separated 
from its perception of the DPRK as an illegal state or a state that should be 
peacefully unified at least under the ROK’s control. In other words, as history 
has demonstrated, it is virtually impossible for the ROK securitising actors to 
think about the DPRK nuclear issues separately from the way in which they 
have perceived the DPRK as a whole;  
(2) the ROK’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons cannot be free from 
the influence of power politics between superpowers; in this case, the US and 
China constitute the power politics. To put it differently, the ROK’s perception 
of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons cannot help but be significantly influenced by 
the international system. Within the system, however, the ROK policymakers 
have tried to create new constructivist thinking related to a solution for the 
nuclear issue on a regional scale;  
(3) the ROK’s perception of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, therefore, might 
become stuck in a discursively dilemmatic situation. Regardless of whether it 
is the conservative or progressive governments, it can be reasoned that the 
securitising actors themselves are outgrowths of such security environments. 
In this situation, perhaps the actors became aware that they had become 
trapped in such a situation in which they could not clearly perform policies 
according to their articulations on their own initiatives. 
 
When analysing the ROK’s securitisation, a broad understanding of the 
theoretical intricacies and discursively dilemmatic situations is first required, so 
that the three key elements of ST—existential threat, referent objects and 
extraordinary measures—can be disclosed in a clear manner. In order to 
delineate the phenomenon that imposed such situations on the ROK’s actors, this 
study suggests a preliminary concept of a discursive chasm. A discursive chasm 
refers to a discursive structure that fundamentally impedes the performance of 
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actors’ security discourse, and that distorts or paralyses discursive formation 
(here, a securitising move). When the securitising actors fall into the chasms, it 
is virtually impossible to break free of the dilemmatic situation insofar as the 
current discursive or material structure in which the ROK is stuck does not change. 
The discursive chasms will be explicated in a more concrete fashion as the Roh 
Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations’ security discourses are analysed. 
More importantly, the concept would play an important role in verifying the 
suggested hypotheses of the thesis. The following section includes a more 
detailed and comprehensive analysis of the theoretical contexts. 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical contexts: IR trend and the Korean peninsula 
Is theory a causal explanation? Stephen Walt (2005: 26) observed that a theory 
‘defines recurring relations between two or more phenomena and explains why 
that relationship obtains’. According to this logic, theories should provide a causal 
story (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013). This American account of theory is good in 
that it uses scientific realism (in this case, realism means methodological realism 
that differs from IR realism) as an epistemological foundation. This kind of 
approach extols an accurate reflection of reality. Then, has IR mainstream prism 
(neorealism/neoliberalism), which has an American theoretical tradition, given a 
plausible and conceivable explanation that can identify a recurring relationship 
between the two Koreas? The answer probably varies according to perspectives. 
However, at least when it comes to South Korea’s North Korea policies, 
neither realism nor liberalism can explain the ROK’s complicated perceptions of 
the DPRK. For example, realism cannot elucidate the DJ and Roh Moo-hyun 
administrations’ perceptions—amenable to compromise with the DPRK—
regarding what had happened during the nuclear crisis. Conversely, neo-
liberalistic characteristics (Lamy 2008), which are comprised of complex 
interdependence—a role of non-state actors, no distinction between low and high 
politics and the decline of the efficacy of military force as a tool of statecraft—
seem to be at odds with the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administration’s 
perception of the DPRK, which clearly distinguished between low and high politics 
while failing to emphasise the role of non-state actors insofar as it is concerned 
with inter-Korean relations. In short, neither theory can consistently explain the 
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ROK’s perceptions throughout the period during which North Korea developed its 
nuclear weapons. 
Although each mainstream theory has an explanatory power that can 
generalise several phenomena recurring around the world, if it is unable to tell a 
coherent and neat story about a specific region, particularly in a region where 
change in the security environment has had a significant impact, at least on the 
regional system, the theory can no longer be considered a theory in a stringent 
sense. Instead, the theories have actually been selectively used to forge each 
theoretical bloc’s foundation. In that regard, this research agrees with the 
statement that ‘IR theorists will generalise in ways not accepted by the area 
specialist, while area specialist claim that the uniqueness of their region prevents 
the application of any general theory’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 83). In addition, 
this research reasons that the European account of a theory may be more 
suitable for the nature of the theme of this thesis: ‘anything that organises a field 
systematically, structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set 
of interrelated concepts and categories’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 84). 
Of course, theories must be based on facts or evidence, and they need to 
have the power to explicate how facts are linked to one another. It would be 
preferable if a theory could put forward a reliable solution for ongoing conflicts. In 
epistemological terms, a natural science—positivism—may be the archetype of 
this kind of approach. Within the realm of social research strategies, empirical 
realists argue that ‘through the use of appropriate methods, reality can be 
understood’, whereas critical realists point out that the discourses of the social 
world cannot be ‘spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events’ 
(Bryman 2016: 25). Either way, for methodological realists, ‘there is a reality that 
is separate from our descriptions of it’ (Bryman 2016: 25). One can infer from this 
perception that positivists regard a reality as something that is value free and can 
be tested. 
In that respect, this research distances itself from positivism; instead it 
adopts interpretivism, which is ‘a term given to an epistemology that contrasts 
with positivism’ (Bryman 2016: 26). This study is therefore in a sense critical of 
the scientific model and holds on to the idea that the social world requires a 
different logic, such as a process of narrative adjustment and constitutive 
relationship (Hansen 2006: xvi). In other words, a reality is not something that is 
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over there, but it is constantly constituted and interpreted. The events and 
discourses of the Korean peninsula need to be examined in this regard. 
Methodological concepts regarding the case of this study will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula has been at the 
crossroads from a theoretical perspective. This is because the structure of the 
Cold War remains unresolved on the peninsula although most other regions have 
had transformative experiences—peaceful reunification, marketisation, 
globalisation and regional integration, such as the European Union (EU), 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc.—throughout the post-
Cold War period. The peninsula, as the last vestige of the Cold War, is still divided 
into two disparate ideologies, and this makes the ROK policymakers confused as 
to what extent they can break down the Cold War mentality towards North Korea. 
In a similar vein, the following comments still seem valid: ‘what dominated the 
debate on North Korea was a plethora of short editorials, opinion pieces, and two-
page “think-tank” policy briefs that lacked depth, were politically- or ideologically-
motivated’ (Cha and Kang 2003: 8). North Korea policy has been based on 
political or ideological preference, not on in-depth considerations that encompass 
the entire theoretical viewpoints. Scholars and experts on North Korea also do 
not seem to be free from such ideological predilection. 
What appears to be more problematic here is that a dearth of reliable 
analyses on North Korea has eventually misled analysis of the ROK’s perceptions 
of the DPRK, not to mention the studies on North Korea itself. This matters 
because there could not be a proper North Korea policy without a proper analysis 
of the ROK’s security perception of the DPRK. It is unfortunate that in this process 
IR theories were not that helpful for analysing the ROK’s complicated perceptions 
of the DPRK and its nuclear weapons, as they have not succeeded in creating a 
simple and powerful theoretical framework that can diagnose policy problems and 
make policy decisions with a view to revolutionising our thinking (Mearsheimer 
and Walt 2013). As Leon V. Sigal (1999) pointed out, although statesman cannot 
simplify reality because they have to have their eyes on practical issues and 
subsequent repercussions, many of which unpredictably occur, such as the death 
of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 and the purge of Jang Song-taek in December 
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2013, 18  at least scholars can afford to do so since they need to show 
policymakers and related audiences a deep understanding of aspects of the 
phenomena. 
When those contingencies happen, as seen in the cases of Kim Jong-il and 
Jang Song-taek, scholars need to ‘provide not only factual knowledge, but also 
the capacity to think and hence be self-reflexive and adaptive when facing new 
decision situations’ (Guzzini 2013: 538). Broadly speaking, there are at least two 
issues that need to be pointed out regarding the role of IR theories in the Korean 
peninsula. Firstly, up until now, theories seem to have been manipulated and 
abused by each political bloc’s preference as a way of reinforcing their discursive 
basis. Secondly, the original characters of each theory have disclosed quite 
contradictory traits when it comes to the connection between policy and theory. 
The following section will discuss this matter. 
 
2.2.1 Realism: a self-contradiction? 
The protracted theoretical dichotomy between realists and idealists (or any 
equivalents) has affected scholars that have tried to come to grips with the DPRK 
issue. This might have led to the binary simplification between ‘hawks’ and 
‘doves’, which lies in the discourse of world diplomacy, not in the field of science. 
One might see at this point some chronic problems regarding a relationship 
between theory and practical issues. As Guzzini (2013: 530) put it, with regard to 
the study on the ROK’s security perceptions of the DPRK, the problems of ‘the 
confusion between practical and scientific knowledge’ and ‘the reduction of 
scientific knowledge to a narrow version of empirical theory’ have been right. That 
is, the division of hawks=realism and doves=liberalism (or constructivism) seems 
to have been routinised in South Korea’s security discourse. In this process, each 
theory was widely used to strengthen the current political division between 
conservatives and progressives, instead of being used to identify a more 
plausible solution to the protracted security issues. 
In general, it is natural to think that realism has permeated the Korean 
peninsula more than any other theory. In fact, there was no room for other 
                                            18 After the death of Kim Jong-il, Jang Song-taek was considered the number two man in the DPRK. Jang was Kim Jong-un’s uncle; he was married to Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s only sister. Jang was executed on suspicion of counter-revolutionary acts. He had long been known to be in favour of economic reform in North Korea. Kim Jong-un later described him as ‘factionalist filth’. 
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theories, such as idealism, (neo-) liberalism and functionalism, to take their 
places amongst the ‘realistic’ theories derived from realism. During the Cold War 
period, as a security free-rider, South Korea exhaustively bandwagoned with the 
US and underwent experiences of realism as a comprehensive version of 
empirical theory, which includes balancing, bandwagoning, containment, 
deterrence, and so forth (Carpenter and Bandow 2004). It is also an unequivocal 
fact that the US chose a containment policy throughout the Cold War era for 
dealing with the DPRK, which relied heavily on realist thoughts, including defence, 
sanctions, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation (Oh and Hassig 2004). 
Against the backdrop of this context, it seems that IR scholars focusing on 
inter-Korean relations have instinctively linked realism with containment or any 
relevant concepts that stand on an antipodal point of engagement that represents 
liberalism or equivalent theories, which has led policymakers to think that any 
kind of engagement could be a policy of appeasement. What is more problematic 
is that they see realism as a problem-solving theory, with which North Korea can 
either collapse or buckle under pressure from the US and the ROK, which has 
proved to be wrong for over two decades since the outbreak of the first Korean 
Nuclear Crisis. Accordingly, realism has unwittingly turned into a very egocentric 
and stubborn theoretical perspective in this process. 
Park and Kim (2012) stressed the importance of South Korean military 
preparedness against the North’s nuclear threat, such as developing deterrence 
and offensive options: consulting closely with the US forces in South Korea, 
deploying precision-guided attacks and eliminating the North Korean nuclear 
weapons. According to them, more effective deterrence options, including threats 
to eliminate the DPRK’s regime are needed. Park C.K. (2010: 499) observed that 
North Korea’s nuclear threat is not only interpreted as a deterrence, but also ‘as 
a military leverage to threaten the very existence of South Korea’. Therefore, in 
response to the DPRK’s nuclear threat, South Korea must prepare a new defence 
posture, including ‘extended deterrence by preventive or pre-emptive capability’. 
Shin (2003) applied the neorealists’ core assumption to the Korean peninsula. He 
opined that the relationship between the two Koreas is still obliged to resort to 
cheating and the relative gains of the other. In this context, he argued that South 
Korea’s support for North Korea could result in their invasion of the ROK. 
 
 
36 
Sohn (2012) called North Korea’s nuclear policy a ‘proliferation consistency’, 
since the DPRK’s pursuit of nuclear armament has continued to be strengthened. 
Confronting the threat, South Korea ‘must arm itself with self-reliant defence 
capabilities that can assure the destruction of the North Korean regime should it 
provoke war’ (Kang 2011: 135–136). Terry (2013) argued that acquisition of 
international status as a bona fide nuclear weapons state had been one of the 
most consistent strategic goals of the DPRK. According to her, not rewarding 
North Korea’s destabilising behaviour—zero tolerance policy—must be prioritised 
to break the cycle of provocation. She admitted the need for dialogue with North 
Korea, but argued that it should be tactical in order to achieve ‘intelligence 
gathering, delivering warnings, conveying positions and exploring differences’ 
(Terry 2013: 84). For her, the current stalemate on the peninsula could be 
changed only if a fundamentally different leadership were to emerge in North 
Korea. The end game of the Korean nuclear crisis ought to be with the demise of 
the DPRK. As one might detect from the above literature, the very concepts of 
realism, such as sovereign-supreme authority and the existence of sovereignty, 
are at the centre of the discussion (Schmidt 2012). All placed the ROK’s 
sovereignty and existence as top priority before anything else, therefore, there 
must be an end game and it should be either the demise of the DPRK or at least 
the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the DPRK’s 
nuclear programme. 
Conservatives have upheld two practical contradictions. Firstly, their 
perceptions vacillate between North Korea’s rationality and irrationality. Many 
tend to argue that North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons, but, 
at the same time, they strongly contend that North Korea must denuclearise. For 
example, the North Korean leaders have often been dubbed as ‘absurd’ or 
‘irrational’ by many of South Korea’s North Korean watchers (Park 2009; FPA 
2016). Park H.R. (2008: 353) was dismissive of the engagement policy and 
believed that ‘North Korean policymakers are not as rational as most people 
assume’. According to him, belief that North Korean counterparts are rational led 
to failure of the South’s policymakers, and this notion can be referred to as a ‘self-
entrapment of rationality in dealing with North Korea’. 
However, this kind of distinction is misleading, because North Korea has 
been developing the nuclear programme in order to guarantee continuation of its 
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own regime and this is mainly because of its rationality based on a cost-benefit 
analysis. From the realist’s point of view, Pyongyang’s behaviour can be 
interpreted as a sign of very rational behaviour.19 This is why many realists 
predicted that the DPRK determined to go nuclear even before its first nuclear 
test in 2006 (Sagan and Waltz 1995; Oh and Hassig 2004). In that respect, 
realism, at least in the case of the ROK’s security discourse, has been a 
categorical proposition rather than being a scientific epistemology. 
Even though the awareness of a security reality is correct, conservatives 
seem to be naïve in terms of creating a realistic solution for the DPRK’s 
denuclearisation. Policies led by realist thoughts have not shown a process by 
which they can make North Korea state actors think that the cost of developing 
weapons is quite high compared with their obvious benefits (Yoon 2014). 
Conversely, conservatives have been making the DPRK regime think that the 
cost of developing nuclear weapons is the most efficient and the cheapest way 
to guarantee its own sovereign-supreme authority. For North Korea, if they ‘really’ 
are realists, nuclear deterrence is not only inexorable, but also desirable.  
Rationality appears to be a problem per se. Mercer (2010: 3–5) observed 
that ‘rational decision making depends on emotion. […] A belief that another’s 
threat or promise is credible depends on one’s selection (and interpretation) of 
evidence and one’s assessment of risk, both of which rely on emotion’. Quoting 
a neuroscientist, he said, ‘the mechanisms of emotion and cognition appear to be 
intertwined at all stages of stimulus processing and their distinction can be 
difficult’. That is to say, one cannot be sure that IR scholars can apply the term 
rationality to decision-makers in the same manner as it has been applied to 
natural science or even sometimes to economics, because there could be several 
emotional or other similar factors in the process of making policy decisions. 
Secondly, conservatives’ perceptions of nuclear issues seem to have 
vacillated between realism and constructivism. It is well-known that realism sees 
state identities as fixed, whereas constructivists or any derivative theories prefer 
the flexible state identity (Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996; Adler 1997; Checkel 
1998; Hopf 1998; Wendt 1999; Copeland 2000; Checkel 2008; Elman 2008; Cho 
2009; Cho 2012; Flockhart 2012; Jackson and Sørensen 2013). Most 
                                            19  Interviews with high-ranking South Korean government officials in charge of inter-Korean relations (March 2014–August 2014). 
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conservatives argued that North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons, 
based upon the logic of IR realism such as egoism and power-centrism. At the 
same time, however, conservatives often use constructivist thoughts in solving 
the DPRK issue. That is, they seem to believe in the possibility that Chinese 
security interests on the Korean peninsula can be altered by way of persuasion. 
The point then needs to be focused on China’s self-interest. Would Beijing 
impose crippling sanctions on Pyongyang for denuclearisation? According to the 
logic of realism, even if China does so, it would do that because they change a 
calculation of the offence-defence balance, not because they are inclined to being 
susceptible to persuasion. 
This issue arises from the structural problem, which is the quintessence of 
structural realism, meaning the international system. As mentioned, the rise of 
China has been gradually transforming the American-led unipolar system in East 
Asia and the role of China has become one of the main variables that can impact 
the DPRK’s denuclearisation. Both the ROK and the US are desperately in need 
of the Chinese government’s help given Beijing’s influence on Pyongyang. A 
contradictory point arises: why have conservatives (scholars or policymakers), in 
general, not tolerated the engagement policies—compromises or agreements—
of the progressive governments with the DPRK, which aims to alter the DPRK’s 
behaviour by persuasion, while thinking that they can ‘persuade’ China? Can they 
ever believe the power of identity shift over the structure? 
Some conservatives might say that what is meant by persuasion and a 
subsequent change of a state’s security identity in this case is not the same as 
that of the constructivist’s concept, arguing that this is part of a strategic 
endeavour. However, given that (neo-)realists have regarded the rise of China as 
a structural change, a latent change of the Chinese security identity in North 
Korea (or on the whole peninsula) should be seen as a dramatic one that can 
transform the strategic stability in the region. The ROK’s strategic dilemma also 
emerges at this point. As long as Pyongyang insists that the nuclear issue on the 
Korean peninsula is a matter involving DPRK-US relations, Seoul’s scope for 
strategic activity is limited. In this case, South Korea must cooperate closely with 
the US to avoid becoming isolated in the processes of negotiations. 
This is a structural problem occurring since the mid-1990s. To reiterate, this 
situation became more complicated when China actively joined the structure, 
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since this implied that the DPRK’s nuclear issue became a matter involving US-
China relations. It shows exactly why persuading China is facing a problem of 
‘structural shift’. If anarchy and the international system are deterministic, as 
realism demonstrates, what conservatives have argued is a contradiction of what 
realism says. The concept of realist constructivism came out of this backcloth, 
and this will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
 
2.2.2 Liberalism and Constructivism: more realistic than Realism? 
Other theories have warred with realism over the Korean Nuclear Crisis. The 
competition amongst theories has become fierce since the end of the Cold War, 
as realism prevailed over other theories during the Cold War period, as stated 
above. In a broad sense, (neo-)liberalism (or liberal institutionalism) may be one 
of the most famous theories to have resisted the realists’ predominance. It is 
generally embodied by economic interdependence by way of international 
regimes or institutions (Keohane 1982; Krasner 1983; Keohane 1990; Jackson 
and Sørensen 2013). Although liberalists still acknowledge the importance of the 
role of states, as Williams (2005) put it, borrowing Carl Schmitt’s term, liberalism 
is sometimes demoted to a ‘depoliticised’ conception of politics. Jervis’ (1999: 51) 
comments on neoliberalism succinctly explained its limitation in terms of policy 
implications: ‘neoliberals do not discuss how states do or should behave when 
vital interests clash’. For instance, territorial conflicts between China and Japan 
(Diaoyu/Senkaku islands), and South Korea and Japan (Dokdo/Takeshima 
islands) cannot be adequately and simply explained by neoliberal analyses.20 
This research reasons that liberalism or other equivalent theories could be 
subsumed under the same category as constructivism or its derivative theories. 
This is because, at least in terms of the North Korea policy, what these theories 
have in common is that they have usually been utilised by progressive 
governments, even though they have different ontological or epistemological 
perceptions. In practice, scholars who advocated the progressive governments 
held that their North Korea policies were predicated on both liberalism and 
constructivism. According to Moon Chung-in (2012), former advisor to the 
                                            20 Former South Korean president Park Geun-hye referred to this situation as ‘Asia’s paradox’: ‘Asia increasingly lies at the heart of the global economy. Hence, the international community is apprehensive that a rising Asia long associated with rapid growth and more open cooperation is morphing into a clashing Asia’ (Park 2012). 
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president of the ROK, DJ’s foreign policy was deeply rooted in both liberalism 
and constructivism. Hence, it may be the case that constructivism was used as a 
theoretical substructure, while at the same time employing liberalism as a 
practical tool for strengthening economic engagement, so that in the long-term 
the ROK can see some changes in North Korea, such as marketisation (Smith 
2015). 
It should be added that neoliberalism and constructivist traditions are not 
mutually exclusive in that both deal with the concept ‘norms’. Regardless of 
whether norms between the states are established tacitly or explicitly, norms 
affect states’ behaviour significantly. For liberalists, such norms ‘lie at the 
foundation of international regimes’ (Viotti and Kauppi 2011: 251); for 
constructivists, norms—‘cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or 
domestic environments’—shape state identity (Katzenstein 1996: 52–53). As 
Christoph Bluth (2004: 25) pointed out, ‘international relations are highly 
regulated and restrained by norms, and despite occasional breaches there are 
no indications that most states are willing to abandon those norms’.  
With regard to this, Moon and Kim (2002: 45–68) suggested the concept of 
‘liberal constructivism’ in order to ‘combine the applications of constructivism and 
liberalism’. Kim and Cho (2009: 415) also agreed that ‘cooperation between 
liberals and constructivists could reduce hostility and confrontation between the 
two Koreas in particular, and East Asia as a region’. However, it would be naïve 
to believe that international regimes always enhance cooperation. Sigal (1999), 
for example, saw the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
during the first Korean Nuclear Crisis as negative. According to him, the IAEA put 
its internal rules and organisational interests before preventing the DPRK from 
future bomb-making. He further argued that because of a failure in Iraq 
beforehand, the IAEA was determined to pressurise North Korea and it impeded 
diplomatic give-and-take. 
Some solutions have been proposed for the DPRK’s nuclear issue based 
on liberal concepts, and these are, in general, linked with the concept of 
engagement. Of course, engagement could also be a realist concept, and 
engagement policy itself varies according to its specific forms. As the rivalry 
between engagement and coercion became tense among policymakers following 
the Cold War, Victor Cha (Cha and Kang 2003: 89) introduced the term ‘hawk 
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engagement’ whereby he underscored that ‘engagement should be the desired 
strategy for hawks because this is the best practical way to build a coalition for 
punishment tomorrow’. According to him, today’s carrots (positive incentives) can 
be tomorrow’s most effective sticks (negative incentives or sanctions). 
Oh and Hassig (2004) suggested a concept of ‘proactive engagement’ for 
the long-term strategy. They argued that DJ’s Sunshine Policy was so cautious 
that it would take a large amount of time to get the peninsula reunified under 
Seoul’s control. Instead, the engagement policy should target North Korean 
people by providing them with information so that they can develop their ability to 
make decisions about their governance. In other words, weakening Pyongyang’s 
regime by enlightening North Korean people and eliminating political ignorance 
is the kernel of the proactive engagement. Kim and Kang (2010) concluded that 
engagement is a viable alternative to coercive strategies insofar as one condition 
would be met: other countries who become involved in any type of negotiations 
with North Korea should keep a degree of coordination among themselves 
despite differing different national interests. For them, the main reason why 
engagement had not worked lay with the huge perception gap between the 
countries involved.21 
What these studies have in common is that all made attempts to create more 
viable alternatives when a situation reached stalemate, in spite of there being no 
guarantee of success in North Korea policy. However, these attempts using 
engagement still seem to be lacking in-depth discussion on the understanding of 
otherness, as they are based on so-called traditional IR theories that hold 
rationalism as one of the most important epistemological concepts. This is a self-
oriented approach, just like a policy based on the coercive concept, since it 
makes little effort to identify the other’s objectives, and it also has to rely on the 
other’s (the DPRK’s regime) will to change. 
The real problem is still not addressed: how can policymakers discern the 
other’s objectives? Diagnosis of a conflicting situation from an objective position 
is indeed critical and difficult. Even realists, particularly defensive realists, who 
argue that most policymakers acknowledge without a doubt that the costs of war 
overshadow the benefits, are no exception to this problem (Lamy 2008). This is 
                                            21 The ‘relevant countries’ in this case refers to participants in the Six-Party Talks: South and North Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the US. 
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because ‘defensive actions and capabilities are often misinterpreted as being 
aggressive’ (Elman 2008: 22). What is crucial is that one state’s (or securitising 
actor’s) perception of the other’s objectives will ultimately decide its security 
policy, and this perception is based heavily upon its own discursively constructed 
identity. In light of this, what is more interesting is that not only is there no manifest 
prediction of the direction the DPRK’s policymakers may take with their decisions 
concerning nuclear weapons, but the ROK securitising actors themselves remain 
ambiguous on their security perceptions of the DPRK regime. 
A necessity for analysis of ‘ideational’ things comes from this point. Although 
it cannot solve complicated issues around the world, it can at least broaden the 
analytical world that had been regarded as a ‘fixed structure’ during the heyday 
of the IR mainstream theories. Many theoretical challenges to the IR mainstream 
came from constructivist tradition. In this tradition, much attention is given to the 
importance of ideational factors. For constructivists, ‘it is simply impossible to get 
a grasp on reality by only looking at the material world’ (Flockhart 2012: 84). The 
US expressed grave concern over one North Korean nuclear warhead (long 
before the DPRK’s first nuclear test), while many French or British nuclear 
warheads did not matter to the US. In a similar vein, Seoul has regarded 
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon as a dire threat, whereas Beijing’s nuclear 
capability is not being recognised as an imminent threat to South Korea despite 
its proximity to the Korean peninsula. Ideas, or ideational factors, are the kernel 
of this tradition. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that discourse incorporates 
material. Even poststructuralists acknowledge that materiality is important. It is 
crucial that materiality is ascribed significance through discourse (Smith et al. 
2012). 
Copeland (2000) highlighted that structural realism lacks intersubjectively 
shared ideas, which is often a more determinant factor, by which actors constitute 
the identities and interests of actors. From this perspective, identity is relational: 
one’s identity and the other are dependent on each other. A social context of 
friendship/enemy comes to mind at this point. Poststructuralists also hold that 
their ‘analytical focus is on the discursive construction of identity’ (Hansen 2006: 
23). As noted by Flockhart (2012: 85), ‘identity is the agent’s understanding of 
self, its place in the social world, and its relationships with others’. The concept 
of identity has served as a catalyst for studies on security perceptions of North 
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Korea. With regard to this, some researches have attempted to devise a path for 
reconciliation between the two Koreas by using the concept of identity (Smith 
2000; Bleiker 2001; Bleiker 2003; Bleiker 2005; Son 2006; Smith 2007; Son 2007; 
Kim 2012). 
Bleiker (2005: 121–122) argued that means of dealing with the other could 
determine the results of the major challenge ahead for both Koreas, because 
‘accepting the otherness of the other is essential if reconciliation is to prevail over 
conflict’. He called this an ‘ethics of difference’. If the two Koreas cannot transform 
dialogical breakthroughs, such as Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and inter-
Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, into a more tolerant acknowledgment of each 
other’s fundamental values, the conciliatory progress will be halted and caught in 
another vicious cycle. 
Kim S-b. (2012) suggested an interesting analysis of the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration’s response after the DPRK’s first nuclear test. As he put it, from 
the realist’s viewpoint, the Roh administration’s response could be construed as 
under-balancing (or over-engaging). In contrast to this, the Lee Myung-bak 
administration’s reaction to the North can be seen as over-balancing (or under-
engaging). By analysing the domestic politics during the Roh administration’s 
period, Kim concluded that the Roh administration’s perception of North Korea 
was the result of discourse that had been formed by the norms and identities of 
inter-Korean relations. According to him, the Roh administration’s under-
balancing/over-engaging response to the first nuclear test was because 
geostrategic interests and security considerations are less important than the 
cultural elements that represent identities.  
Son K-y. (2007) also analysed South Korea’s perception of North Korea 
from the perspective of identity politics. In order to elucidate the formation of 
national identity, he held that national identity can be changed by human agency, 
such as norm entrepreneurs and statecraft. Therefore, the role of agents (or 
securitising actors) becomes important in this case, and actors’ attitudes do not 
automatically reflect a salient identity of a country, but are an articulation of 
‘identity norms’, which means ‘standards of appropriate behaviour for in-group 
actors vis-à-vis an out-group’ (Son 2007: 489). 
The important role of securitising actors and their identities may be best 
epitomised by Wohlforth (1993: 2): ‘if power influences the course of international 
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politics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people who make 
decisions on behalf of states’. Viewed in this light, DJ could be labelled as a norm 
entrepreneur, and his norm entrepreneurship—Sunshine Policy—was gradually 
embedded in South Korean society after his inauguration. Even though the 
engagement policy was interpreted initially as dissident norms against the 
backdrop of previously institutionalised identity norms, through the process of an 
‘identity norm life cycle (norm emergence – norm collision – norm cascade – norm 
internalisation)’ (Son 2007), Sunshine Policy was followed by President Roh 
Moo-hyun, despite controversies surrounding the policy. In sum, all three 
arguments by Bleiker, Kim and Son have none of ‘a given national identity’ for 
both individuals and states. Their views ‘stand in stark contrast to the realist and 
liberal assumption that actors in international politics have only one pre-existing 
identity’ (Flockhart 2012: 85). 
Smith (2000) argued that alterations in security perceptions are required. 
She seems to believe that national identity is changeable. As for her, policy 
analysis or the security perspective on North Korea is ‘curiously outdated’, and 
the securitisation against the DPRK is based on the postulation that North Korean 
politics is ‘mad’ in the sense that its motivation is normatively unacceptable. Smith 
also pointed out several fundamental assumptions of the prevalent securitisation 
paradigm: first, the DPRK will not be changed unless the regime is eliminated; 
second, the DPRK is an exceptionally bad or mad entity. As a result, ‘the 
[previous] securitisation paradigm provides a poor guide for policymakers 
because it fails to grasp the complexity of North Korean politics and their rapidly 
changing nature’ (Smith 2000: 617).  
Her security analysis of the DPRK goes beyond conventional security 
matters and elite discourse. In her view, real security threats do come from the 
breakdown of North Korea’s economic structure that may give rise to the DPRK’s 
human security crisis including inequality, cross-border illegality and people-
smuggling, rather than from its military capabilities (Smith 2007). Even though 
this study does not focus on human security, neither does this agree that the 
nature of North Korean politics has changed ‘rapidly’, Smith’s argument shares 
the constructivist view that identity is relatively flexible. 
In addition, one should think that an alteration of the perspective towards 
others is possible on the premise that an understanding of self is altered in the 
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first place. It is not easy, of course, to clearly observe this psychological process 
in chronological order (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Mercer 2010). One might say 
that both phenomena can occur simultaneously, since identity per se means 
relationships with others. Hence, identity is meaningful within a social context, 
whether based on amity or enmity. Regarding this, Lee Jong-seok, former 
Unification Minister of the ROK, also posit that North Korea’s national identity or 
interests can be altered by the efforts of the international community. According 
to him, the North Korean regime did not know whether it should continue to 
develop the nuclear programme, at least before the fall of Libyan Muammar 
Gaddafi’s regime in 2011. If anything, in terms of denuclearisation, North Korea 
had been strongly influenced by attitudes in the US (Lee 2011a). 
Howard (2004) dealt with constructivism from another angle: the language 
games of the US government with respect to North Korea. He gave more weight 
to a language-based constructivist approach rather than to norm-oriented 
constructivism, because a norm-oriented one cannot explain ‘why the US was 
willing to talk to one member of the axis of evil, North Korea, while it invaded 
another, Iraq’ (Howard 2004: 812). He argued that both the AF and the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) made the US reluctant to 
forcefully threaten North Korea because of a set of rules for negotiating the 
DPRK’s nuclear issues. Conversely, the US-Iraqi relationship was short of 
negotiating tables that enabled the language games corresponding to the KEDO 
or Six-Party Talks (SPT) on the Korean peninsula. 
However, Howard’s arguments are indistinct for several reasons. First, 
language games create norms. The AF, KEDO and SPT began with language 
games but ultimately ended with a set of rules that the countries directly involved 
should abide by; that is, norms. Therefore, it would not be necessary to 
distinguish a language-based constructivist approach from a norm-oriented one 
in this case. Second, a real reason that the US would not invade North Korea is, 
as Howard admitted, the DPRK’s formidable retaliatory capabilities. North Korea 
deploys a massive conventional force along the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) that 
can cause significant damage to the South as well as to US forces in South Korea. 
Cho Myung-chul, a high-ranking North Korean defector, explained that 
Pyongyang’s willingness to wage war against the US and the ROK had been 
increased since Iraq’s defeat in the first Persian Gulf War. Cho further argued 
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that ‘North Korean military officials concluded that Iraq had been too timid and 
defensive. If we’re in a war, we’ll use everything. And if there’s a war, we should 
attack first, to take the initiative’ (cited in Carpenter and Bandow 2004: 91). 
Nevertheless, Howard’s work deserves some attention as it showed that the 
‘strategic use of language’ can either create or limit future actions of states.  
To sum up, these alternative approaches have attempted to re-evaluate the 
rationality of previous securitisation processes or security perceptions, although 
they seem to be relatively tolerant of the North’s extreme belligerence. Further 
literature focused on the role of the US in the Korean peninsula (Sigal 1999; 
Harrison 2003; Cumings 2004; Harrison 2005; Cumings 2007). The authors 
argued that the US’s perception of the DPRK needs to be reconsidered. For them, 
the Korean Nuclear Crisis could have been resolved decades ago were it not for 
the reluctance of the US to negotiate with the DPRK. Although their criticism of 
US policy does not seem commensurate with that of the DPRK, it can be said 
that these arguments can be considered to be partly in sync with constructivist 
concepts, given that they raised the possibility of identity change for the 
securitising actors. 
Despite the increase in studies based on constructivism amongst domestic 
scholars focusing on the Korean peninsula, most have concentrated on 
theoretical problems (Hong 2002; Namgung 2008; Choi 2009; Chun 2010). 
Relatively few studies have been devoted to the constructivist approach, 
including discursive or interpretative studies in relation to the South Korean 
governments’ security policy on North Korea (Kim 2002; Paik 2013). Paik H-s. 
(2013) analysed the Lee Myung-bak administration’s North Korea policy from the 
constructivist viewpoint. Utilising the concepts of identity, interests, agents and 
structure, he defined the Lee administration’s North Korea policy as ‘a failed one’. 
Paik argued that the Lee administration attempted North-South talks five times, 
all of which were initiated by international environments such as developments in 
the relationship between the US and China or the US and the DPRK. According 
to him, policymakers of the Lee administration can be defined as a pro-absorptive 
unification group, which pursued immediate and direct political interests through 
the North Korean regime collapse. In this regard, securitising actors of the Lee 
administration could be termed ‘Korean Neocon’. Although Paik’s analysis is 
based on constructivist concepts, given that the ROK’s policy towards the DPRK 
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has an ideologically divisive character, his harsh stance on the Lee administration 
that symbolised the conservative may not be free from criticism, as it is likely to 
broaden the previous policy gap between the conservatives and liberals. 
Kim Y. (2002) pointed out that several constraints should be considered 
when applying constructivism to real policy. He took the Sunshine Policy as an 
example, emphasising that the policy that connotes the process of a ‘common 
identity’ (shared knowledge → shared identity → change of understanding → 
change of policy) necessitates a considerable amount of time. In other words, a 
policy based on constructivism takes too long to anticipate its effectuality, not to 
mention a short-term policy effect. To use Europe as an example, the concept of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—an organised, agreed upon 
foreign policy of the European Union—‘is characterised by remarkable 
sophistication of procedure’, and its ‘ambition of creating runs parallel to the entire 
history of European integration process’ (Winn and Lord 2001: 20). That is, from 
the constructivist perspective, it took an enormous amount of time to form the 
common identity of the CFSP (McCormick 2011). It is therefore understandable 
that much more time and effort would be required for a similar process on the 
Korean peninsula. 
It would be safe to say that scholars focusing on constructivism have tried 
to diversify the perspectives on North Korea. They have attempted to ‘explore the 
background conditions and linguistic constructions’ (Checkel 2008: 73) beyond 
realist definition of statecraft that is subject to the ‘confining international structure’ 
in which states must operate (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: 80). At the same time, 
however, the constructivism-centred approach was inclined to the progressive-
wing thoughts, thereby being susceptible to criticism that it is short of an 
explanation for power politics. In addition, as the above literature review showed, 
many studies based on the constructivist concepts—discourses, norms, 
identity—were not able to overcome the level of simple analysis of conservatives 
and progressives. Even though the increasing number of scholars have been 
focusing on the role of discourse and language as methodological tools, 
constructivism, regardless of whether it is based on Wendtian (conventional) 
perspectives or poststructuralist ones, still appears at an initial stage in terms of 
epistemology.22 
                                            22 Checkel (2008: 72–73) sees conventional constructivists as positivists, in that ‘they start from 
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2.2.3 Towards an eclectic paradigm? 
The concept of realist constructivism seem to be necessary at this point, as these 
concepts partly represent the changing trend of IR theories. After several Grand 
Debates of IR, including idealists versus realists, traditionalists versus 
behaviourists, and positivists versus reflectivists, the pursuit of ‘theoretical peace’ 
that searches for possibilities of various forms of pluralism, has become another 
general trend in this academic field (Dunne et al. 2013; Lake 2013). Strictly 
speaking, constructivism itself is one of such eclectic endeavours to bridge 
between paradigms (Adler 1997). Barkin (2003) rightly pointed out that 
constructivism does not have the same theoretical level as realism and liberalism, 
as it is directly linked to perception of IR theories, and therefore it is a meta-theory. 
For him, ‘realist constructivism’ can be an alternative. Barkin argued that 
constructivism does not necessarily connect itself with liberal-idealism; if anything, 
it is compatible with realism in that classical realists also stressed the importance 
of the role of morality and ideational elements as well as material ones. That is, 
‘constructivism adds to classical realism an ontological basis for understanding 
the social construction of politics in general’ (Jackson 2004: 351). Michael 
Williams (2005) also observed that Hans Morgenthau’s classical realism put 
emphasis on ideational variables, as Morgenthau demonstrated that the concepts 
of power and security interests are ‘constitutive’, according to different actors and 
situations. 
However, as Chun (2010) pointed out, the concept of ‘realist constructivism’, 
as its name implies, still shares the same problem with constructivism. As noted 
above, constructivism is a meta-theory, which tries to bridge between 
foundationalism (positivism) and anti (or post)-foundationalism (postpositivism). 
This led many constructivists to experience ontological and epistemological 
confusion. For example, Alexander Wendt is widely seen as a thin constructivist, 
and he stays away from anti-foundationalism (Smith 1996; Zehfuss 2013). In 
effect, however, the basic ontological positions that many constructivists hold are 
heavily dependent upon normative or ideational concepts, such as identity, 
interests, ideology and discourse (Agius 2013). Given that all these concepts are 
                                            a standard (for the US) positivist view of how we should study IR’, whereas he regards the European variant of constructivism as post-positivist or interpretive. In that regard, this research is closer to the European variant of constructivism. 
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closely linked with anti-foundational positions in many ways, what then would be 
the ontological and epistemological viewpoint of realist constructivism? If 
Zehfuss’s (2001: 341) comment—‘the notion that identities or their transformation 
can be treated as variables within a causal explanation is problematic’—is valid, 
the ontological and epistemological confusion of realist constructivism seems 
likely to continue (Sterling-Folker 2002). 
Although this research does not base itself on realist constructivism, it 
stands in the midst of these trends that have reinforced the eclectic perspectives 
on IR. This research follows discursive (or interpretive) ontology and 
epistemology that may be located somewhere between constructivism and 
poststructuralism, since the study basically holds that security is discursively 
constructed. Nevertheless, as many other poststructuralists argued (Doty 1996; 
Hansen 2012; Epstein 2013; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015), this 
research also acknowledges the importance of material foundation from which 
discursive concepts can begin to grow, and regards the material factors as 
virtually existent that have consistently and significantly constrained the 
securitising moves of the South Korean actors. As aforementioned, the material 
factors can include several phenomena as follows: geopolitics (the rivalry 
between the US and China that affects the Korean peninsula as a structural 
factor), the ROK’s Constitution, which illegalises the DPRK regime, the existent 
material nuclear threats of North Korea, and so forth. 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
What needs to be taken into account is: (1) that the ‘taken for granted’ dichotomy 
between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism should be flexible and; (2) that 
the term ‘material factor’ does not necessarily mean a ‘deterministic structure’ 
that IR traditionalists refer to, as it is inextricably and ultimately bound up with 
intersubjective interaction between state actors. As this study will later discuss, 
the dichotomy between materiality and non-materiality is neither right nor helpful 
for finding causes in IR, as causes can include not only the ‘pulling and pushing’ 
but also the ‘constraining’ and the ‘constitutive’ (Kurki 2006; Kurki 2008). 
Therefore, focusing on identification of possible ‘causal influences’ or ‘capacities’ 
is preferential, rather than just trying to find causes themselves (Eun 2012). 
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Having provided the theoretical contexts of the theme of the thesis, before moving 
to the case studies, the remaining task is to elucidate the methods and 
methodological foundation of the thesis. The following chapter presents a close 
examination of the conceptual points of discourse, security discourse and ST; 
including a preliminary stage in which this research applies ST to South Korea’s 
security environment. Methods for the analysis of case studies will also be laid 
out in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 
51 
3.  
Methodological Concerns: Conceptualising Security 
Discourse 
The thesis has so far shown the principal academic and practical points that need 
to be considered concerning the ROK’s security discourses on issues of the 
DPRK and its nuclear weapons. The perpetual contestation amongst IR theories 
has proved that none can be ruled out, not only because each theory is able to 
explicate part of the security situation on the peninsula, but also because they 
seem to have overlapped and even appear interchangeable, as shown in the 
previous chapter. These theoretical and practical considerations lead us to think 
about the necessity for a better-organised conceptual frame in order to unravel 
such a complicated issue in which no one has ever drawn a conclusion as to what 
could be a ‘realistic solution’ to the DPRK’s nuclear problem. Consequently, the 
ROK administration’s security discourses need to be examined in more detail in 
order to make discursive connections between the so-called leftist and rightist 
governments clear, and to detect in what sense their discourses overlap, and 
under what situations the discourses are ambiguous, divergent or distorted. 
 
 
3.1 Conceptualising discourse 
 
3.1.1 Characteristics of discourse 
The goal of this chapter is to set up a clear criterion by which the thesis can 
analyse the security discourses of the ROK governments in a systematic and 
pragmatic way. It shows reasons why research based on discourse analysis (DA) 
is necessary in examining the Korean nuclear crisis. This chapter is also an 
additional part of the literature review in terms of providing a methodological 
background. Since discourse is a central term for this study, its meaning must be 
defined. As already shown in Chapter 1, the term discourse in this study differs 
from talking about mere facts. This implies that representing a reality is one of the 
obvious functions of discourse, and we know that the way reality is represented 
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is usually expressed by means of language. This is why discourse is inseparably 
linked to language, which is a ‘medium through which we make sense of the world’ 
(Diez et al. 2011: 39). In this sense, Paul Chilton (2004: 16) defined discourse as 
the ‘use of language’. Discourse sometimes includes symbols or symbolic actions, 
and ultimately can ‘encompass all forms of communication’ (Schneider 2013a; 
Taylor 2013b).  
However, even in this case, non-linguistic representations need to be 
interpreted as a form of language. No matter what techniques are employed to 
represent a reality, if representation means conveying a specific meaning, it 
entails linguistic interpretation. The range of definitions varies. Norman 
Fairclough saw discourse as a ‘language of social practice determined by social 
structures’, while David Howarth observed that discourse is ‘systems of meaning, 
including all types of social and political practice, as well as institutions and 
organisations’. Maarten Hajer observed that discourse is ‘a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and 
transformed in a particular set of practices’ (cited in Pierce 2008: 279–281).  
With regard to definitions of discourse, one might notice that the term 
‘practice’ is frequently used along with meaning, representation, and so on. That 
is, every discourse comes out of social or political practices. To borrow Hajer’s 
phrase, each discourse is produced, reproduced and transformed by a set of 
practices. It should also be noted that a set of practices is operated by a group of 
people. As the sociolinguist James Gee pointed out, ‘discourses are ways of 
displaying (through words, actions, values and beliefs) membership in a particular 
social group or social network’ (cited in Taylor 2013b: 17; italics in original). 
It seems that regardless of whether it is a thin or thick reflectivist (or 
postpositivist) tradition, which ranges from conventional constructivism to 
poststructuralism, one of the most important lexical units is mutual, since ‘mutual 
constitution’ is the vital concept for most reflectivists wanting to ‘underscore the 
impossibility of pure objectivity’ (Viotti and Kauppi 2011: 277). The concept of the 
impossibility of pure objectivity is predicated on the reflectivists’ firm conviction 
that a society is intersubjectively (mutually) constituted (Checkel 2008; Adler 
2013). Intersubjectivity, by definition, means ‘the variety of possible relations 
between perspectives’, which can ‘belong to individuals, groups, or traditions and 
discourses’ (Gillespie and Cornish 2010: 1). As mentioned in Chapter 1, even the 
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same phenomenon can be differently construed, because actors deal with 
information utilising their own cognitive structures (or different perspectives) that 
have been formed by myriads of social reasons. In that regard, neither social 
structures nor their context can be equivalent to the aggregated beliefs of 
individuals. If anything, a specific discourse that dominates a society is an 
outcome of intersubjective mutual constitution amongst influential actors. The 
actors ‘can be found in individuals, groups, states, ideational structures, and non-
human actants’ (Salter and Mutlu 2013a: 2). 
Klotz and Lynch (2007: 10) defined practices as ‘the habitual actions’ that 
emanate from interpretations that sustain ‘dominant intersubjective 
understandings’, and discourses can therefore be seen as ‘the combination of 
language and techniques employed to maintain’ the practices. In sum, 
representing a reality is a discussion about intersubjectivity among social or 
political agents that exert their power by way of discourse through which practices 
are being carried out. Put differently, the concept of ‘mutual’ (‘inter-’), 
‘changeability’ and ‘contestability’ have been at the centre of the tradition that 
stresses a discursive approach (Weldes 1996; Howarth et al. 2000; Van Dijk 2008; 
Glynos et al. 2009; Van Dijk 2009). In this process, to reiterate, the role of 
language is crucial, as language is connected to the ‘human cognitive ability to 
engage in free critique and criticism’ (Chilton 2004: 29). 
 
3.1.2 Methodology for discursive turn 
Unless neuroscience discovers the entire mechanism that can perfectly shed light 
on the pattern of people’s behaviour, the interpretive approach in political or social 
science might be ineluctable. That said, the necessity of breaking the mould of 
dichotomy between explanation and understanding is worthy of notice. In other 
words, it would be unnecessary to draw a sharp line between causality (or 
explanation) and meaning (or interpretation) (Hay 2004). In that sense, it is worth 
quoting the following passage at some length: 
But this dichotomy between explanation and understanding relies on overdrawn distinctions between science and the humanities. […] The main dividing line among constructivists is the putative distinction between constitutive and causal claims. Yet few clear markers differentiate the two, because the language of “causality” is quite fluid. Separating constitutive “how possible” questions from causal “why” questions mirrors the problematic distinction between explanation and understanding. Yes, causal studies do tend to speak in terms of explaining behaviour, while studies of meaning talk about understanding the conditions for action. Certainly the terms are not interchangeable, but in practice there is considerable overlap. 
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Those who say they explain behaviour also interpret meaning, and those who focus on understanding language also explain action to some degree.  (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 14–15) 
Milja Kurki (2006) in this sense aptly problematised the dichotomy between 
explanation and interpretation by pointing out that this trend originated from David 
Hume’s conception of causation that only stressed the importance of our 
experiences of the empirical world, which is later strengthened by King, Keohane 
and Verba’s (1994) Designing Social Inquiry. Kurki pointed out that ideas, norms 
and discourses ‘define and structure social relations’. Put differently, one can 
regard ideas, norms and discourses as ‘“constraining and enabling” causes’, and 
thereby it ‘gets us away from the “pushing and pulling” model’ (Kurki 2006: 206–
207). Steve Smith (1996: 19) also argued that the empiricist epistemology based 
on the thoughts of David Hume and John Locke ‘rules out any consideration of 
(unobservable) things like social or international structures’ and it therefore ‘does 
not allow us to talk about causes since these are unobservable’. In short, 
especially in relation to discursive approaches, causality is created not only by 
what we can observe and measure, but also by various facilitating conditions that 
are distinct from arbitrary ones. 
John Fiske (1994) observed that the language people use is never neutral 
no matter how benign it may seem to others. As long as this thesis deals with 
discourse, it may not be a theoretical or methodological neutral interpretation of 
events. As Robert Cox (cited in Zehfuss 2013: 145; italics in original) pointed out, 
theory ‘is always for someone and for some purpose’. In other words, ‘to theorise 
means to prescribe a particular way of thinking about the world’ (Burnham et al. 
2008: 3). A useful starting point for this study is to acknowledge that the concept 
of the ‘neutral’ researcher is a fallacy, and to advocate ‘reflexivity, so the 
researcher reflects on his or her own position and how it develops as the research 
progresses’ (Baker and Ellece 2011: 27). Most researchers have their own values 
and prejudices and this ‘undoubtedly affects the nature of their research’ 
(Hammond and Wellington 2013: 14). Regardless of whether it is based upon 
positivism or postpositivism (reflectivism), this kind of epistemological concerns 
referred to above are always latent. For example, in IR, both neorealist and 
constructivist schools of thought are affected by this problem. It would be 
ineffective to criticise either realism or constructivism from the other’s point of 
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view on the grounds of the ontological or epistemological discrepancies between 
them, since the respective ways in which they look at a reality are totally different. 
 
 
3.2 Conceptualising security discourse 
Having discussed the attributes of discourse, let us turn to the theme of security 
discourse. It may be relatively easy to define security discourse as we have 
already seen that there are several definitions of discourse. One might call 
security discourse a security-related use of language, or it could be described as 
a security-related language determined by political structures (organisations) that 
wish to display a specific security issue through words, actions, values and beliefs. 
Such security discourses would probably be comprised of a social and political 
set of practices or habitual actions that emanate from political elites (securitising 
actors) wanting to represent something as either threatening or threatened 
objects. To borrow Stephanie Taylor’s (2012) definition of DA, analysing security 
discourse might be defined as ‘the study of well-established meanings or ideas 
around a security topic which shape how we can talk about it’ or as ‘the study of 
how meanings of a specific security issue are established, used, challenged and 
changed’. 
As aforementioned, this thesis adopts ST as a theoretical framework. First 
of all, ST embodies the above-mentioned characteristics of security discourse in 
a systematic fashion, as well as directly dealing with security issues with either 
constructivist or poststructuralist perspectives that place emphasis on discursive 
conceptions as ontological and epistemological distinctions (Buzan and Hansen 
2009). Secondly, ST provides researchers who espouse the reflectivist tradition 
with several helpful concepts, such as (de-) politicisation and (de-) securitisation, 
from which researchers can develop their own conceptual and methodological 
ideas that are distinct from security studies based on traditional theories. Thirdly, 
in terms of understanding security, ST offers room for researchers to forge new 
links amongst discourse (or language), security studies and critical approaches. 
In other words, it allows questions to be asked regarding ‘existing social power 
relations’ that produce, reproduce and challenge security discourses (Zehfuss 
2013: 145). The connection between critical traditions in IR and ST will be 
discussed in the following section. 
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3.2.1 Securitisation Theory and its critics 
The thesis has covered some essential aspects of ST in Chapter 1. This section 
deals with a more detailed contemplation of ST and concentrates on the theory 
as a medium for linking theory and methodology, in the sense that ST has a mixed 
origin from a theoretical perspective: constructivism, poststructuralism and critical 
theory (Balzacq 2011). In recent years, several accounts have pointed to the 
increasing debate on ST. ST ‘has grown in complexity and nuance since its earlier 
articulation in IR by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’ (Salter and Mutlu 2013b: 818). 
Ever since the publication of Security: A New Framework for analysis, critics have 
argued over this term. The main arguments of the original ST are as follows: 
security is a speech act that is discursively constructed. To be securitised, issues 
must be ‘articulated’ by securitising actors. As noted above, this study basically 
follows this logic as a basis for interpretation of security discourses. In the 
articulation, a specific issue is represented as an existential threat to a particular 
group of people. The securitising actors (often political elites constituting 
governments) try to legitimate their representations of a specific issue by saying 
that the threat would significantly develop without taking exceptional (or 
extraordinary) measures. 
According to the CS, which is the matrix of ST, ‘the distinguishing feature of 
securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because 
if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy 
our failure”)’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). What decides a crucial security object of a 
country is therefore dependent upon a securitising actor’s speech act. In this 
process, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the CS regards the securitisation as a more 
extreme version of politicisation. Donnelly (2013: 44) called this a ‘threat-urgency 
modality’. In order to treat something as an imminent or existential threat, and ‘to 
enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’, a 
securitising actor’s speech act involves an intersubjective understanding that is 
continuously being constructed within a political community (Buzan and Wæver 
2003). In that sense, security cannot be defined in objective terms and is 
therefore ‘a self-referential practice’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 34). 
This ST’s basic logic has provoked several critiques, which engendered the 
second generation of ST scholars. The criticism of CS seems to be classified into 
five parts: speech acts, an audience, a criterion of successful securitisation, the 
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range of securitisation and the boundary of securitisation. To begin with, 
overemphasis on speech acts of the CS has been criticised by post-CS ST 
scholars. Ole Wæver, the core of the CS, argued that ‘the utterance itself is the 
act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a 
ship). By uttering “security”, a state-representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area’ (1995: 55; italics in original). Wæver applied 
John Austin’s term ‘performative utterances’ to explain the securitisation process 
that is initiated from a speech act. According to Austin, performative utterances 
not only describe something but also create (new) reality; namely, performatives 
are speech acts. For example, the words ‘declare’, ‘promise’ and ‘vote’ are called 
explicit performatives. By applying this concept to ST, Wæver transformed the 
traditional threat perception into what a speech act does (Austin 1975; Baker and 
Ellece 2011). As Léonard and Kaunert (2011: 57) pointed out, ‘the original 
formulation of ST is heavily influenced by linguistics, and more precisely the 
concept of speech acts’. 
Can we, then, conclude that a declaration (or a speech act) predetermines 
all securitisation processes? Balzacq (2011: 12–13) contended that ‘language 
does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it’. For him, a 
speech act itself cannot be empirically credible nor can it be theoretically useful. 
He gave an example of a typhoon: ‘What I say about a typhoon would not change 
its essence. […] threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck 
entire political communities regardless of the use of language’. Wilkinson (2007) 
also highlighted the problem of a speech act’s centrality for securitisation. In the 
case of the overthrow of the government in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, the 
securitising dynamic was significantly changed by the swelling numbers of 
demonstrators and ‘youths who had grown tired of listening to speeches’ provided 
by an incumbent regime (Wilkinson 2007: 19–20). In other words, the ultimate 
cause of what has happened in Kyrgyzstan seems to be the actions, not the 
speech acts. 
However, it seems that these critics defined the term ‘speech act’ too 
narrowly, and these views are predicated upon the dichotomous assumption that 
discourse ‘is somehow locked in a linguistic realm and “can’t do/won’t do” 
materiality’ (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015: 6). It is important to note that 
language and matter are inseparable. Of course, a speech act would be hollow 
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without an ensuing physical action, but at the same time, materiality is 
meaningless without a declaration of a specific security issue in regard to social 
context. 23  The power of a typhoon is immense. Its essence is unalterable 
regardless of speech acts. What is crucial, however, is that agents—social beings 
such as securitising actors and an audience—can not only be prepared, but are 
also much more aware of the danger of the typhoon in a very public sense with a 
declaration as a momentum. A typhoon is seen as a mature tropical cyclone, but 
it can also be seen as a god’s anger in some regions. The differences of 
interpretation result in disparate social phenomena. It does construct a reality. 
The UK’s nuclear weapons Trident programme does not raise US anxieties, but 
the US expresses extreme concerns over the DPRK’s one low-grade nuclear 
weapon. ‘Material cause in itself does not “determine” outcomes, nor does it 
provide an adequate explanation in and of itself’ (Kurki 2006: 207). Speech acts 
inevitably incorporate material. These two things—speech acts and physical 
actions—simply cannot be separately identified. 
In short, a speech act as a declaration of a securitising move is too important 
to be disregarded. Let us remind that when Austin said a speech act, ‘he calls the 
“total situation” (or total context)’ and ‘the “total situation” is comprised of the 
“pertinent facts” that determine the situation as being of a certain sort’ (cited in 
Stritzel 2014: 25). Oren and Solomon (2015: 318) also pointed out that ‘Austin 
clearly recognised that the success of words in doing something at the very 
moment of their utterance depended in part on circumstances that preceded (and 
likely will succeed) that moment’. Speech acts should be accepted as an 
outgrowth of the relevant context in which numerous material and ideational 
elements are included. 
Other criticisms of ST focus on the role of the audience. This problem also 
arose from the ambiguity of speech acts. These critiques suggest that the CS 
lacks a sense of an audience’s role (Balzacq 2005; Balzacq 2011; Watson 2012). 
It seems that in some sense the CS brings these criticisms upon themselves by 
insisting that ‘the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as 
such’ without concrete conceptualisation of the range and the role of audiences 
                                            23 ‘Materiality’ refers to ‘the matter out of which the world is composed: the nonhuman things that make up our everyday existence as well as the corporeality of our embodiments’, while ‘discourse’ is the ‘meaning-making activity’ (Aradau et al. 2015: 58). Susan Hekman (2010) (cited in Aradau et al. 2015: 58) said that discourse ‘constitutes our social world and the structures that define it. It also constitutes the natural world by providing us with concepts that structure that world’. 
 
 
59 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 25). For Balzacq (2011: 20), the CS ‘opts for an illocutionary 
view of security rather than a full-fledged model encompassing perlocution as 
well’.24 By introducing Kingdon’s ‘three streams model’, Léonard and Kaunert 
(2011) tried to reconceptualise the role of the audience, claiming that the CS 
implicitly downplays the audience role. According to this model, the problem 
stream (which refers to the construction of a policy problem capturing the 
attention of decision-makers), the policy stream (which refers to the process of 
policy formation in which policy alternatives are generated by specialists working 
in government positions) and the politics stream (which refers to political 
elements, such as public mood, election results and changes in the administration) 
constitute three streams. 
It seems clear that the CS focused more on the securitising actors than the 
audience, and this critique is right in that the securitisation process initiated by a 
speech act is ultimately linked to a perlocutionary act. Kingdon’s model also can 
give some insights into ST in terms of forming audience groups systematically. 
Nevertheless, what is problematic with this criticism is that it is still not clear what 
kind of audience deserves more attention in a specific security issue, nor does it 
provide standards for concrete classification between audiences. In some 
situations, several audiences can also be securitising actors. The audience could 
overlap with other audience groups according to their respective positions. For 
instance, expert groups can be subsumed under both policy and politics streams, 
since they can participate in debating security policies (or policy alternatives) as 
members of the policy stream, and at the same time they can create or organise 
public sentiment/opinion as members of the politics stream. 
The problem of a criterion of successful securitisation is directly linked to 
the role of audiences, in the sense that securitisation represents a mutual process 
between securitising actors and audiences. Regardless of whether they belong 
to the CS or post-CS groups, it seems that almost all scholars acknowledge that 
‘audience acceptance’ is one of the core conditions of successful securitisation 
(Buzan et al. 1998; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Vuori 2008; Balzacq 2011; 
Stritzel 2011; Stritzel 2012; Watson 2012; Donnelly 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013b; 
                                            24 According to Austin (1975: 98–132), speech acts can be classified into three types: locutionary (which refers to the superficial meaning of a speech), illocutionary (which refers to the real meaning of a speech by which the speaker intended to persuade audiences) and perlocutionary (which refers to the actual effect of a speech act, which makes audiences do something; if this is the case, the audiences are ‘persuaded’ by a speaker). 
 
 
60 
Stritzel 2014). These are all based on the assumption that ‘only the audience can 
decide whether this proposal will be accepted as legitimate’ (Donnelly 2013: 45–
46). Even in socialist systems, securitising actors need to ‘nourish and sustain’ 
the communication with audiences ‘in order to maintain the political order’ (Vuori 
2008: 71). 
These perspectives are ostensibly right, and it has indeed made ST 
abundant in terms of its theoretical position; however, the devil is always in the 
detail. Although one ought to acknowledge that securitising actors and audiences 
are reciprocating in principle, some practical issues need to be considered: what 
if the audience cannot decide which security position (speech acts) would be 
better? What if public opinion about security issues is too divisive (for example, 
supporters of the conservatives and proponents of left-wing politics are neck and 
neck)? What if both securitising actors and audiences just cannot see through the 
common enemy’s (North Korea’s) intention, and both agents run short of the 
ability to analyse what is going on in the enemy’s side? What if securitising actors 
and some audiences, including expert groups, are complicit in the securitisation 
process in the interest of their domestic authority? Can the acceptance of the 
audience be an ultimate criterion for a successful securitisation? The problem of 
insufficient empirical studies strengthening ST still remains. 
Be that as it may, it seems possible for researchers to delimit what they 
should analyse in terms of DA. If anything, investigators need to specify the 
demarcation between a securitising actor and the audience, even if these two 
agents are interrelated at the final stage of the securitisation process. The 
process is sometimes closer to an illocutionary act rather than a perlocutionary 
act, at least in the early phase: the declaration (or construction) of a new security 
issue with proposed extraordinary measures provided by policy makers. For 
example, when Seoul initiates a new North Korea policy, the launch of the policy 
depends heavily on the president’s (or several top policy makers’) personal 
political philosophy towards North Korea (Im 2004; Hahm 2008). The direct role 
of the audience cannot easily be found, particularly in the early stage of the 
securitising moves against the DPRK, even though the government is elected by 
the audience’s power. As a result, what is needed is a more condensed and 
specified definition of a securitising actor (or an audience). This might be a more 
practical start. 
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Two additional concerns about ST are the range (which refers to the objects 
on which ST needs to focus) and its boundary (which refers to the dynamics of 
securitisation, politicisation and desecuritisation). The origin of these concerns 
seems to be linked to the CS’s original questions: how do researchers ‘provide a 
classification of what is and what is not a security issue?’, and ‘how do issues 
become securitised?’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 1). Buzan (1991) contended in his book 
People, States and Fear that states are the principal referent object, while at the 
same time introducing several types of national insecurity including societal 
threats. Wæver (1995) developed the concept of societal security to refer to 
identity, which constitutes a duality of state security. For the CS, societal security 
could be understood as identity security as part of the planning that aims ‘to set 
out a comprehensive new framework for security studies’. In this context, 
although the referent object for security is often regarded as the state (or the 
nation), securitising actors ‘can construct anything as a referent object’ (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 1, 36, 120). Regarding this, Knudsen (2001) opined that the CS must 
consider the military sector and the state as a core concept of securitisation. Even 
if one admits the importance of the broad security concept, securitisation 
‘inevitably requires a more consistent interest in security policy’, since the CS’s 
position, either on the state or on security issues, are ambiguous (Knudsen 2001: 
365). 
However, Knudsen’s view itself still seems to be no more than security 
studies that are inclined to traditional perspective, and in that respect, the CS’s 
attempt is worth considering, despite its ambiguity. What is interesting here is that 
this kind of criticism of ST could be converted into contrary logic from the 
perspective of other academic spectrums. For instance, critical security studies’ 
argument is in sharp contrast with that of Knudsen. Ken Booth (cited in Buzan 
and Hansen 2009: 215) criticised ST as being ‘state-centric, elite-centric, 
discourse-dominated, conservative, politically passive, and neither progressive 
nor radical’. 
Above this, Hansen (2000) raised an issue of ‘the silent security dilemma’. 
Taking an example of honour killings in Pakistan, she raised a question of 
‘security as silence’. Honour killings of girls and women in Pakistan are a gender-
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related problem. It is not only ‘the question of equality of social security’, it is also 
an existent and imminent threat towards women. However, this problem has a 
deep connection to Pakistani culture in terms of gendered collectivity, which has 
led to a long absence of speech acts for securitisation. Therefore ‘the focus on 
the verbal act of speech causes difficulties in coming to terms with what can be 
called “security as silence”’ (Hansen 2000: 291, 294). Paradoxically, however, 
through this problem ST shows the importance of the role of speech acts all the 
more, even though securitisation per se cannot solve the problem. Had ST not 
stressed the distinctive role of a speech act as a catalyst for the securitisation 
process, the honour killing issue in Pakistan could not have been recognised as 
a potential security issue that revealed the threat towards women. 
Providing a classification of what is and what is not a security issue causes 
another problem: ST’s boundary (Figure 3.1). This is caused by the distinction 
between politicisation and securitisation suggested by the CS. As Emmers (2007: 
116–117) pointed out, ‘the model may not be able to sufficiently dissociate an act 
of securitisation from a case of severe politicisation’. He further argued that ‘the 
solution for non-military challenges are frequently found in the realm of politics’, 
and therefore, concerning securitising as an issue, ‘the political motives’ need to 
be stated. In a sense, Emmer’s comment was inevitable, as the CS themselves 
said that securitisation can be seen as ‘a more extreme version of politicisation’, 
which means the realm of security and that of politics are standing along the 
continuum, therefore they cannot be separated at a specific point. 
Although appearing to have a different philosophical basis, Karl Schmitt’s 
concept of sovereignty might be briefly recalled at this point. ‘For Schmitt, 
sovereignty is defined by the act of decision’. As Schmitt explained, a ‘Sovereign 
is one who decides upon the exception’, and it can thus be compared with an 
extraordinary measurement of ST, which is an articulation of emergency. 
Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty ‘lies in the act of decision merges powerfully 
with his famous vision of “the concept of the political”’ (Williams 2005: 85–86; 
 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual boundaries of ST 
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italics in original). Given that both Schmitt and ST see the conditions of 
emergency as the essence of decision made by securitising actors (or the 
Sovereign), the boundary issue between politicisation and securitisation appears 
to be collateral, because regardless of these ‘-sation’ types, what is crucial here 
is the forging of security by securing national identity (or fortifying political 
ideology) that can be corroborated by either politicisation or securitisation. 
Meanwhile, the boundary issue also seems to be linked to 
‘institutionalisation’. If a specific threat is so extremely resilient that securitising 
actors no longer have to utter the threat repetitively, and thereby the threat 
becomes taken for granted, one can say that the securitising moves are 
institutionalised. As Faye Donnelly (2013: 49) pointed out, and as Figure 3.1 
shows, this ‘raises questions about how desecuritisation becomes possible in this 
context’, and ‘if speaking security becomes the norm rather than exception, the 
boundary between politicisation, securitisation and desecuritisation begins to 
blur’. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this issue can have an important implication for 
the ROK’s securitisation case, in which the nuclear threat from the DPRK seems 
to have been so resilient. 
 
3.2.2 Securitisation Theory and the ROK: analytical mechanisms 
The new challenge for traditional security studies began with the following 
questions: ‘what is it that is being secured?’, ‘what constitutes the condition of 
security?’, and ‘how do ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public 
policy debate?’ (Lipschutz 1995: 1–2; italics in original). ST also arose from this 
academic-resistant current. It refused to accept an objective or material things as 
a basis of security, and thereby brought a process of securitisation initiated by 
agent’s speech acts. Hence, ST is inextricably linked to the concepts of ideas, 
identity and discourse. As Bill Mcsweeney (1996: 84–85) said, for the CS, ‘a 
society’s survival is a matter of identity’, and ‘identity is not a fact of society; it is 
a process of negotiation among people and interest groups’. The CS asserts that 
‘the label subjective is not fully adequate’ to figure out the process of forming 
security based on identity, therefore securitisation ‘has to be understood as an 
essentially intersubjective process’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 30–31; italics in original). 
Security is either socially or discursively constructed. 
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One additional point that needs to be considered is that a delicate eclectic 
theoretical perspective is needed when dealing with ST since it is based on a 
theoretical mix: constructivism, critical theory and poststructuralism. As a result 
of this, ST has naturally utilised concepts and methods derived from 
interdisciplinary research, such as politics, sociology, psychology, linguistics and 
so on. However, the fact that ST is a comprehensive theory has made the CS 
vulnerable in terms of its academic position. Stritzel (2014) pointed out that the 
theoretical ambiguity of ST has been clear as it oscillates between a formalistic 
speech-act theory (linguistics), poststructuralist reading and sociological theory. 
The CS’s middle position, between traditionalist state-centrism and ‘equally 
traditional peace research’s and critical security studies’ calls for “individual” or 
“global security”’, seems to have made the ambiguity issue bigger (Buzan and 
Hansen 2009: 213). 
No matter how complicated it seems from the perspective of a unitary 
scholarship however, what is important here is that ST is also based on a 
‘reflexive relationship between knowledge and social reality’ along with other 
constructivists’ theorising (Guzzini 2005: 496). Although ST has a mixed 
theoretical origin, there is no doubt that ST cannot be equal to critical security 
studies in which ‘emancipation is something of a mantra’ (Zehfuss 2013: 150). 
This does not rule out the possibility of ST as a vehicle for emancipation. Insofar 
as the ‘salience of identity politics’ continues (Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007), 
the connection between critical theory and ST will also run on. 
The same holds for the association of ST with poststructuralism. As Sjöstedt 
(2013: 146) opined, as ‘many followers of securitisation lean towards a more 
postpositivist position, securitisation is essentially viewed as a mutually 
constitutive process’. Both ‘draw attention to the political implications of 
representations and interpretations’ by focusing on discourse (Zehfuss 2013: 
154). Both posit that identity is vital in the construction of security (Buzan and 
Hansen 2009). Both proposed ‘a performative analysis’ (Guzzini 2005: 512). As 
Bialasiewicz observed, performativity refers to how ‘discourses constitute the 
objects of which they speak’, and therefore, as Campbell (cited in Zehfuss 2013: 
154) said, it ‘enables us to understand security culture as a relational site for the 
politics of identity’. These similarities remind us of the constructivist assumptions 
that see national interests as ‘meaningful objects with which the world is 
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understood’, which ‘emerge out of the representations’. In constructivism, 
national interests are seen as ‘the product of intersubjective processes of 
meaning creation’ during which securitising actor’s articulation and alternative 
representations can be ‘contested’ (Weldes 1996: 280–285). 
Despite all the similarities, it might not be easy to render poststructuralism 
equivalent to ST simply because poststructuralists do not correspond with ST’s 
agent-centrism. As Stritzel (2014: 41) pointed out, for example, Jacques Derrida 
saw ‘the speaking human subject’ as ‘just a function of language’, whereas ST 
place a greater emphasis on speaking agents. Poststructuralists’ incessant 
emphasis on the constitutive power of discourse that necessarily entails 
‘deconstruction’ can also make the CS reluctant to identify with them, because 
ST needs, in one way or another, a relatively ‘stable’ rule of speech acts in a 
language game in order to securitise an object that has previously been 
established as a basis on which the actors exert their legitimate authorities 
(Donnelly 2013). Be that as it may, based on the above discussion, one might 
notice that discourse is vital for analysing securitising moves. Insofar as the core 
of ST implies the discursive processes in security studies, and given that ST has 
played an important role of bridging between discursive approaches and 
traditional security approaches, it would be worth noting how security studies 
based on a discursive model can contribute to analysis for empirical security 
issues that have complicated and overlapping theoretical factors, as seen in the 
ROK’s security discourses. 
Having discussed the main arguments of ST, its theoretical position, 
methodological or empirical pitfalls and its inseparable relationship with discourse, 
let us return to the practical issue of the Korean peninsula, which has every 
reason to study security in a discursive manner. First, the securitising moves of 
the Korean Nuclear Crisis emanated from the ideological cleavage between the 
two Koreas, and the cleavage deepened as securitising actors participated in 
forms of their own understanding and consciousness by means of discourse 
(Purvis and Hunt 1993). There is no doubt that the two Koreas have developed 
their own political discourses by virtue of the disparate ideology, identity, 
rhetorical style and so on. It is well known that the history of the peninsula’s 
conflict has been fraught with rhetorical, ideological hostility (Oberdorfer and 
Carlin 1998; Bleiker 2005; Bluth 2011a). 
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Some might say that the ideological conflict (communism/socialism versus 
liberal democracy/capitalism) is over on the grounds that the major objective for 
the North Korean regime is to sustain its current position, regardless of ideological 
form. This could be right. However, no one can deny that contemporary 
ideological conflict on the peninsula originated in the Cold War relationship 
between the US and the Soviet Union. The two Koreas remain suspicious of each 
other’s intention to unify the peninsula by absorption or force based on a one-
sided ideology. Moreover, the North Korean-style ideology such as Juche (self-
reliance or self-dependence), Seon-gun (military first) and its own brand of 
socialism (Kim Il-sung-ism or Kim Jong-il-ism) is the strongest instrument of 
propaganda for sustaining its internal authority.25 With regard to this, Norman 
Fairclough, the core of critical discourse analysis (CDA), claimed that ‘political 
leaders will argue that their views are, basically, common sense, whilst their 
opponents’ are entirely ideological’ (cited in Pierce 2008: 286; italics in original). 
Both Korean actors also have stigmatised each other as entities preoccupied with 
authority and ideology, while upholding their own discourses. 
Second, the peninsula has been awash with rhetorical wars. The 
international community seems to have become accustomed to taking a barrage 
of bombastic (sometimes real threatening) comments from Pyongyang. The 
intensity of its rhetoric against Seoul and Washington has significantly increased 
since young leader Kim Jung-un’s appearance. Although it is not as vituperative 
as the DPRK’s rhetoric, South Korea has also raised its rhetorical threatening 
level correspondingly.26 It is often described as ‘a war of words’. Each Korea’s 
ideology is too contradictory to coexist with each other. Consequently, the 
security discourse of the peninsula has not only been condensed to hostile 
ideologies between the two Koreas but is also fraught with ‘agreeing to disagree’ 
even when they are in agreement in certain cases. 
                                            25 In April 2009, while Kim Jong-il was alive, North Korea removed the term ‘communism’ from its constitution. Instead, it upheld its own socialism and planned economy system. However, the North Korean media began to use the term again under the Kim Jong-un regime. 26 For example, from March to April 2013, the DPRK announced the nullification of the 1953 truce that ended the Korean War and declared the military ready for combat. Soon after, North Korea warned foreign diplomats residing in Pyongyang to evacuate in the event of war. In April 2016, Kim Jong-un threatened the US and South Korea with inter-continental ballistic rockets, saying ‘keep any cesspool of evils in the earth including the US mainland within our striking range and reduce them to ashes’ (Kwon and Park 2016). Meanwhile, reportedly, the US-South Korea held massive joint military exercises, dubbed as a ‘beheading mission’. The target of the mission was Kim Jong-un himself (Talmadge 2016). 
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Third, and more importantly in the context of this research, this ideological 
cleavage between the two Koreas resulted in sub-ideological conflicts, known as 
nam-nam galdeung (South-South discord), within the ROK, debating whether or 
not they should regard the DPRK as an enemy. As seen in Chapter 1, this is 
represented as dissension between the conservative and progressive blocs, and 
this dichotomy has been dominant amongst securitising actors as well as the 
audience, which ranges from political elites to scholars to media to the general 
public (Shin 2006; Son 2006; Son 2007). In other words, concerning the solution 
for the DPRK’s nuclear issue, the dominant security discourse has been a 
conservative-progressive dichotomy from which almost every sub-security 
discourse is derived. The frame has been strengthened by several seminal 
remarks made by securitising actors. 
Let us briefly look at some of the remarks of Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and 
Lee Myung-bak to see why their perceptions of the DPRK’s nuclear threats have 
been regarded as disparate. As aforementioned, it should be noted that South 
Korean presidents have taken a leading role in establishing security policies on 
North Korea. As an individual factor, the influential power of the presidents has 
been phenomenal (Im 2004; Hahm 2008). Lee Sun-jin (2013), former Deputy 
Minister for policy planning and international organisations of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the ROK, pointed out that ‘if truth be known, there have been 
wide deviations in South Korea’s North Korea policy according to each 
president’s political tendency’. Particularly in relation to security perceptions of 
North Korea, South Korean presidents have exercised enormous political 
leverage in the process of making North Korea policy. Although this does not 
necessarily belittle the role of the structural factors and other agency-level factors, 
analysis of the ROK security discourse would be meaningless without an 
examination of presidential speech acts. 
The following quotation was frequently used to show how President Roh, 
amongst many analysts, perceived the Korean Nuclear Crisis. Many Pyongyang-
watchers called this ‘Roh Moo-hyun Doctrine’. 
[North Korea’s] rigidity may be reasonably interpreted as motivated by their need to be assured about the safety of its system that might be endangered if it accommodated changes. […] The North Koreans maintain that their nuclear weapons and missiles constitute a means of safeguarding their security by deterring threats from the outside. By and large, it is hard to believe what the North Koreans say, but their claim in this matter is understandable 
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considering the environment they live in. We cannot conclusively say that Pyongyang is developing nuclear weapons to attack someone or to support terrorists. (Roh 2004a: 12 November) 
In this speech Roh stressed that a favourable environment for North Korea must 
precede any containment policy against them. That is, the surrounding countries, 
such as South Korea and the US, should lighten the security burden of North 
Korea to solve the nuclear issue because Pyongyang’s main security concern is 
inextricably linked with antagonistic relations, particularly between the US and the 
DPRK. In the same speech, Roh further argued that ‘in the final analysis, the 
North Korean nuclear issue boils down to whether security will be provided to the 
North, and whether or not it will be given an opportunity to overcome its plight 
through reform and openness’ (Roh 2004a). 
It seems that Roh’s belief system lasted even after the North’s nuclear test. 
He finally showed his confidence in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue by 
way of dialogue after returning from the second inter-Korean summit held in 
Pyongyang in October 2007: ‘negative views are voiced in some quarters about 
the progress of talks. They say the North is not reliable, but this kind of view is 
not right. Only dialogue, not any form of pressure, will persuade the North to 
abandon its nuclear programme’ (Roh 2007b: November 13). 
Unfortunately, Roh’s moment of triumph was not long-lasting. As Donald W. 
Keyser (2011: 27) pointed out, Lee Myung-bak’s landslide electoral victory in 
December 2007 was widely interpreted as a ‘stark repudiation of ten years of 
progressive policies under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’ in South 
Korea. As mentioned earlier, Roh stressed that South Korea and the US need to 
understand the security challenge North Korea is facing; therefore, it is mandatory 
that Seoul and Washington must try to dissipate Pyongyang’s security concerns. 
Instead, Lee underlined North Korea’s denuclearisation as an essential 
prerequisite for resuming talks with Pyongyang: 
[That] a second nuclear test was conducted by North Korea last week is extremely disappointing and shocking news, not only to the Korean people but also to the world. When all countries are concentrating on surmounting the current economic crisis, the North Koreans pushed ahead with the nuclear test. […] North Korea has to realise the fact that posing threats to the stability and peace of the world with a nuclear arsenal would turn out to be extremely detrimental to the North Korean regime as well. (Lee 2009c: 3 June) 
Lee’s stance on North Korea seemed to be much more resolute. However, 
it could not prevent North Korea from creating further provocations. As noted 
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above, North Korea committed unprecedented provocations including the navy 
ship Cheonan incident and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong island. Above all, 
the DPRK’s third nuclear test, which occurred in February 2013, was just before 
Lee’s retirement from the presidency. Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s new leader Kim 
Jong-un successfully constructed his internal legitimacy (Swenson-Wright 2013: 
147) (although it is not certain whether Kim asserted his authority over the country 
in the long term). Lee maintained his hawkish perception of Pyongyang up to the 
time of his retirement. He expressed that he relinquished a hope of 
denuclearisation in North Korea without DPRK’s regime change: ‘At long last, we 
came to a realisation that it no longer makes sense for us to anticipate that the 
North would abandon its nuclear programme or its policy of brinkmanship on its 
own’ (Lee 2010a). In a farewell speech, Lee argued that ‘although the North 
Korean regime refuses to change, the people in the North are changing fast and 
no one can stop it. […] We are observing the change closely’ (Ser 2013). 
The above-mentioned speeches addressed by Presidents Roh and Lee 
show that there are some differences in security discourse in dealing with the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue. Accordingly, the Roh and Lee administrations’ perceptions 
of North Korea seem to be disparate, and the discourse based on the 
‘conservative-progressive’ dichotomy has strengthened in this way. It is this 
dichotomy that has hindered the ROK securitising actors as well as the audience 
from establishing a more consistent North Korea policy, and the vicious cycle of 
the pattern seems to be unending as long as there is friction between the two 
groups. 
What is somewhat surprising is that even ST, which itself needs to have a 
‘critical’ perspective, has been used to reinforce such a dichotomous perspective 
in analysing the ROK’s security discourses. For instance, borrowing the ST’s 
terms, Kim S-h. and Lee G. (2011) argued that the Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
administrations virtually desecuritised the DPRK’s nuclear problem by 
downgrading its nuclear threat from existential to non-imminent. According to 
them, these administrations also desecuritised the same threat by taking 
measures including inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, as well as by 
stressing the importance of the continuity of inter-Korean relations. They further 
argued that the Lee administration securitised the same issue, as they regarded 
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the denuclearisation of North Korea as an essential prerequisite or at least a 
crucial element for the restoration of trust between the two Koreas. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, one must call into question the current 
discourse: given that security is discursively constructed in the tradition of ST, 
can we really say that the Roh administration desecuritised the North Korean 
nuclear threat while the Lee administration securitised it? Can diplomacy or 
dialogue not be subsumed under the category of extraordinary measures? Are 
the two political blocs’ security discourses really different? Are the two presidents’ 
perceptions of the nuclear issue really different? If different, in what sense are 
they different? If not, in what sense are they similar? Can the current discourse 
framed by the dichotomous perspective be a rational tool for explaining the ROK’s 
security discourses? Is there not a possibility of founding a dialectical discourse 
model whereby one can evaluate the current security discourse that only 
highlights the disparities between the conservative and the progressive? If there 
are some fundamental obstacles that make the ROK’s securitising actors become 
stuck in a discursive contradiction, what are they, and in what way are these 
obstacles expressed in the actors’ speech acts? 
In the author’s view, ST should and could offer a better starting point for 
academic assessment of these issues. If security is a result of discursively and 
socially constructed processes, as the CS argued, speech acts made by 
securitising actors would matter in that they constitute a potentially dominant 
security discourse. Therefore, it allows us to investigate what the securitising 
actors have been saying about the existential threats, referent objects and 
extraordinary measures. If the Roh and Lee administrations’ securitising moves 
towards the DPRK’s nuclear issue are really different, speech acts of the two 
Table 3.1 Units of security analysis: South Korea’s securitisation 
Units Contents 
Existential threat The DPRK’s nuclear weapons 
Referent objects 
Special relations Peaceful Inter-Korean relations → Peaceful unification 
International system The ROK-US alliance, The ROK-China relations 
Political system Liberal democracy 
Economic system Market economy 
Extraordinary measures Pre-emptive strike, coercive diplomacy, engagement, etc. 
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presidents must be different. If not, however, there would be at least two latent 
possibilities that could hinder the ROK’s securitisation process. First, the ROK’s 
securitisation against nuclear weapons is, in fact, not so much securitisation as 
politicisation. The second possibility relates to ST’s theoretical incompleteness. 
Either way, the case of this thesis will show either ST’s analytical forte or its 
inadequacy as a theoretical framework. In this regard, Table 3.1 shows a priori 
classification of the ROK’s security discourse on the DPRK’s nuclear threat. The 
analysis of the Roh and Lee administration’s security discourses will be dealt with, 
based on this framework, in the following two chapters. 
 
 
3.3 Compiling methods 
 
3.3.1 Methodology for security discourse 
Research design is concerned with ‘turning a research question, a hypothesis or 
even a hunch or idea into a manageable project’ (Hammond and Wellington 2013: 
131). That is, ‘to formulate a research project is inevitably to make a series of 
choices’ (Hansen 2006: 73). DA is not an exception. When it comes to questions 
of meaning, it is always difficult to begin with ‘a fundamental matrix of dimensions 
which would satisfactorily allow us to organise all approaches neatly and without 
remainder’ (Glynos et al. 2009: 6). Even though discourse analysts try to 
represent reality against essentialism or objectivism, all DA may be a sort of 
specific representation that is selective. In this sense, taking a ‘problem-driven 
approach’ might be desirable rather than clinging to ontological emphasis that 
implies a ‘purely theory-driven approach’ (Glynos et al. 2009: 9–10). 
Having problematised empirical phenomena, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
one can then ‘narrow the scope’ of the agenda ‘enough to make it operational’ 
(Schneider 2013b). Silverman (2013: 96) also reiterated that the importance of 
narrowing the focus rests on the fact that ‘it will produce a manageable and 
achievable research task’. Then what should analysts focus on in methodological 
terms? Jonathan Potter (cited in Silverman 2013: 110; italics in original) pointed 
out that ‘DA has an analytic commitment to studying discourse as texts and talk 
in social practices […] the focus is […] on language as […] the medium for 
interaction; analysis of discourse becomes, then, analysis of what people do’. 
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This research has already dealt with the essential traits of discourse, the 
relationship between discourse and language, and the role of discourse in 
security studies. Securitising actors construct security identity and security 
context, which are intersubjective, by means of texts and talk in social practices. 
Discourse, in other words, ‘both provides a constitutive context for political 
articulations […] and consists of articulatory practices that re-produce but also re-
shape this context’ (Diez 2014: 3). Following Potter’s reasoning, the thesis would 
also commit to analysing language that forms interaction among securitising 
actors in the first place (looking for patterns of security discourse), and then it 
would move to an analysis for ‘classifying the various strategies’ of the actors 
(interpretation of the discourse) (Taylor 2013b: 45). 
Accordingly, this research holds with the notion that language is political 
particularly in regard to a discursive approach in security policy, and conforms to 
the anti-foundationalism that explains ‘reality is not discovered. […] No actor can 
be objective or value-free. Reality is socially constructed’ (Furlong and Marsh 
2010: 190–191). Be that as it may, it does not necessarily mean that this study is 
entirely against causality and explanation, nor does it hold to poststructuralism 
altogether. Avoiding extreme theoretical and methodological positions in the 
debate seems to have become the ethos of the 21st century’s discipline of IR 
theory (Eun 2012; Diez 2014; Dunne et al. 2013; Lake 2013; Lundborg and 
Vaughan-Williams 2015). According to Jackson and Sørensen (2013: 246), for 
instance, many IR scholars have ‘moved towards a less confrontationist view of 
methodology. […] They seek out a middle ground which avoids a stark choice 
between ‘positivist’ and ‘post-positivist’ methodology’. In Hay’s (2004: 143) words, 
‘such a dualism is unhelpful’. DA does not focus on providing a new theoretical 
apparatus; instead, it tries to offer a new analytical perspective in order to 
investigate the rules and meanings that affect the construction of social and 
political identity (Torfing 2005). 
 
3.3.2 Methods for security discourse: corpus-assisted DA 
Although there are ‘no firm guidelines about how’ DA ‘should be carried out’ 
(Burnham et al. 2008: 248) in terms of methods, there have been many efforts to 
show how DA can delineate the complicated nature of foreign affairs and national 
security, and a variety of analytic approaches are being used. This study basically 
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agrees with the logic of mixed methods in order to ‘compensate for the perceived 
shortcomings of stand-alone methods, with the aim of either providing a more 
complete picture or enhancing coverage’ (Barbour 2008: 151). As Jennifer Mason 
(cited in Barbour 2008: 155) pointed out, ‘social experience and lived realities are 
multi-dimensional and […] our understandings are impoverished and may be 
inadequate if we view these phenomena only along a single continuum’.  
Analysing securitising actors’ speech acts may be a time-consuming and 
complicated process, just as it is in analysing qualitative data (Mason 1994: 89). 
The necessity of computer-assisted corpus linguistic analysis arises at this point. 
The expediency of corpus linguistics has recently received attention, particularly 
in DA, as it enriches research design as well as interpreting results (Mautner 2009; 
O'Keeffe and McCarthy 2010; Pearce 2014). Corpus-assisted DA is a ‘systematic 
attempt to identify the frequency with which certain words, functions or concepts 
occur within a text and […] to explore the context in which these words are 
positioned for rhetorical or other effect’ (Hammond and Wellington 2013: 34). It 
also allows the researcher ‘to work with enormous amounts of data yet get a 
close-up on linguistic detail’, which is ‘hardly achievable through the use of purely 
qualitative CDA, pragmatics, ethnography or systemic functional analysis’ 
(Mautner 2009: 125). 
It is expected that DA assisted with corpus linguistics could offer a 
meaningful starting point for the evaluation of core terms used by securitising 
actors. In addition, by utilising corpus linguistics software to identify ‘the relative 
statistical significance of the co-occurrence of items’ (Mautner 2009: 125), 
corpus-assisted DA could help analysts to reveal changing and repetitive patterns 
of actors’ speech acts. Therefore, the author’s ‘individual, intuitive judgement on 
evaluative meaning with shared assumptions and judgements’ could be improved 
or objectified with the help of corpus-based collocational information (Mautner 
2009: 136). However, it does not necessarily mean ‘relegating qualitative 
methods to a later stage in the research project’ (Barbour 2008: 160). Having a 
comprehensive knowledge of an issue means that an analyst is able to deduce 
or infer a priori core terms and preliminary interpretation within a specific context 
as previously perceived by the analyst. In this respect, it would be possible to 
choose typical texts and core terms along with corpus-assisted analysis. 
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Since this study more directly draws on ST, which is later defined by Stritzel 
(2014: 51) as ‘a distinct theory of discourse of a special kind in security studies 
and international security affairs’, it would be more accurate to say that this 
research is a distinct type of CDA that focuses on security phenomena from IR 
perspectives. Wodak argued that CDA ‘should be transparent so that any reader 
can trace and understand the detailed in-depth textual analysis’, which is 
described as ‘retroductable’ by CDA scholars (Kendall 2007). To recap, 
borrowing Mautner’s (2009: 138) phrase, corpus linguistics software that 
‘compiles frequency lists, identifies keywords and reveals statistically significant 
collocations’ would help analysts who want to challenge a prevalent discursive 
structure to cope with large amounts of textual data, thereby ‘reducing 
researchers’ bias and enhancing the credibility of analyses’. 
For computer-assisted linguistic analysis, this study will use Sketch Engine, 
a powerful corpus query system (Kilgarriff et al. 2014; Pearce 2014), as the main 
tool for interrogation of the corpus. For the writing procedure, this section will 
briefly introduce how keywords of a specific text can be extracted. Tables 3.2 and 
3.3 show the top-twenty keywords in the corpus of each administration’s white 
paper regarding unification and diplomacy issues, each of which was published 
in 2008 and 2013 respectively. As the white papers are written in Korean, the 
Table 3.2 Keywords by simple frequency 
Roh Moo-hyun administration Lee Myung-bak administration 
South-North promotion / enlargement cooperation FTA Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) energy peace agreement military stage inter-Korean relations economy summit support USFK North Korean nuclear weapons mutual  Six-Party Talks (SPT) peace system national security 
principle advanced security unification policy South-North Cheonan corvette missile Mt. Keumgang Yeonpyeong Island promotion reinforcement national defence future-oriented improvement provocation strong army enlargement intimidation measures support Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)  
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words in the tables have been translated into English. In both tables, functional 
words such as determiners, pronouns and prepositions are excluded. 
Table 3.2 represents the top-twenty keywords extracted by simple 
frequency from each administration’s white paper. Although the keywords in the 
table do not reveal the contexts in which the words were used, they identify words 
used frequently by securitising actors. Keywords can also denote some specific 
issues that occurred in each period. For example, on the one hand, one can 
contemplate that the role of ‘Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)’ was important 
in relation to inter-Korean relations throughout the two administrations, as the 
word can be seen on both sides. On the other hand, words like ‘summit’, ‘SPT’ 
and ‘peace system’ can only appear on the side of the Roh administration’s part, 
while words like ‘unification policy’, ‘Cheonan corvette’ and ‘Yeonpyeong Island’ 
can only be found on the side of the Lee administration. Therefore, the table 
indicates that the different keywords represent each administration’s different foci 
and altered security situation in a definite manner. This is important because it 
strengthens reliability and validity regarding discursive debate, while decreasing 
the possibility of making false assumptions when talking about facts. 
In Table 3.3, the keywords, sorted in descending order reflect the ‘keyness 
score’ that ‘roughly expresses relevance of the word in the text compared to a 
general text in the same language’ (SketchEngine 2015b). Extracting words, not 
 Table 3.3 Keywords by keyness score 
Roh Moo-hyun administration Lee Myung-bak administration 
agreement ROK-US alliance national defence cost Northeast Asian era inter-Korean relations Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) working level contact peace system Yongsan garrison summit defence reform North Korean nuclear problem Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) joint statement economic cooperation special agreement normalisation of relations cooperative project independent national defence separated families 
principle advanced security unification policy strong army future-oriented co-prosperity / co-existence North Korea policy national crisis management preparation for unification denuclearisation Grand Bargain provocation Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) national defence finances for unification international community inter-Korean relations weapon system separated families Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)  
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by just raw frequency but by the keyness score, may well complement the 
keywords extracted by simple frequency. As this indicates words used by a 
securitising actor by comparing with a reference corpus, it can also provide 
supplementary entry points for DA, so that the actor’s perception of threats, 
referent objects and extraordinary measures can be considered in a broader 
context. A reference corpus is ‘a large, recent, general language corpus’; large 
being ‘at least 50 million words’ (Kilgarriff et al. 2014: 23). A reference corpus is 
‘ready-made, off the peg, including a wide variety of genres (written, spoken, 
newspapers, fiction, etc.) and millions of words per genre’, whereas a main (focus) 
corpus could be compared with a ‘Do-it-yourself’ (DIY) corpora, which is 
‘designed to tackle smaller-scale research questions’ (Mautner 2009: 132). 
In sum, it is possible to see the extent to which an actor has used particular 
words in comparison with the frequency of the words used in a reference corpus, 
which has a statistically adequate quantity of words from a huge assortment of 
material. The keyness score can be calculated as follows (SketchEngine 2014):27  
 
݂݌݉௙௢௖ + ݂݊݌݉௥௘௙ + ݊  
 
As mentioned, these keywords could be utilised as a ‘point of entry’ for DA 
that assists in selecting words. The keywords provide us with additional points for 
analysis of the ROK’s security discourse relating to the Korean Nuclear Crisis. 
Consideration of the context in which each keyword was used can facilitate 
avoidance of analytical prejudice. Analysis of keywords can also identify ways in 
which use of words differ or concur between the two administrations. Analysis of 
keywords can then be supplemented with a ‘re-reading’ of the original key texts 
(Hansen 2006: 59). Although the white papers themselves are not the subject of 
corpus-assisted DA in this thesis, the keywords included in the above tables are 
expected to be useful in the process of analysing each president’s speech acts. 
As the words are intertextually linked to the presidential speeches, it is estimated 
that presidential speeches could be traced using some of these keywords. The 
                                            27 In this formula, ‘fpmfocus is the normalised (per million) frequency of the word in the focus corpus, fpmref is the normalised (per million) frequency of the word in the reference corpus, n is the simple Maths (smoothing) parameter (n=1 is the default value)’ (SketchEngine 2014). 
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following chapters will illustrate use of many of these keywords in presidential 
addresses. 
 
3.3.3 Methods for security discourse: interpretive/intertextual DA 
As DA essentially deals with texts and talk as a form of language that constitutes 
(or represents) reality, selecting data for collection may be the first task for most 
discourse analysts. The process of data collection itself varies since there are 
several kinds of DA, each serving different analytical purposes. For example, a 
project may combine DA and ethnography, or use naturally occurring data. In 
these cases, aside from choosing texts, interviewing, observation, field notes and 
data notes from interviews can be included (Taylor 2012; Silverman 2013; Taylor 
2013b). 
With regard to the issue of choosing texts, there seems no manifest criterion 
for what should be considered appropriate text for DA. However, as Ruth Wodak 
and Michael Meyer (2009: 23) recognised, ‘most studies analyse typical texts’, 
although ‘what is typical […] frequently remains vague’. In that respect, Hansen 
(2006: 64) offered a meaningful model for the text selection. The process of 
choosing texts needs careful intertextual reading in a broad sense, and her model 
 Table 3.4 Intertextual research models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3A Model 3B 
Analytical focus Official discourse: Heads of state Governments Senior civil servants High ranked military Heads of international institutions Official statements by international institutions 
Wider foreign policy debate: Political opposition The media Corporate institutions 
Cultural representations: Popular culture High culture 
Marginal political discourses: Social movements Illegal associations Academics NGOs 
Object of analysis Official texts Direct and secondary intertextual links Supportive texts Critical texts  
Political texts Parliamentary debates Speeches,  Statements Media texts Editorials Field reporting Opinion—debate Corporate institutions Public campaigns Recurring intertextual links 
Film, fiction, television, computer games, photography, comics, music, poetry, painting, architecture, travel writing, autobiography 
Marginal newspapers, websites, books, pamphlets Academic analysis 
Source: Hansen, L. (2006). Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, p. 64 
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is considered appropriate for choosing texts as a basic framework. Since this 
study takes both the governmental discourse and the main opposing discourse, 
Models 1 and 2 of Hansen’s intertextual models will be considered as the main 
subjects of analysis (Table 3.4). To begin with, presidential speeches would be 
the top priority source. In order to put this into practice, each president’s (Roh 
Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak) official speeches, translated into English by 
translators of Cheong Wa Dae (The Blue House; Office of the President of the 
ROK), will be used as main sources of corpus-assisted DA. As aforementioned, 
presidential speeches have an enormously significant impact on the ROK’s 
security discourse. Presidents’ speech acts are generally seen as the final and 
most refined form of security discourse. In South Korea, put differently, an official 
security discourse was made by an implicit system of ‘imperial presidency’ (Im 
2004; Hahm 2008; Kim 2013). 
Aside from this, white papers and policy reports produced by each 
administration will be dealt with as one of the key official texts. These are 
important because both present the securitising actors’ philosophy. More 
importantly, since the white papers and policy reports of the two administrations 
were published at the final stage of the respective tenure, one can detect the 
changing pattern of policies and speech acts compared with their speech acts at 
an initial or middle stage. These also reflect each administration’s defensive logic 
regarding criticism that emerged from the opposition. Therefore, it would be safe 
to say that a white paper implies the final and comprehensive thoughts of a 
 Table 3.5 Key texts for the thesis 
Model Texts (2003.2–2013.2) 
Model 1 Official texts Presidential speeches White Papers; Policy Reports Direct and secondary intertextual links Autobiographies of Presidents Other influential memoirs (written by above Ministerial level officials) Interviews 
Model 2 Political texts Parliamentary debates (FAUC and NDC) dealing with the DPRK issues* Media texts Articles dealing with Presidents and Ministerial level officials’ comments Corporate institutions Public opinion poll conducted by KINU and IPUS** 
* FAUC: Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee; NDC: National Defence Committee * KINU: Korea Institute for National Unification; IPUS: Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University  
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government that need to be publicised to justify their policies. In addition, 
autobiographies of presidents, other influential memoirs written by major 
securitising actors and transcripts of the author’s interview with the actors will be 
utilised as secondary intertextual links. 
With regard to Model 2, speeches, official political debates (parliamentary 
debates), interviews and articles produced by political leaders will be considered 
for locating identity and policy. In particular, in the interest of securing more 
comprehensive political context for DA, this thesis has examined all the 
parliamentary debates of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee and 
National Defence Committee of the ROK Assembly from February 2003 to 
February 2012, insofar as the Assembly Committee minutes are concerned with 
the DPRK issues. Furthermore, opinion polls on the South Korean public’s 
perceptions of the government’s North Korea policy conducted by institutes such 
as KINU and IPUS that have public confidence will also be used as an index of 
the ROK’s securitisation. The key texts are summarised in Table 3.5. 
For an understanding of the context in which political articulation occurs, 
comprehensive background knowledge in terms of both choosing texts and 
interpreting them is vital. As context refers to a slightly more formal version of the 
situation, circumstances or environment, it can be defined as ‘the relevant 
environment of language use’ (Van Dijk 2009: 3). Here, as elsewhere, the 
connectedness between text and context is intersubjective in the sense that texts 
(or talks) are not only constituents of a context but also constitute the context 
(Van Dijk 2008). The following transcript shows the importance of understanding 
context when analysing texts: 
1. QUESTION: On North Korea? 2. MS. HARF: Uh-huh. 3. QUESTION: Yeah. North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom Hyun Hak-bong 4. has mentioned yesterday [in an] interview with British TV that North Korea [was] ready to 5. fire nuclear weapon[s] [at] anytime. He also said if [the] US uses conventional weapons 6. they will do so [as well]; and if [the] US uses nuclear weapons, they will also do so. How -- 7. MS. HARF: Well, I saw those reports. There is obviously an overwhelming  8. international consensus against North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.  9. We have called on North Korea to abandon both programmes  10. in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. This is required by  11. multiple UN Security Council resolutions. And we remain fully prepared to  12. deter, defend against, and respond to the threat posed by North Korea. 13. We obviously are steadfast in our commitment to the defence of not only  14. the United States but our allies and our interests in the region. 15. QUESTION: So now he has acknowledged that North Korea has nuclear weapons. So -- 16. MS. HARF: I don’t think that’s a big secret. 17. QUESTION: Big secret, okay. (Laughter) 
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18. MS. HARF: There’s a reason we’re working to denuclearise the Korean peninsula. 19. QUESTION: Thank you. 
The above quoted text is extracted from the transcript of the daily press 
briefing of the US Department of State, 23 March 2015, during which then Deputy 
Spokesperson Marie Harf was questioned. In this transcript, the reporter asked 
Harf about the DPRK’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against the US (lines 
3–6). Responding to this, Harf mentioned United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions (1718, 1874 and 2094), claiming that North Korea must abandon all 
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a CVID manner (lines 7–
14). The reporter asked again, in line 15, in order to check how the US would 
respond to what the DPRK is insisting: ‘we are a nuclear weapon state’. 
Immediately afterwards, Harf replied to this question with ‘I don’t think that’s a big 
secret’, which made the reporter laugh in line 17 (in this case, fortunately, there 
is video material so one can detect how the communication was taking place). 
There is no doubt that line 16 in this text should be centred from a discursive and 
contextual viewpoint, for Harf’s acknowledgment clearly implying that ‘it is not a 
big secret that the DPRK is a nuclear state’ is against the US government’s official 
position: ‘North Korea’s demand to be recognised as a nuclear weapons state is 
neither realistic nor acceptable’ (Birsel and Nebehay 2013). 
In principle, the US government can never acknowledge that North Korea is 
a nuclear state, but in reality, they are well aware of the extent to which the DPRK 
has developed its nuclear weapons programme (Hwang 2010a; Nikitin 2013). 
This is important because it reflects the constitutive power of discourse in terms 
of security reality by which the US can sustain the legitimacy of the NPT system. 
This also suggests that the US’s securitising move against the DPRK has been 
subsumed under the category of institutionalisation (meaning that the US 
securitising actors repetitively articulate the DPRK’s nuclear threat, as the 
‘multiple’ UNSC resolutions demonstrated). 
Academic implications of this kind of interpretive DA might be epitomised as 
follows: firstly, it shows how discourses made by securitising actors constitute 
discursive reality (representation) that is different from material reality; secondly, 
it shows how securitising actors perceive security reality; thirdly, it shows how 
powerful and resistant the actors’ representations of security reality are in terms 
of constraining the effect that impacts on their security perceptions, which are 
self-referential; and finally, the former three characteristics may point to the 
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concept of the discursive chasm, which in this case represents an ineluctable gap 
between materiality (North Korea as a nuclear state) and discursive practices (not 
acknowledging the fact). The chasm may also allude to a point where 
securitisation process falls into institutionalisation or falls back to politicisation. 
As aforementioned in terms of choosing texts, one of the most conspicuous 
methods in analysing security discourse is ‘intertextuality’, which is also from 
linguistics. Intertextuality, a term, coined by Julia Kristeva, literally means ‘a kind 
of play (fullness) between text; that is, the play of intertextuality is the process of 
reading through which one text refers to another text in the process of cultural 
production’ (Finley 2005: 686). This term implies that ‘to communicate we must 
utilise existing concepts and conventions […] whilst our intention to communicate 
and what we intend to communicate are both important to us as individuals, 
meaning cannot be reduced to authorial “intention”’; in other words, ‘we do not 
precede language but are produced by it’ (Chandler 2014: italics in original). This 
reflects exactly what the theorists in the postmodern epoch wanted to emphasise: 
regardless of whether they are literary or non-literary, ‘every artistic object is so 
clearly assembled from bits and pieces of already existent art’ (Allen 2000: 6). In 
that regard, security studies dealing with discourse also put emphasis on the 
‘mutual’ (or ‘inter-’) constitutive way in which actors’ perceptions are in general 
formed by means of language. 
Several literatures have employed the interpretive and intertextual DA in 
terms of handling security issues. For example, Hansen (2006: xvi) successfully 
showed how poststructuralist DA can delineate the ‘constitutive relationship 
between representations of identity and foreign policies’. To show how complex 
the foreign policy debate over Bosnia is, she identified the basic discourses 
related to Bosnia that have impacted on Western society by choosing textual 
material, which includes general material (e.g. presidential statements, British 
House of Commons debates, academic analysis, etc.) and several key texts, 
such as influential travel books. 
Stritzel (2012: 556) utilised intertextuality to avoid ‘a priori selection of 
agency/agents within securitisation’. In analysing the securitisation process of 
organised crime in the USA, he argued that the ‘sociopolitical process’ should be 
taken into account because the securitisation of organised crime emanated 
originally from a ‘cultural context and its communicative ecology’, which can be 
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corroborated by intertextual links and popular culture in this case. Through 
Hansen and Stritzel’s case studies, one might see the role of intertextuality as an 
instrument for recontextualisation. Both studies are strong in that they 
recontextualised the securitising moves in a way that has never been approached, 
and provided different perspectives. At the same time, both are weak since their 
re-representations of securitisation also rely on a subjective notion that is 
imperfectly constituted within the context of specific discursive fields. 
Donnelly (2013: 17–19, 71) eschewed herself from poststructuralism in the 
process of analysing the Bush administration’s securitisation of the Iraq War in 
2003. For her, poststructuralist scholars ‘rely on deconstruction’ in which ‘any 
system of meaning, including discourse, will always be unfinished and unstable’. 
She instead combined critical constructivism with a Wittgensteinian approach to 
language so that ST is ‘conceptualised as a specialised language game’. While 
recognising that both critical constructivism and poststructuralism approaches 
‘set out to analyse the mutually constitutive relationship between agency, 
structure and language’, she took language more seriously with the concept of 
the ‘rule’, so that finding ‘intersubjective reference points that enable agents to 
act in one way as opposed to another’ can be possible. This is a good attempt 
and it indeed broadens the domain of ST by drawing on a language game. 
Although she focused more on the constructive role of language rather than on a 
not fixable meaning, her study is essentially interpretive and constitutive through 
which speeches, statements and interviews are traced. 
Sarai B. Aharoni’s (2014) study drew on a narrative approach as a 
distinctive form of DA. Borrowing Susan Chase’s definition, Aharoni (2014: 380) 
conceptualised narrative as ‘an oral or written act of retrospective meaning-
making of understanding one’s own and others’ actions’. By conducting semi-
structured face-to-face interviews with those who participated in Israeli-
Palestinian peace negotiations, from a feminist point of view, she identified that 
gender stereotyping could be enhanced and reproduced in strategic dialogue. 
Here, as elsewhere, ‘interpretive methodology’ is applied to capture ‘not only what 
was said, but also the meaning behind it’ (Aharoni 2014: 380–381). As Roxanna 
Sjöstedt (2013: 155) pointed out, ‘in terms of epistemology, interpretative 
methods can be used to examine collective ideas and identities’ as all ‘concepts 
are traced through text’. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The methodological sequence of research in the tradition of DA boils down to this: 
(1) Select an issue with a problem-driven (critical) approach; (2) Choose texts 
with comprehensive relevant knowledge, and if necessary, collect more data with 
the help of intertextuality; (3) Identify patterns of discourse used by securitising 
actors with the help of corpus-assisted DA; (4) Interpret and classify the discourse, 
and recontextualise a discursive structure. In particular, stage (3) can be divided 
into several phases. First, each securitising actor’s speech act will be examined 
by identifying the most frequent patterns of word usage. The frequent patterns 
will be shown in two steps: raw frequency and the keyness score. Second, on the 
basis of that, each keyword that constitutes frequent patterns will be analysed 
with the help of key-word-in-context techniques, which are part of corpus-based 
techniques (Wetherell et al. 2001). In that process, specific keywords that are 
deemed as more significant than others will be further investigated. The 
grammatical and collocational traits of those keywords will be analysed. Third, 
the core terms of this research—North Korea and nuclear—will also be examined 
in accordance with additional corpus-based techniques, such as t-scores and MI 
scores, which demonstrate association between a node word and collocates. 
Again, each collocate of the core terms will be analysed in order to identify 
characteristics of the actor’s security discourse. 
This chapter has discussed the fundamental methodological issue in terms 
of analysing security discourse within the context of ST. It seems that ST is able 
to explain itself conceptually, but not in a methodological way due to its 
complicated theoretical basis. Placing emphasis on a speech act in and of itself 
does not tell us in what way security discourse should be analysed. What 
keywords should be centred in terms of representing security discourse? How do 
we know that securitising actors’ speech acts are self-contradicting? How do we 
know that the actors’ speech acts are part of the intersubjective process? In what 
way can the ROK’s pattern of a securitising move best be delineated? These are 
the practical issues that this research turns to in the next section.  
Seoul’s security discourses on Pyongyang need to be re-evaluated or re-
read. Having considered this, the following three chapters will focus on each 
president’s speech acts and speech acts of the relevant securitising actors in 
order to find out whether the ROK securitising actors have misled the audience. 
 
 
84 
As noted, corpus-assisted DA and supplementary qualitative DA, such as 
interview and textual analysis, will be used as methods for investigating key texts. 
The discursive structure of the ROK securitising actors has not been disclosed in 
a proper and systematic way and, subsequently, resulted in both actors and 
audiences accepting the current discourse uncritically. Once the discursive traits 
of each administration have been analysed, the security discourses can be 
evaluated and compared in a more objective and comprehensive manner. This 
may well challenge taken-for-granted assumptions about the predominant 
discourse. This has provided the initiative for the research. 
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PART II. Evaluating Security Discourse 
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4.  
Roh Moo-hyun’s Security Discourse 
4.1 Did Roh desecuritise the DPRK’s nuclear issue? 
Previous chapters have shown the conceptual and methodological necessity for 
the analysis of security discourse in South Korea with regard to the North Korean 
nuclear issue. South Korean securitising actors have suffered not only from a 
scarcity of the information about the North Korean nuclear capability but also from 
an unpredictability of the North Korean decision making process. Therefore, it 
can be said that the security discourses produced by the ROK securitising actors 
were not based on reality but rather on a mixture of segmental facts and 
subjective perceptions. The Roh Moo-hyun administration was labelled as a 
progressive or a liberal political bloc, and President Roh referred to himself and 
his administration as being liberal (Oh 2009; Yoo 2010). As noted in Chapter 1, 
the current security discourse in South Korea has long been producing a 
discursive stereotype that the progressive administrations virtually desecuritised 
the DPRK’s nuclear issue. Chapter 4 and 5 will therefore be focused on 
ascertaining to what extent today’s discourse corresponds with the securitising 
actors’ speech acts in reality. This chapter consists of two parts: the first part 
deals with Roh’s speech acts patterns and, on that basis, the characteristics of 
the Roh administration’s securitising moves will be examined in the second part 
with the help of additional DA. 
 
4.1.1 Security as speech act 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, corpus linguistics can offer an important insight into 
analysing discourse at the initial step, particularly when there are enormous 
amounts of data. In addition to the information about word frequencies, by 
computing statistical significance among words frequently used, it can indicate 
some points that need to be more focused on during the process of analysis. In 
that regard, it can be said that Table 4.1 is an entry point of this chapter: it shows 
the top-twenty patterns of word usage by Roh during his presidency. The corpus 
(274,350 words) corresponds to all his speeches, which were formally translated 
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into English by the Presidential Office team. The most frequently used words in 
the table are derived by means of a trigram. A trigram is a kind of n-gram that 
aims to show a contiguous sequence of words, letters, and so on. An n-gram can 
include a unigram (a word), a bigram (a sequence of two words), a trigram (a 
sequence of three words), and four- or five-grams are also possible until an n-
gram exists. A unigram and a bigram have been ruled out because if these are 
applied, too many function words (i.e. determiners, auxiliary verbs, prepositions, 
Table 4.1 Roh’s top-twenty patterns of word usage (3-grams) 
2003 2004 2005 
Word Freq. word Freq. word Freq. 
the United States the Korean Peninsula North Korean nuclear on the Korean the North Korean in Northeast Asia as well as peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia of the Republic of peace and Republic of Korea the Republic of in the world and prosperity in the intl. community of the Korean Korean nuclear problem peace on the Korean nuclear issue 
78 74 72 65 64 61 60 55 46 40 40 38 36 36 36 35 34 33 32 31 
the two countries as well as our two countries the Republic of Republic of Korea of the two be able to North Korean nuclear the North Korean in Northeast Asia will be able between our two the National Assembly of the Republic the development of the Korean people the Korean Peninsula Korean nuclear issue I hope that of Northeast Asia 
53 52 40 37 37 35 34 33 29 27 26 26 24 24 23 23 23 23 22 21 
as well as Republic of Korea in the world the two countries be able to the Republic of of the Korean the Government will would like to will continue to our two countries the development of ladies and gentlemen I would like to of the Republic serve as a will serve as the Korean people in Northeast Asia between our two 
47 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 29 29 28 27 27 27 25 24 23 23 23 23 
2006 2007 Total 
word Freq. word Freq. word Freq. 
as well as would like to I would like the two countries the Korean people the Republic of be able to of the Korean Republic of Korea the Korean Peninsula of the Republic our two countries will continue to on the Korean the intl. community the United States between our two The Government will the National Assembly in Northeast Asia 
61 51 48 46 46 44 44 43 42 41 38 35 33 33 29 29 29 27 25 24 
the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean be able to North Korean nuclear the Korean people the North Korean would like to the Six-Party Talks the Participatory Gov. I would like the United States Korean nuclear issue I hope that the National Assembly peace and prosperity Korean Peninsula and will be able in the world 
85 75 72 64 52 44 43 41 38 36 33 33 32 32 30 29 29 27 27 27 
as well as the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia be able to North Korean nuclear on the Korean the North Korean Republic of Korea the United States the Republic of of the Korean would like to I would like of the Republic the Korean people in the world peace and prosperity our two countries will continue to the National Assembly 
292 241 210 195 190 188 172 172 170 166 165 162 152 147 145 141 138 131 121 116  
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coordinators, subordinators and so on) could be included, and consequently 
those words could encroach on many parts of the top position in the table. 
Of course, it cannot be said that a table based on a trigram is totally free 
from the influence of function words, and nor can it be guaranteed that there is 
‘any relation among units in n-gram’ (SketchEngine 2015b). For example, one 
can see in Table 4.1 that ‘as well as’, which is generally used as either a 
conjunction or preposition, is ranked top in the total. The sequence of words like 
‘be able to’, ‘would like to’ or ‘I would like’ also do not mean anything by 
themselves. These would be meaningful only when they are used in a wider 
context that includes sentences or paragraphs. Aside from this, some terms seem 
to overlap. For example, in 2003, the term ‘Republic of Korea’ (38 times) and ‘the 
Republic of’ (36 times) were likely to be extracted from the same sentences in 
many situations. However, no one can guarantee that both terms were used 
exactly in the same situation and therefore the table included all the patterns 
without exception. 
A noun like ‘Republic of Korea’ is also relatively insubstantial as it simply 
stands for self of the relevant corpus. Although the way of representing self is 
important in analysing discourse, it might not be easy to infer specific discursive 
traits from the simple number, meaning absolute frequency. Nonetheless, it 
should be noticed that nouns like ‘the North Korean’, ‘the Korean Peninsula’, ‘in 
Northeast Asia’ and ‘the United States’ were frequently used as part of Roh’s 
speech acts, as these words are representing the others and structures that are 
seen as significant to self and construction of its identity. It is important to note 
that the raw frequency, which is shown in the second column of each year in the 
table, ‘often picks out the obvious collocates’ (Clear 1995). Hence it might be fair 
to say that the Roh administration’s security discourse, through which its social 
and political practice was implemented, was formed around these words. 
Most importantly, this table gives readers an important pattern by showing 
several lexical words from which readers can extrapolate meaningful contexts. 
The table clearly shows that many of Roh’s speech act patterns consist of North 
Korea or its nuclear issue-related words (‘North Korean nuclear’, ‘Korean nuclear 
issue’, ‘the Six-Party Talks’, and so on). Given that the frequencies of these words 
correspond to what Roh emphasised in his speech, it can be said that the security 
issue was absolutely central to Roh, among other issues. The corpus used in this 
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table is not just about security issues; it covers all parts of Roh’s speeches 
throughout the field, including diplomacy, economy, culture, society, art, and so 
forth (that is, the corpus is not limited to Roh’s security-related addresses; it 
represents all of the addresses). Readers may also reason that the North Korean 
issue or the North’s nuclear issues are closely linked to the Korean peninsula, 
Northeast Asia, and the US, all of which take up a significant amount of space in 
the table. 
The keywords extracted by other n-grams show similar results. In Table 4.2, 
the most frequently used words have been derived by 4- and 5-grams (the corpus 
of this table is the same as the previous table). This makes the context in which 
the words are used clearer. Here, again, it is clear that security-related words are 
seen everywhere in the table. As in the case of the previous table, this too 
indicates several discursive traits of Roh’s speech acts. Firstly, the North Korean 
nuclear issue and related issues virtually constitute almost all of the main 
speeches reflecting lexical words. Secondly, one can infer the fact that the 
international system cannot be ignored in relation to the DPRK’s nuclear issue 
from phrases like ‘peace on the Korean Peninsula’ and ‘peace and prosperity in 
Northeast’. This roughly shows the way that Roh thought about the 
connectedness between international systems (structure) and the North Korean 
Table 4.2 Roh’s top-twenty patterns of word usage (n-grams) 
4-grams 5-grams 
word Freq. word Freq. 
on the Korean Peninsula the North Korean nuclear I would like to The Republic of Korea of the Republic of North Korean nuclear issue will be able to as well as the from home and abroad between our two countries peace and prosperity in peace on the Korean of the two countries the Korean Peninsula and guests from home and of the Korean people will serve as a prosperity in Northeast Asia of peace and prosperity me in a toast 
175 164 150 140 120 113 112 77 75 75 66 64 61 60 58 57 56 56 56 55 
the North Korean nuclear issue of the Republic of Korea peace on the Korean Peninsula guests from home and abroad join me in a toast me in a toast to and prosperity in Northeast Asia peace and prosperity in Northeast Please join me in a on the Korean Peninsula and in a toast to the distinguished guests from home and the North Korean nuclear problem and distinguished guests from home toast to the good health a toast to the good of peace and prosperity in to the good health of wish every one of you I am very pleased to 
100 100 64 58 55 53 53 52 51 49 49 45 42 41 37 37 36 35 32 30 
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nuclear issue. Last but not least, the table corroborates that Roh was cognisant 
of the fact that the resolution to the DPRK’s nuclear issue is directly linked to the 
peace on the Korean peninsula and prosperity in Northeast Asia. 
This also proves the fact that Roh did not desecuritise the nuclear issue. 
The frequency of his articulation of the relevant issue itself seems to indicate that 
Roh raised the securitising move from the level of politicisation to securitisation. 
In other words, the North Korean nuclear issue had been articulated in a constant 
manner during the period of the Roh administration. In that respect, given the 
influence of presidential addresses of the ROK, it can be said that the nuclear 
issue had invariably been practised with all types of social and political practice 
in South Korea. If not a perlocutionary act, at least Roh’s speech acts could 
constitute an illocutionary act. Of course, one needs to analyse further to examine 
his speech acts in detail focusing more on pertinent issues: in what way was the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue articulated? How can the key elements of ST—referent 
objects and extraordinary measures—be delineated in Roh’s speeches? The 
following sections deal with such matters. 
 
4.1.2 Conflicting referent objects 
According to ST, an issue ‘is managed within the standard political system’ during 
the period of politicisation, whereas the issue arises as ‘an existential threat to a 
referent object’ at the stage of securitisation (Emmers 2007: 112). What then is a 
referent object to the ROK government? As outlined in the previous chapter, 
common sense tells us that there are several referent objects to the South Korean 
governments, all of which are related to the value of South Korea’s Constitution. 
With regard to this, liberal democracy, based on fair market economy, may well 
be the ROK’s referent object. The Constitution of the ROK clearly stipulates 
(Article 1) that ‘the ROK shall be a democratic republic. The sovereignty of the 
ROK shall reside in the people, and all state authority shall emanate from the 
people’. Article 119 conditions that ‘the economic order of the ROK shall be based 
on a respect for the freedom and creative initiative of enterprises and individuals 
in economic affairs. The state may regulate and coordinate economic affairs in 
order to […] prevent the domination of the market and the abuse of economic 
power […]’. 
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The next referent object is relevant to national security. With regard to this, 
national security and the defence of the land are compared to the ‘sacred mission’ 
in Article 5 of the Constitution. Article 37 shows how important defending national 
security is by stipulating that ‘the freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted 
by Act only when necessary for national security, […]’. The importance of the 
ROK-US alliance comes out of this point. When North Korea, under the patronage 
of the Soviet Union and China, invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, a UN 
coalition led by the US was determined to defend the South. The war fell into a 
stalemate after China entered, and it finally ended as a result of signing an 
armistice in July 1953. The entire peninsula could have been under the control of 
the communist North Korea without the US’s military assistance. Before the US-
led counterattack, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) easily overwhelmed 
South Korean forces in a surprise attack. 
At the conclusion of the Korean War (1950–1953), during which around 
37,000 Americans were killed, the ROK and the US signed a Mutual Defence 
Treaty in November 1953. Since a peace treaty has never been signed amongst 
the countries involved in the Korean War, Article VI of the treaty stipulates that 
‘this treaty shall remain in force indefinitely’. In essence, the ROK-US alliance is 
the foundation of national security for South Korea. As far as South Korean 
national security is concerned, the existence of the alliance is indispensable. In 
this sense, the US troops have been regarded as sacrosanct in the ROK. Roh 
himself evinced this perception several times: 
The Korea-US alliance, forged with blood, has been instrumental in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia, in addition to security in Korea for the past 50 years. At the Korea-US summit in May, President George W. Bush and I agreed to further solidify the bilateral alliance. During my visit to Washington, I had the opportunity to meet Korean War veterans and was quite impressed by their pride and unchanging love for Korea. (Roh 2003c: 26 July) 
Last but not least, peaceful unification is a supreme task for South Korea. 
The word ‘unification’ is mentioned nine times in the Constitution and seven times 
with the term ‘peaceful’ (English version). This fact alone substantiates that 
peaceful unification is a Maginot Line for the ROK. Regarding this, the 
Constitution (Article 4) specifies that ‘the ROK shall seek unification and shall 
formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free 
and democratic order’. Articles 66 and 69 of the Constitution more directly impose 
a duty of pursuing peaceful unification on South Korean presidents. However, 
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maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations, which is a prerequisite to peaceful 
unification, is another problem. The issue of conflicting referent objects arises 
from this point. There are two issues: one is residing in the ROK’s own 
contradiction and the other is about the ROK’s relative position of inter-Korean 
relations. These two things are closely related to each other. In reference to the 
former, Article 3 of the Constitution of the ROK may come up. It prescribes that 
‘the territory of the ROK shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent 
islands’. According to this Article, North Korea is an anti-government organisation 
that is taking possession of the northern part of the peninsula. This Article forms 
the backbone of the legitimacy of peaceful unification, but at the same time, 
ironically, it has been an obstacle to establishing peaceful inter-Korean relations 
because of its inherent message: North Korea is illegally taking over half of the 
Korean peninsula. 
Article 3 therefore has been central to debates in South Korea concerning 
its perspective on North Korea. The following dialogue derived from the debate 
at the National Assembly of the ROK. The debate is between a then member of 
the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Hong Jun-pyo and Kim Seung-gyo, 
who was a solicitor attending the Committee (NA 3/12/2004). 
1. HONG: Did you say that Article 3 (territorial clause) is a declaratory stipulation? 2. KIM: It should be interpreted like that -- 3. HONG: Is it represented like that in the Constitution? Is there any country  4. that regards a territorial clause as a mere thing which has just been mentioned once? 5. KIM: Nowadays many Constitutional scholars also think like me. Therefore how to  6. see the conflicting problem between Article 3 and Article 4 (unification clause) -- 7. HONG: Article 4 is all about how to unify. That Article declares that we should unify 8. the peninsula peacefully and not by invasion or war. I don’t understand the way 9. you construe Article 3: a territorial clause does not have a regulatory power. 10. KIM: There are many declaratory stipulations other than the territorial clause. 11. HONG: Declaratory stipulations themselves are many. 12. KIM: In any case, a considerable number of Constitutional scholars are 13. of the same opinion. 14. HONG: I’ve never heard that a considerable number of Constitutional scholars share 15. the view of such opinions. 
The gist of Kim’s story may be as follows: given that North Korea is a proper 
nation in terms of international law and it does exist in reality, any inter-Korean 
relations would necessarily be conflicting if we keep denying the North’s regime 
or its legality. Therefore, it would be better to think that Seoul has already 
acknowledged the Pyongyang regime. In this sense, Article 3 of the Constitution 
could be interpreted as a declaratory stipulation that does not exert regulatory 
power. However, from Hong’s perspective, perhaps it would be hard to accept 
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the fact that the DPRK has been acknowledged since it should be seen as an 
anti-government entity. As can be seen in lines 7–9, Hong cannot agree with Kim 
because Article 3 should be construed as a regulatory stipulation not limited to a 
mere declaration. Perhaps this dialogue shows Hong’s concerns that the current 
divided situation on the Korean peninsula would last much longer if South 
Koreans accepted the North’s regime as a normal state. As this thesis will later 
show, these kinds of concerns have been real, particularly among the so-called 
conservatives and this logic forms one of the central parts of the ongoing debates. 
The problem of this perceptual discrepancy is inseparably linked to the issue 
of inter-Korean relations. Making peaceful inter-Korean relations does not 
depend solely upon South Korean securitising actors, and many parts of the task 
rely on North Korean actors. Just as South Korean actors are struggling with the 
incongruity between their constitutional principle and the reality, the North Korean 
actors also exert much effort to maintain their own referent objects derived from 
political identities that appear to deviate from the general thoughts of the 
international community. The Socialist Constitution of the DPRK, which was 
amended and supplemented on 1 April 2013, stipulates in Article 9 that ‘the DPRK 
shall strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of 
Korea […] and reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful 
reunification and great national unity’. From this clause, one can infer that North 
Korea is aiming to reunify the peninsula under the flag of socialism. One caveat 
here is that in North Korea the North Korean Worker’s party (NKWP) is more 
influential than any other governing bodies, which can be seen in Article 11 of the 
Constitution: ‘the DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the 
NKWP’.  
What is more, the regulation of the NKWP clearly indicates that it 
strengthens the Juche ideology by holding fast to Marxism–Leninism, while 
showing strong disapproval of ‘reactionary and opportunistic’ thoughts, such as 
capitalism, feudal Confucianism, revisionism, sycophancy and so on (NKWP 
2010). The political philosophy Juche often refers to the ‘creative application of 
Marxist-Leninist principles to the modern political realities in North Korea’ (Lee 
2003: 105), which was initiated by Kim Il-sung, a founding father of the DPRK. 
The core elements of the Juche ideology include Jaju (domestic and foreign 
independence), Jarip (economic independence) and Jawi (military independence) 
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(Lee 2003). According to the regulation of the NKWP, the ultimate goal of the 
DPRK is to put the entire peninsula under the flag of Juche (NKWP 2010). As can 
be seen in the Preamble of the Socialist Constitution, the Juche ideology would 
be ‘immortal’ as long as the current Kim regime survives. 
Seon-gun policy, which refers to military-first, is another key concept of the 
DPRK. Seon-gun has been central since the Kim Jong-il era, and it represents 
the military’s primacy in society. Seon-gun is also ‘referred to as chongdae 
cheolhak, meaning “the barrel-of-a-gun policy”, which is a reference to Mao 
Zedong’s idea that “political power grows from the barrel of a gun”’ (Nelson 2013: 
90). Juche ideology can be protected by Seon-gun policy. Hence, both are 
complementary as ideological or philosophical weaponry. Another goal of these 
ideologies is to drive out American imperialism, which has generally led to the 
contention that the US armed forces should be expelled from the ROK (NKWP 
2010). 
The referent object of the DPRK is therefore the antithesis of that of the 
ROK. In terms of the political and economic system, it seems nearly impossible 
that Pyongyang’s own style of socialism based on Juche and Seon-gun can 
coexist with the ROK’s ideological identities. In relation to the international 
(regional) system, the structure of the ROK-US alliance, which is deemed ‘sacred’ 
in the ROK, is unacceptable in the DPRK. Considered in this framework, it indeed 
may be said that maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations is one of the most 
difficult jobs for South Korean securitising actors given the disparate referent 
objects between the two Koreas. The dilemma between defining state security 
and pursuing the goal of peaceful unification seems to be perpetual until grave 
material variables occur (e.g. sudden leadership change of the DPRK regime, 
breakout of full-scale war, etc.). 
Can we find this kind of dilemmatic situation in Roh’s speeches? Table 4.3 
shows the top-twenty keywords extracted by the keyness score. The way of 
extracting words by the keyness score was already explained in the previous 
chapter. The main corpus in this table is the same as that of the previous tables 
in this chapter: all Roh’s speeches during his presidency from February 2003 to 
February 2008. The reference corpus used here is called enTenTen [2012], which 
includes 11,191,860,036 words (12,968,375,937 tokens). This time, the words 
that were originally in the ranking but have a weak correlation with the North 
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Korean issue are excluded so that one can detect more relevant words presented 
by Roh.28 This table gives different insights from the previous tables, which only 
indicated a simple arithmetic count of the number of words. As mentioned, a 
result by the keyness score would be meaningful, in that it provides an analytically 
important point whereby one can extrapolate more general features of each 
keyword used by a securitising actor from a broader perspective. The words in 
brackets are also extracted by the same method, all of which are closely related 
to the original keywords. 
First, interestingly, many of the words included in the table directly or 
indirectly point to the aforementioned referent objects that were derived from the 
values of the Constitution. At first glance, Roh seemed to put more weight on 
peaceful inter-Korean relations. Words like ‘prosperity’, ‘cooperation’, 
‘coexistence’, ‘peacefully’, ‘exchanges’ and ‘reconciliation’ stand for peaceful 
inter-Korean relations in a straight manner, while the words ‘Gaeseong’ and 
‘summit’ symbolise such relations in a relatively indirect way. The words 
‘unification’ and ‘compatriots’ clearly show that Roh perceived North Korea as a 
country consisting of fellow nationals that should be unified with South Korea. To 
                                            28  The excluded words, for example, are excellency, APEC, Gwangju, Geonbae (cheers), congratulatory, gentlemen, and so forth. 
Table 4.3 Extracted keywords in Roh’s speeches 
Keywords keyness score main corpus frequency reference corpus frequency 
Northeast(Asia) Gaeseong(GIC) peninsula prosperity(coprosperity) cooperation(cooperative) coexistence Pyongyang democratisation(democracy) denuclearisation(nuclear) peacefully(peace) exchanges(dialogue) confrontation(confrontational) multilateral(diplomatic) reconciliation OPCON(USFK) distrust summit substantive friendship(reaffirmed) unification(compatriots) 
137.03(46.99) 125.83(27.92) 115.63 94.82(40.18) 91.41(33.62) 82.75 81.60 77.58(27.29) 58.73(27.68) 57.44(30.68) 51.73(28.11) 47.45(30.14) 46.61(38.92) 43.28 39.62(39.53) 35.39 34.84 33.39 32.04(31.67) 30.56(27.82) 
418(521) 39(11) 303 310(12) 702(111) 46 50 42(217) 19(397) 67(702) 148(194) 72(16) 42(88) 95 12(12) 30 222 48 162(20) 25(14) 
116,355(456,988) 265(4,188) 98,153 125,671(5) 312,508(127,784) 10,739 13,149 10,132(324,328) 958(595,040) 36,672(956,788) 108,495(279,829) 51,584(9,954) 25,487(83,160) 80,318 191(219) 23,305 257,336 48,314 201,647(14,193) 22,111(8,815)  
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sum up, peaceful inter-Korean relations and a subsequent peaceful process of 
unification as referent objects are clearly shown in Roh’s speeches. 
With regard to this, the word ‘Gaeseong’, which is ranked 2nd, needs to be 
highlighted, as the ‘Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)’ is a symbol of inter-
Korean cooperation. The GIC, located just across the DMZ from South Korea, 
was launched in 2003 in order to ease tensions between the two Koreas by 
founding an industrial park where South Korean finance and manufacturing 
businesses are combined with North Korea’s relatively cheap labour. This is 
important because the meaning of Gaeseong is not only a path to peaceful inter-
Korean relations, but is also an instrument for North Korea’s reform and openness 
whereby Pyongyang can conform to the market economy in the long term. Roh’s 
belief in liberal democracy and market economies, both of which were referred to 
as the core referent objects of the ROK, seems to be robust. 
I have been trying to apply democracy in every field of state administration–fundamental principles and trust, fairness and transparency, dialogue and compromise, […] It is my belief that democracy and the market economy are the two most successful systems devised by humanity. During the past century, nations of the world prospered or failed depending on whether they adopted a market economy or not.  (Roh 2004c: 2 December) 
Based on this perception of market economies, he urged North Korea to open its 
door while abandoning its nuclear programme. It goes without saying that he 
wanted the North Koreans to be exposed to a market economy. 
North Korea is now at a grave crossroads determining whether it will continue in isolation or opt for openness. The choice will not be easy for the incumbent North Korean leadership. I hope that North Korea will take this occasion to abandon its nuclear program and choose the path to coexistence and openness. (Roh 2003d: 13 May) 
However, the way Roh persuaded North Korea to open its society appears 
to have changed since his visit to North Korea and meeting with the North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il in October 2007. 
I had an important experience during my visit to Pyongyang. We have believed and said that reform and opening up is a good thing and that success of the GIC would bring about reform and openness in North Korea. In the North, I learned that the North Koreans are not pleased at such remarks by us, and now I think we were a little careless to seek to expedite the opening of North Korea through the success of the GIC. (Roh 2007d: 14 October) 
This speech sounds a bit strange, inasmuch as almost everyone in South Korea 
was already well cognisant of the fact that North Korea had shown an adverse 
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reaction to the term ‘reform and openness’, and North Korea had been reluctant 
to open its society. Perhaps it might be Roh’s strategic remark to elicit more 
positive responses from Pyongyang in terms of economic cooperation; even so, 
it sounds somewhat unnatural to many South Korean audiences to hear that Roh 
‘newly’ learned that Pyongyang is not pleased at the terms ‘reform and openness’. 
After all, Roh’s referent objects—making peaceful inter-Korean relations through 
a market economy system—were confronted with the DPRK’s Juche ideology. 
Roh had no option but to acknowledge that there is an ongoing ‘confrontation’ 
and ‘distrust’ between the two Koreas. 
Second, the words ‘Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)’ and ‘United 
States Forces Korea (USFK)’, ‘friendship’ and ‘reaffirmed’ connote the 
importance of the ROK-US alliance in terms of South Korean national security. 
Regardless of the contexts in which these words are used, as mentioned, there 
is no doubt that the existence of USFK has been essential to all the ROK 
governments. The words ‘friendship’ and ‘reaffirmed’ were also Roh’s favourite 
ones when he emphasised the value of the alliance. The issue of ‘OPCON’, 
however, seems slightly different, because the progressive and conservative 
groups differed in opinion as to whether South Korea should get wartime OPCON 
back to the ROK.29 
It is known that the Roh administration actively requested regaining wartime 
OPCON, resulting in an agreement with the Bush administration to a complete 
transfer by April 2012. 30  It is interesting that many of the conservative US 
securitising actors were also supportive of Roh’s plan (Niksch 2010; Klingner 
2011; Rumsfeld 2011). The point here is that the OPCON issue had already been 
politicised, and the issue itself is security-related, hence the issue was well-
framed as a security question within the South Korean discursive realm. The 
liberal bloc thought that getting back OPCON would be to regain the ROK’s 
referent object as national security, whereas the conservatives saw it as 
jeopardising the ROK’s security environment (Hwang 2010b). However, Roh was 
confident that the ROK armed forces would do very well with recovered OPCON. 
                                            29 The US took OPCON shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. While peacetime OPCON was transferred to the ROK in 1994, wartime OPCON is still under the control of the Combined Forces Command led by a US Army four-star general. 30 The transfer was delayed to December 2015 at the time of Lee Myung-bak’s presidency. In October 2014, however, the ROK and the US yet again reversed the decision: ‘the transfer will focus on South Korea achieving critical defensive capabilities against an intensifying North Korean threat. Therefore, no new date for transferring OPCON will be set’ (DoD 2014). 
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For him, the issue of regaining OPCON was to do with South Korea’s referent 
object, as the following quotation indicates: 
Why should we hold back in exercising our own OPCON? Now, I would like to point out that the ROK faces the diplomatic reality of having to deal with North Korea and China. We certainly do not want any contingency situation to let alone war in our relations with North Korea, but sadly we have to presuppose and prepare for such a situation. […] When Korea discusses Northeast Asian security matters with China after having regained operation control, wouldn’t China be more likely to listen to what we have to say?  (Roh 2006b: 22 December) 
Roh considered regaining OPCON a crucial diplomatic significance, but he 
did not provide the public with possible and cogent scenarios in which the ROK’s 
decision-making process cannot function because of the absence of OPCON. 
Even though his contention—South Korea must not be engaged in any 
contingency situation against its will—was right, the visible existential threat was 
North Korea’s nuclear weapon, rather than uncertain eventualities. In addition to 
that, deterring nuclear attack by the North should be placed at the centre of any 
kind of contingencies in the region. Seen from this perspective, the issue of 
regaining OPCON was not successfully securitised because Roh seemed to be 
short of having persuasive power to separate one referent object (regaining 
wartime OPCON as a way of strengthening South Korea’s defensive and 
diplomatic capability in contingencies) from another referent object (the ROK-US 
alliance as a deterrent to the DPRK’s sabre-rattling), as well as failing to show 
the urgency of recovering OPCON to the audience. 
Third, more importantly, the words ‘denuclearisation’ and ‘nuclear’ allude to 
the fact that Roh tried to articulate the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, 
Roh was well aware that the North’s threat is existent, which can imperil the 
South’s referent objects. As aforementioned, Roh’s articulation of the relevant 
issues was consistent and frequent. In addition to this, an in-depth reading of the 
word ‘substantive’ shows that Roh attempted to find appropriate measures by 
which North Korea can be denuclearised. These words also imply that in order to 
maintain peaceful inter-Korean relations, Roh had to come to terms with a North 
Korea that held fast to developing its own nuclear programme. The issue of the 
substantive measures (how to deal with the DPRK and its nuclear threat) will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Aside from this, the high keyness score of the words ‘Northeast’ and 
‘peninsula’, each of which means Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula, 
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implies that Roh emphasised that South Korean referent objects ought to be 
thought of within the context of the international (or regional) system. His 
standpoint appears to be in line with the regionalist perspective that opines that 
‘the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and 
cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars to explore 
contemporary security affairs’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 10). 
In sum, tying all the extracted keywords and pertinent quotations together 
shows that Roh struggled to match each referent object of the ROK: peaceful 
inter-Korean relations, ROK-US alliance, liberal democracy and market economy. 
No new referent objects of the ROK emerged within the extracted keywords. It 
also shows that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and its strong aversion to reform 
and openness are two of the biggest stumbling blocks that caused the collision 
among the ROK’s referent objects. However, the table itself does not provide us 
with Roh’s extraordinary measures whereby the issues of the conflicting objects 
and the DPRK’s nuclear threat can be solved. This brings us to the next step of 
securitisation: what measures should the securitising actors take? What could 
‘substantive’ measures be? What securitising moves can be legitimised by the 
audience even when the moves break the rules of the standard political system? 
 
4.1.3 Limited extraordinary measures 
The previous two sections of this research have shown that Roh, as the head of 
state, articulated the North Korean nuclear issue with a high frequency in a 
constant manner, and the issue was at the centre of the Roh administration’s 
securitising moves. The gravity of the issue was clearly articulated from the very 
beginning of Roh’s presidency: 
North Korea’s nuclear development can never be condoned. Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development. If it renounces its nuclear development programme, the international community will offer many things that it wants. (Roh 2003a: 25 February) 
His perception of this issue as an existential threat remained until the last year of 
his tenure: 
Korea is channelling its best efforts into the GIC project, a fledgling window of opportunity. The biggest impediment to this goal is the issue of the North Korean nuclear program, which has not been resolved yet. We have put a lot of effort into resolving this issue, but we don’t hold the key.  (Roh 2007e: 25 March) 
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This speech is interesting. Although he emphasised that the nuclear issue 
is still the biggest impediment, Roh acknowledged that South Korea does not hold 
the key to solving the North Korean nuclear issue. This is important because 
‘playing a leading role’ in solving the issue was one of the three main principles 
that he put forward throughout his presidency (another two principles were no 
tolerance for the North’s nuclear weapons and a peaceful resolution). Having no 
key for a solution does not necessarily mean that they forsook their original will 
to play a leading role. Nevertheless, his acknowledgment alluded to Seoul’s limit 
when it comes to its capability to substantialise its securitisation against 
Pyongyang. In other words, the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be fully 
securitised by South Korea in a way that the CS originally intended. 
According to the CS, ‘securitisation is not fulfilled only by breaking rules 
(which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to 
nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking of rules’ 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Why is breaking rules needed when securitising 
something? As mentioned in Chapter 3, ST is called a ‘threat-urgency modality’ 
(Donnelly 2013). Securitising actors assert that without taking extraordinary 
measures, the threat would significantly expand. Therefore, the securitisation 
process provides the actors ‘with the special right to use exceptional means’ 
(Emmers 2007: 114). In short, the securitising process is often apart from a 
standard political system, and the actors break a rule that is applied to a normal 
situation in the process of securitisation. 
The Iraq War is often referred to as an example of securitisation which was 
not successful from ST’s perspective in that securitising actors failed to persuade 
audiences. The main securitising actors of the Iraq War were US President 
George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and they justified their 
invasion of Iraq with the pretext of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that 
Saddam Hussein might have. Many audiences, either in the US/UK or in other 
countries, could not accept the actors’ assertion that Saddam’s WMD were an 
existential threat to the Western world. In this process, the US and the UK 
launched an attack on Iraq without getting a UN mandate: they broke an 
international rule (Emmers 2007; Donnelly 2013). 
The ROK’s securitisation process seems quite the opposite compared to 
the Iraq War case. The DPRK’s WMD system, including nuclear weapons and 
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ballistic missiles, has been widely accepted as an existential threat to South 
Korea, Japan and the US. In this respect, Roh also pointed out that ‘the North 
Korean nuclear problem is an issue requiring an urgent solution’ (Roh 2003e). 
However, in the case of the DPRK’s WMD threat, a boundary of extraordinary 
measures has fairly been circumscribed. As stated in Chapter 2, it is very hard to 
imagine a war with North Korea because of its considerable armed force and, in 
particular, the forward deployments of its troops near the DMZ. In 1993, the 
Pentagon concluded that ‘a war in Korea could cost as many as 500,000 military 
casualties within the first ninety days, more lives than were lost throughout the 
1950–1953 war’ (Sigal 1999: 211). Even a surgical strike on North Korea’s 
nuclear sites runs the risk of triggering a full-scale war. 
What emerges from this brief account leads us to consider another possible 
extraordinary means: what can lead North Korea to come to a decision about 
denuclearisation? As mentioned, the form of breaking rules can have a variety of 
forms insofar as the means is adopted as a special tool by which an actor can 
lessen the level of existential threat. Hence, it does not necessarily need to be a 
form of breaking the positive law or international law. Instead, it may be either a 
form of enactment of special law or recognised as acts of state doctrine. The US 
Patriot Act after the 9/11 attack in 2001 could be one of the examples of this case. 
As outlined in Table 3.1, possible extraordinary measures, which are 
relatively plausible, in the case of the North Korean nuclear threat can be either 
coercive policy (threats based on sanctions) or engagement (dialogue) policy. 
What is interesting is that both of these measures have a certain level of rule-
breaking traits, in that coercive policy jeopardises the possibility of peaceful inter-
Korean relations, which is guaranteed by the Constitution of the ROK (Article 4), 
whereas engagement policy impinges on Article 3 of the Constitution, which does 
not recognise North Korea as a legal state. This is why the ROK governments, 
regardless of whether they are based on conservative or progressive ideology, 
have so far indicated that their contacts with North Korea can be legitimised by 
the name of tongchi-haengwe (prerogative or acts of state; acte de 
gouvernement). 
The point here is that every securitising actor in South Korea must accept 
the reality that they are performing the acts of state based on legal dualism (Kim 
2014a). This is because they have no option but to acknowledge the fact that 
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North Korea is controlling half of the Korean peninsula as an actual country. In 
this respect, the legal dualism is predicated on the dual fact relationship in the 
peninsula. The relationship between the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation 
Act (IECA) and the National Security Act of South Korea (NSA) shows this 
situation well. For instance, Article 1 of the IECA stipulates that ‘the purpose of 
this Act is to contribute to the peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula by 
prescribing matters necessary to promote reciprocal exchange and cooperation 
between the area south and north of the Military Demarcation Line’. Article 3 of 
the same Act specifies its relations with other Acts: ‘With respect to any activities 
aiming to reciprocal exchange and cooperation between South Korea and North 
Korea, […], this Act shall prevail over other Acts, to the extent of the purposes of 
this Act’. 
On the contrary, the NSA was made ‘to secure the security of the State and 
the subsistence and freedom of nationals’ (Article 1). Article 2 of the Act stipulates 
that ‘for the purpose of this Act, the term “anti-government organisation” means 
a domestic or foreign organisation or group which uses fraudulently the title of 
government or aims at a rebellion against the State, and which is provided with a 
command and leadership system’. In the NSA, there is no doubt that the term 
‘anti-government organisation’ refers to North Korea.  
To sum up, there can be no common ground upon which both Acts might 
coexist unless the legal system introduces the concept of a dualistic structure. 
This might be read easily when we think of the relationship between international 
law and national law, as dualists emphasise that ‘between internal and 
international provisions there cannot exist any kind of conflicts since these 
provisions don’t have the same object’ (Marian 2007: 17). However, just as 
international legal experts come to terms with a complicated reality to which such 
a dualistic view can rarely be applied, the ROK securitising actors also struggle 
with the reality in which they are facing the DPRK, which has a duplex feature. 
Consequently, this in part constitutes a discursive chasm that has made Seoul’s 
securitisation implausible. In a sense, therefore, ROK actors have always been 
practising rule-breaking in their securitising moves. 
As can be seen in his remarks at the inaugural banquet in February 2003, 
Roh clearly expressed that he would choose an engagement policy as an 
extraordinary means against the North Korean nuclear issue: ‘no matter what 
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difficulty lies ahead, the issue should be resolved peacefully. Dialogue is the only 
way to a solution’ (Roh 2003e). Two points arise from this: to what extent is an 
engagement policy (dialogue or negotiation) effective as an extraordinary 
measure? What kind of sub-measures were proposed and adopted to 
substantialise the measures? Had a securitising actor come up with real 
extraordinary measures against the enemy’s existential threat, a corpus 
representing the actor’s speech acts would have included some clues from which 
one could infer that the actor intended to lessen the level of threats. 
Again, corpus-assisted DA can provide us with another significant entry 
point by giving collocated words that are closely related to the main issue. As this 
thesis directly deals with Seoul’s discourses on Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, the 
core terms would be ‘North Korea’ and ‘nuclear’. It is expected that almost every 
speech act of the actors regarding extraordinary measures would be connected 
with these two words. Therefore, if the actors had had substantive means against 
the threat, there must have been some collocated words that indicate the means 
in one way or another. Regarding this, Table 4.4 gives the top-twenty collocates 
of ‘North’ (Buk in Korean, referring to North Korea) with the highest t-scores and 
MI scores respectively. Collocation refers to ‘the habitual or characteristic co-
occurrence patterns of words’ (Xiao 2013). The node word here is ‘North’, and 
hence the twenty words can be called the node word North’s collocates. A lexical 
Table 4.4 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of North 
Collocate T-score Collocate MI score 
nuclear Korean Korea (nuclear) issue South (Korea) (nuclear) problem (nuclear) programme resolve peacefully peaceful help (nuclear) test dialogue solution (nuclear) weapons resolution cooperation resolving trust peninsula 
16.169 15.138 14.080 11.344 8.742 7.511 5.800 5.620 5.073 4.434 4.005 3.978 3.907 3.855 3.584 3.576 3.545 3.446 3.180 3.158 
nuclear dismantlement missiles South (Korea) compatriots missile dismantling abandon solution (nuclear) issue peacefully (nuclear) problem (nuclear) programme athletes resolving collapse attack  (nuclear) test (nuclear) weapons resolve 
8.399 8.241 8.104 8.075 7.978 7.978 7.978 7.756 7.756 7.630 7.613 7.592 7.574 7.563 7.563 7.519 7.493 7.486 7.393 7.264  
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collocation allows researchers ‘to generate lists of words that co-occur frequently 
with’ the node word (SketchEngine 2015a). As the collocations are directly related 
to North Korea, one may closely notice how Roh perceived North Korea. In the t-
score part of the table, function words (e.g. the, to, and, of, etc.) are excluded. 
The MI stands for Mutual Information, which indicates ‘the strength of the 
bond between two items, that is, whether there is a higher-than-random 
probability of the two items occurring together’ (Mautner 2009: 125). Put 
differently, one can observe the strength of association between two items via the 
MI score. The t-score is to figure out the certainty of collocation. It is about ‘the 
confidence with which we can assert that there is an association’ (Collins 2008). 
Jem Clear (1995) opined that ‘it is very safe to claim that there is some non-
random association’ between two items. In sum, both of these measurements are 
good supplements for finding an actor’s discursive traits, as there is no way of 
distinguishing the collocates ‘objectively from frequent non-collocates’ (Collins 
2008). The t-score (1) and MI-score (2) are calculated according to the following 
formula respectively (SketchEngine 2014):31 
 
௙ಲಳି೑ಲ೑ಳಿඥ௙ಲಳ                                                      (1) 
logଶ ௙ಲಳே௙ಲ௙ಳ                                                     (2) 
 
Richard Xiao (2013) pointed out that if the MI score is 3.0 or higher it can be taken 
as evidence, and a 2.0 or higher t-score is expected to be statistically significant. 
The words extracted by these scores are important since not only can a 
researcher get information on a securitising actor’s linguistic detail, but it also 
gives a researcher an additional direction in which the actor’s speech acts should 
be analysed. In this sense, what Table 4.4 implicates is twofold. First, this is to 
show how strong and often it is that Roh related North Korea to its nuclear issues, 
since the top-ranked collocate is ‘nuclear’ in both the MI and t-scores. This 
demonstrates that Roh clearly articulated the relationship between North Korea 
and nuclear issues in his speeches so that the term nuclear could be discursively 
                                            31 fA refers to the number of occurrences of the keyword in the whole corpus (the size of the concordance), fB refers to the number of occurrences of the collocate in the whole corpus, fAB refers to the number of occurrences of the collocate in the concordance (number of co-occurrences), and N refers to the corpus size, respectively. 
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practised within the context of the DPRK issue. This also corroborates the 
reliability of the results that showed the keywords based on raw frequency and 
the keyness score in the previous sections. Moreover, most words in the table 
derived from both scores point to the DPRK’s nuclear issues: ‘issue’, ‘problem’, 
‘programme’, ‘test’, ‘weapons’, ‘dismantlement’, ‘missiles’, ‘resolution’, ‘resolve’, 
and so forth. In effect, it is within bounds to say that the greater part of the 
collocations on North Korea by Roh is directly related to the nuclear issues. To 
put it succinctly, in his speech acts, Roh virtually equated North Korea to the 
nuclear issues. 
Second, this is to show how Roh thought about the way in which he can 
solve the North Korean nuclear issue. The t-score part of the table reveals that 
the words ‘resolve (or resolving)’, ‘peacefully (or peaceful)’, ‘help’, ‘dialogue’, 
‘cooperation’, ‘solution (or resolution)’ and ‘trust’ might be closely related to a way 
of resolving the issue. What is problematic here is that none of these words 
manifestly point to a specific means of denuclearisation of the DPRK. In other 
words, in terms of extraordinary measures, these are more abstract than 
substantial. In the case of the MI score-based words, although many words in the 
right half of the table overlap with the words based on the t-score, some words 
(e.g. ‘dismantlement’, ‘dismantling’ and ‘abandon’) do not. However, these words 
still seem to be rather abstract and appear to be a part of categorical statements, 
which do not indicate any concrete measures by themselves. The words ‘collapse’ 
and ‘attack’ seem to be different, in that they allude to extraordinary measures in 
a relatively more direct way because causing the DPRK’s collapse or a military 
attack on North Korea could be one of the radical measures that can lead to either 
the demise of the DPRK or an all-out war on the peninsula. Did Roh pursue these 
kinds of measures to solve the Korean Nuclear Crisis? 
This is why we need to look into the keywords’ collocational patterns. An in-
depth analysis of the words ‘collapse’ and ‘attack’ tells us that Roh used these 
words in order to object to the ideas of harbouring such things (Tables 4.5 and 
4.6). Corpus-assisted DA can show total cases of co-occurrences between 
collocates (keywords) and the node word, so that researchers can grasp the 
whole context in which the keywords are used. Although the tables here do not 
show the whole sentences due to the word limit of the thesis, they render the 
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keywords more available, thereby making the contexts clearer. Here are some 
excerpts that include the entire sentence from the tables: 
Some people seem to look for the North to collapse. That, too, would cause an enormous disaster for the people of the South. There is no guarantee that in the face of an impending threat to its system, the North would not make a dangerous choice. (Roh 2004a: 12 November)  Believing that jitters over the possibility of war will weigh on our economy, I openly objected to any possible U.S. attack on North Korea, and I repeatedly emphasised that there will be no war on the Korean Peninsula.  (Roh 2003b: 2 April) 
These sentences make it clear that Roh considered the idea of the DPRK 
collapse to be dangerous one since it could lead to an enormous disaster for the 
ROK. When it comes to the word ‘attack’, the word was used by Roh because he 
thought that he had to prevent rumours of any possible US attack on the DPRK 
from spreading so that the ROK’s economy remained intact. This will be 
discussed in detail in the following section. In any case, in this way, each keyword 
can be understood while not being away from the core terms and, accordingly, a 
securitising actor’s discourse could become clearer. 
What about the collocations of ‘nuclear’? Table 4.7 includes the top-twenty 
collocates of ‘nuclear’ according to the t-scores and MI scores respectively. This 
table shows considerable similarities with the table that indicated the same scores 
for the collocations of ‘North (Korea)’. What this table can tell us is as follows: first, 
considering all the keywords in Tables 4.4 and 4.7, it is evident that Roh 
manifestly linked North Korea with nuclear issues. Second, in terms of solving the 
issues, it seems that Roh preferred a peaceful way to measures based on 
sanctions or coercive policies (one cannot see any kind of sanction-related words 
Table 4.5 Co-occurrences of attack and North 
any objection to a possible U.S. attack on mentioned the possibility of an attack against mentioning the possibility of an attack against objected to any possible U.S. attack on that Washington has no intention to attack  
North North North North North 
Korea in the future. Such reasoning represents Korea. Some of them were responsible U.S. Korea. Rather, they are actively voicing Korea, and I repeatedly emphasised that Korea. When the Six-Party Talks resume,  
Table 4.6 Co-occurrences of collapse and North 
threat. Some people seem to look for asked was whether war would break out and potential outbreak of war and collapse of neither do we consider it feasible. As long as 
North North North North 
to collapse. That, too, would cause an Korea would collapse. When I said it would Korea, but on the top of their list of Korea does not collapse suddenly, there  
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in the tables). A frequent appearance of the word ‘peacefully’ corroborates this. 
The collocational link among ‘North Korea–nuclear problem–missiles–resolving 
(or resolution)–peacefully’ seemed to be firmly established in Roh’s speech acts. 
Third, some words (e.g. ‘give (up)’ and ‘conducted’) show the level of Roh’s 
determination to denuclearise North Korea as well as the level of consternation 
when Pyongyang finally ‘conducted’ its first-ever nuclear test in 2006. The 
following quotations show such traits: 
For North Korea, there is no choice other than to give up its nuclear ambition. Nuclear weapons will gain it nothing, and the only way to tide over the economic plight with the help of world assistance is to first give up nuclear weapons. (Roh 2004b: 7 December)  We are now facing a grave challenge to peace on the Korean Peninsula. That is because North Korea conducted a nuclear test after all despite strong objections and warnings from the Republic of Korea as well as the international community. Peace on the Korean Peninsula can never coexist with nuclear weapons. (Roh 2006a: 6 November) 
Fourth, most importantly, just as we have seen from the collocations of 
‘North’, this table also lacks the keywords that can show us exceptional measures 
dealing with the DPRK nuclear issues in a concrete manner. As mentioned, Roh’s 
speech acts were replete with the DPRK nuclear issue-related words; 
nevertheless, most of the words (e.g. ‘peacefully’, ‘resolution’, ‘solution’, ‘give 
(up)’, ‘dialogue’, ‘trust’, ‘dismantlement’, and so on) themselves cannot be seen 
Table 4.7 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of nuclear 
Collocate T-score Collocate MI score 
North (Korea) Korean issue problem programme Korea peacefully resolve weapons resolved test resolution solution resolving Pyongyang help power solve give (up) issues 
16.138 13.827 12.812 7.913 7.333 6.830 6.231 6.060 5.736 5.635 5.280 4.106 3.989 3.731 3.724 3.656 3.653 3.144 3.120 3.094 
abandon weapons dismantlement North’s dismantling test programme peacefully dismantle missiles waste issue solution resolving North (Korea) problem plants resolve resolved conducted 
9.591 9.350 9.269 9.269 8.913 8.906 8.854 8.810 8.783 8.716 8.591 8.586 8.461 8.398 8.386 8.349 8.269 8.086 8.036 7.928 
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as extraordinary measures. They are at best important principles or categorical 
statements. Regarding this problem, additional in-depth analyses of the keywords 
will be shown in the following section. Aside from this, some of the words in the 
table, such as ‘power’, ‘waste’ and ‘plants’, are not related to the DPRK issue, for 
they point to the issues relating to nuclear power plants in the ROK in terms of 
electric power supply. 
The reason why Roh’s speeches do not include more practical collocates 
may rest upon two possibilities: one is it might be true that Roh did not have 
sufficient practical means to make their slogan—peaceful resolution—available. 
Second, Roh possibly did have some practical means, but he was aware that 
those are short of becoming extraordinary measures that can forestall the North 
Korean nuclear threat. Hence, in terms of DA, there are at least two ways to avoid 
the potential pitfalls that might be caused by interpretation based only on the 
quantitative results. Firstly, as aforementioned, by looking into a word’s 
grammatical and collocational pattern a close-up of the features of each collocate 
can be identified. Secondly, the potential shortcomings of corpus-assisted DA 
can be complemented by qualitative analysis including documentary analysis and 
interviews. On the basis of the analysis of the core terms, and with the help of 
broad corpora and other key texts-based analysis, the next section further 
discusses what practical traits can be derived from Roh’s speech acts in regard 
to his securitisation process against the DPRK’s nuclear threat. 
 
 
4.2 Main characteristics 
As delineated in the previous section, corpus-assisted DA has given us some 
important points in terms of finding a certain pattern of speech acts made by Roh. 
It has also given an opportunity to initiate an in-depth analysis of specific words 
by providing concordances (a view of all occurrences from the corpus for a 
particular search word), statistically conspicuous terms and collocates, so that a 
researcher carries out DA in a more objective manner. In addition to this, ST, as 
a theoretical framework, seems to be meaningful, inasmuch as an actor’s security 
discourse could be understood in an organised way by classifying the actor’s 
perceptions into several stages according to the framework: perception of 
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existential threats, articulation of security-related speech acts, including referent 
objects and extraordinary measures. 
 
4.2.1 The pursuit of double securitisation 
The first thing to be considered as the characteristic of Roh’s security discourse 
may be his securitising moves towards two others. In other words, in the process 
of securitising the DPRK’s nuclear issue, Roh securitised North Korea and the 
US at the same time. Securitising the US was a serious issue because it could 
be seen as securitisation jeopardising the ROK-US alliance that represents an 
important pillar of South Korean referent objects. As was shown in the previous 
section, Table 4.5 included all co-occurrences of ‘attack’ and ‘North’. What is 
interesting is that four out of the five sentences contain the word ‘US’ or 
‘Washington’. It connotes that Roh was more concerned about the US attack on 
North Korea. It was imperative for him to securitise this issue before securitising 
the DPRK’s nuclear issue. Lee Jong-seok, former Unification Minister and the 
Chief of the National Security Council (NSC) of the ROK under the Roh 
administration, corroborates this in his memoir:  
President Roh was aware that the heightening tensions between North Korea and the US may spill over into a war. […] Regarding measures against North Korea, the US asserted that ‘it would be inevitable to impose sanctions on North Korea once North Korea has started reprocessing plutonium’, and ‘they are not precluding a military option against North Korea’. […] Roh actually believed that the US might attack North Korea. Therefore he thought that he needs to get confirmation from the US that they would not choose a military option as well as risky action that might have led to a war. (Lee 2014b: 182–183) 
Regardless of whether the US had a real intention to instigate a military 
attack against North Korea, it seems true that Roh firmly believed the possibility 
of a US attack. In order to achieve a ‘peaceful’ solution to the DPRK’s nuclear 
issue, Roh had to securitise another threat—a war on the Korean peninsula—
that might be caused by a US attack on North Korea. Roh faced a huge dilemma 
again: North Korea’s nuclear programmes constitute a serious threat to South 
Korea. The ROK-US alliance is a strong deterrent to such a threat. However, at 
the same time South Korea should deter the US from taking military action 
against North Korea, as it is very likely to trigger a total war on the Korean 
peninsula that might lead to annihilation of the Korean people. In this sense, it 
can be said that Roh struggled with two securitising moves: that is, securitisation 
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against North Korea’s nuclear threat to South Korea on the one hand, and 
securitisation against a US military attack on North Korea, which may result in a 
North Korean attack on South Korea, on the other hand. 
Roh initiated double securitisation from the very first stage of his presidency. 
A short introduction to the situation at the time of Roh’s inauguration may be 
helpful. The Roh administration officially began on 25 February 2003. Roh was 
inaugurated in the midst of the second North Korean Nuclear Crisis, which was 
sparked by North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and its clandestine highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) programme. From a broader perspective, the crisis was 
an outgrowth of the US’s post-9/11 identity. For the US, the top priority in the 
post-9/11 period was to prevent WMD from reaching terrorist groups. In the 
Nuclear Posture Review in December 2001, the Bush administration formulated 
that America must be ready to use nuclear weapons against rogue states, 
including North Korea. In January 2002, at the State of the Union address, 
George W. Bush, America’s 43rd President, included North Korea in the ‘axis of 
evil’, along with Iran and Iraq. 
Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with WMD. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11, but we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and WMD, while starving its citizens. […] State like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. (Bush 2002: 29 January) 
Unsurprisingly, North Korea denounced this address, arguing that Bush’s 
remark was no less than a declaration of war. Putting the DPRK’s resistance 
aside, what is interesting is that with this as a momentum, the Bush administration 
has been branded as bellicose and radical across the world. In addition to that, 
the phrase ‘axis of evil’ was widely construed as a precursor of US attacks on 
North Korea, albeit depending on each viewpoint. The Roh administration was 
also deeply influenced by this term. For the high-ranking officials of the Roh 
administration, it was highly likely that the US would put its military attack on North 
Korea into action, given its capability and the traits of an administration that was 
well known for the influence of a group of neoconservatives on its formulation of 
foreign and national security policies. The Roh administration strengthened its 
perception that the Bush administration is a political group based on a religious 
sentiment by this term ‘axis of evil’ (Lee 2014a). 
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The term ‘axis of evil’ demonstrated how important political rhetoric is, and 
it had indeed a strong influence on the Roh administration’s perception of the US 
government as far as the DPRK issues are concerned. Whether the Bush 
administration had a real intention to launch a military attack against North Korea 
remains equivocal. Regarding this, there are conflicting records that indicate 
different policy implications. According to Bush’s biography, it seems that the US 
had been seriously considering carrying out a military strike: 
After a few months with no progress, I tried a different argument. In January 2003, I told President Jiang [Zemin of China] that if North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme continued, I would not be able to stop Japan—China’s historic rival in Asia—from developing its own nuclear weapons. […] In February, I went one step further. I told President Jiang that if we could not solve the problem diplomatically, I would have to consider a military strike against North Korea. (Bush 2010: 424) 
However, Condoleezza Rice’s (former US Secretary of State and Bush’s national 
security advisor) account does not match with Bush’s memoir: 
Though they [South Koreans] might have feared that the US would use military force, they needn’t have worried: the Pentagon wanted no part of armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. We were without a workable policy.  (Rice 2011: 159) 
According to Rice, by the end of 2002, Bush had finally adopted a ‘tailored 
containment’, which aimed to change the North Korean regime through pressure, 
rather than announcing regime change (Rice 2011: 163). If this is true, it can be 
said that Roh overreacted to the uncertainties of a US attack against North Korea, 
to the extent that the ROK-US alliance is affected (Cha 2004; Gregg 2004; Kim 
2004). Yet the problem was not that simple. What is clear is that there was a 
serious disagreement within the Bush administration as to a proper strategy for 
North Korea (Cheney and Cheney 2011; Rice 2011; Rumsfeld 2011), and the 
‘military attack’ discourse had been expressed in several ways from both inside 
and outside of the government in the US until 2003: 
Some of the most secret and scariest work under way in the Pentagon these days is the planning for a possible military strike against nuclear sites in North Korea. […] Officials say that so far these are no more than contingency plans. They cover a range of military options from surgical cruise missile strikes to sledgehammer bombing, […] There’s nothing wrong with planning, or brandishing a stick to get Kim Jong-il’s attention. But several factions in the administration are serious about a military strike if diplomacy fails, and since the White House is unwilling to try diplomacy in any meaningful way, it probably will fail. (Kristof 2003: 28 February, New York Times) 
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In addition to this, on 4 March 2003, in an interview with American 
newspapers, Bush for the first time officially mentioned military action against 
North Korea (Matthews and Greene 2003). The Roh administration’s concerns 
over US military action were not only caused by the realm of discourse but also 
by material factors. Early in March, an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft 
spying on international waters near North Korea was intercepted by North Korean 
fighter jets. Days earlier, a North Korean fighter jet swooped over the Northern 
Limit Line (NLL), which is a de facto military demarcation line on the Yellow Sea 
between the two Koreas, and returned to the north when South Korean fighter 
jets approached it. On 10 April, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT came into 
effect. In the meantime, the NSC of the US announced that North Korea had 
restarted a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. 
Roh’s securitisation against the US was not just about its possible military 
solution; it was about the US’s loathing for the Kim Jong-il regime, which is 
inextricably linked to the regime change discourse. The Bush administration 
rejected anything that the Clinton administration had agreed with North Korea, 
including the AF (Gregg 2004; Bush 2010; Rice 2011). They saw ‘the negotiation 
itself as a reward to the outlawed North Korean regimes’ (Kim 2004: 163). Bush 
publicly referred to Kim Jong-il as a ‘pigmy’, ‘tyrant’ and a ‘spoiled child at the 
dinner table’, whereas Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State under 
the Clinton administration, argued that ‘we know very little of Kim Jong-il. Our 
intelligence said that he was crazy and a pervert. […] He’s not crazy. […] Bush 
didn’t listen to the talks the Clinton administration had with North Korea’ (Fryer 
2010). At any rate, it seems true that the Bush administration at least wanted to 
see that the Kim regime was overthrown if it was impossible to topple the regime 
militarily. They just could not accept North Korea as an appropriate counterpart.  
As long as Kim Jong-il was in power, I thought we had little prospect of inducing his regime to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. […] Instead of offering inducements of financial aid and heating oil, I thought there might be a remote possibility that if we put enough diplomatic and financial pressure on the country, some of its senior generals might overthrow Kim Jong-il. (Rumsfeld 2011: 642) 
Bush’s ‘Kim Jong-il phobia’ appears much stronger:  
One of the most influential books I read during my presidency was Aquariums of Pyongyang by the North Korean dissident Kang Chol-hwan. The memoir […] tells the story of Kang’s ten-
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year detention and abuse in a North Korean gulag. […] Kang’s story stirred up my deep disgust for the tyrant who had destroyed so many lives, Kim Jong-il. (Bush 2010: 422) 
In regard to this, Kang Chol-hwan, whose book significantly influenced 
Bush’s perception of Kim Jong-il, pointed out that ‘even if North Korea gives up 
its nuclear programme, its political system would not be changed. Without regime 
change from the current one to one that is predicated on a rational system, its 
denuclearisation would be meaningless’ (Kang 2014). The problem is that 
genuine regime change is not easy. Hwang Jang-yop, the highest ranking North 
Korean defector ever, best known for being the father of North Korea’s Juche 
ideology, had already predicted that there were over 100 people who could 
replace Kim Jong-il’s position, and hence there would be no such sudden change 
in North Korea even if Kim Jong-il died (Cheong 2011) (after Kim Jong-il’s death 
in December 2011, Kim Jong-un, the third and youngest son of Kim Jong-il, took 
power). More importantly, China would never allow political turmoil to continue in 
North Korea, and China would be expected to intervene in North Korea if the US 
stepped into the North Korean tumult (Koo 2008; Song and Lee 2016). In other 
words, as China stubbornly opposes an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, 
it is hard to imagine that the US would push ahead with a military strike on North 
Korea, which would run the risk of seriously worsening relations with Beijing (Lee 
2012a: 120–121). 
These situations raised Roh’s dilemmatic situation once more: (1) the Bush 
administration obviously wants to see the Kim Jong-il regime be replaced; (2) the 
ROK-US alliance is essential for South Korea to defend itself from a North Korean 
attack; (3) in fact, the North Korean Kim regime is not only intractable but also 
durable, even in the case of Kim Jong-il’s absence; (4) hence, the strategy of 
regime change or overthrow of the Kim regime is not only unreasonably idealistic 
but also dangerous to maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations; (5) given 
China’s opposition, the probability of an American military attack against North 
Korea seems unrealistic, which can result in a terrible disaster of a total war; 
nonetheless, the spread of rumour concerning war and the possibility of war, 
which could have a significant impact on the ROK’s sovereign credit rating, 
cannot be ignored. 
Under these circumstances, as the corpus-assisted DA confirmed earlier, 
Roh appears to have decided to break a rule of the ROK-US alliance, which 
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needs to be strong and solid even in all possible contingencies. Roh thought that 
the US itself was becoming a source of an existential threat. Roh’s own words 
confirm this:  
In early 2003, it’s widely rumoured again that the US would attack North Korea. […] I publicly said that “bombardment on North Korea is not on”. Conservative press and experts criticised that it was a rash comment that vitiates the ROK-US alliance. However, I decided that the president’s remark was necessary at that time. […] I obviously spoke my mind that there would be no act of war against North Korea insofar as I am president. The military staffs of the Bush administration might properly understand my word. It meant that American military aircraft cannot land anywhere on South Korean soil, and that the US armed forces cannot launch an operation, as there would be no help from the ROK armed forces. (Yoo 2010: 250–251; Roh Moo-hyun’s autobiography) 
As this quotation directly indicates, Roh made peaceful inter-Korean relations the 
top priority that outweighs the importance of the ROK-US alliance. In that respect, 
it can be said that he regarded the Bush administration as a potential, but at the 
same time, existential threat.  
[On 31 October 2003] In a small Q-and-A session former defence secretary William Perry asked what could be done to stop the slide in trust and understanding between the US and South Korea, which had taken relations to the lowest point Perry had ever seen. President Roh replied without hesitation that North Korea is the only issue on which Washington and Seoul disagree, but that in regard to that issue a wide perception gap exists. Roh stated that half a century ago, Korea had endured a horrible fratricidal war in which millions had died. He said that any repeat of that tragic experience must be avoided at all cost. (Gregg 2004: 149) 
What needs to be considered here is that Roh’s securitisation against the 
US does not necessarily mean that they desecuritised the North Korean nuclear 
issue. What is meant by ‘securitisation against the US’ is that they adopted 
‘dialogue’ as an extraordinary means so that they can resolve the North Korean 
nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. In this sense, one can say that the ST 
framework may be useful because it elucidates a tangible structure of a 
securitising actor’s discourse. If one actor had desecuritised some threats, there 
would have been no perception of such threats, no referent object, no 
extraordinary measures regarding the threats. In the case of Roh, however, all of 
the core components of the securitisation were included, which are aimed to 
articulate the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, from ST’s viewpoint, the 
argument that Roh desecuritised the DPRK’s nuclear issue is misleading. 
In effect, as noted earlier, Roh could not just disregard the ROK-US 
relationship, which forms a significant foundation of Seoul’s referent objects. If 
anything, without the US’s cooperation, securitising the North Korean nuclear 
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issue itself was impossible. What was more problematic to South Korea was that 
North Korea ‘had been demanding that the US meet with them one-on-one’ 
(Cheney and Cheney 2011: 474). This is called North Korea’s tong-me-bong-nam 
strategy, meaning that North Korea ‘values the US-North Korean relationship at 
the expense of South Korea’s isolation’ (Kim 2014b: 62). North Korea has 
consistently argued that the nuclear issue is a problem between the US and them, 
not an issue of inter-Korean relations. In his autobiography, which was 
posthumously published by his closest political aide, Roh acknowledged this 
contradictory situation into which South Korea could not help but fall in the 
process of securitisation (Figure 4.1):  
The DPRK-US relationship has had a crucial effect on the situation of the Korean peninsula as well as inter-Korean relations. The North Korean nuclear issue in itself arose from the DPRK-US relationship. It is difficult for South Korea to solve the issue while taking the leading role. I had severe heartburn throughout my presidency due to the conflicting situation in which we were not able to play a leading role in solving the issue, even though South Korea is directly involved with the conflict and peace. I got upset many times with North Korea and the US. The fact that I could not express my anger caused more stress. (Yoo 2010: 248–249; Roh Moo-hyun’s autobiography) 
 
4.2.2 Making dialogue extraordinary 
As the corpus-assisted DA has shown, the collocational link in Roh’s speech acts 
among ‘North Korea—nuclear issue—missiles–resolving/resolution—peacefully’ 
boils down to one word: ‘dialogue’. Simply put, an in-depth analysis of each word 
that is closely related to the core terms ‘North’ and ‘nuclear’ demonstrates that 
the word ‘dialogue’ should be at the centre of all the collocations. Then what 
needs to be done now is to look into the word’s grammatical or collocational 
 
Figure 4.1 Roh’s double (overlapping) securitisation 
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patterns, since it is expected that Roh’s concrete extraordinary measures could 
be derived from this analysis if he had had a real substantive means. 
The corpus used in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 is the same as the previous tables. 
The sentences that are not directly related to the North Korean nuclear issue are 
excluded, even though they have the term ‘dialogue’. The word ‘dialogue’ is 
modified by other words in one table, and is positioned as a subject in the other 
one. These indicate Roh’s discursive traits considerably. Several analytical points 
can be noted. First, as can be seen in Table 4.8, Roh put top priority on the inter-
Korean dialogue concerning the North Korean issues. He seems to have firmly 
believed that inter-Korean talks could be a significant leverage in dealing with the 
DPRK’s nuclear issues. Second, as shown in Table 4.9, dialogue was the only 
viable option that can be used as an extraordinary measure. He literally ruled out 
any other means. However, when North Korea carried out its nuclear test in 2006, 
Roh could not help participating in adoption of the UNSC sanctions against the 
North. A speech addressed two days after the North’s first nuclear test shows his 
concern with this problem: 
 
Table 4.8 Occurrences of dialogue following modifier 
the peninsula. There have been frequent should be taken to prevent the inter-Korean to the negotiation table. The three-way . There is no denying that inter-Korean Cold War, the United States began positive resolve the nuclear issue, and inter-Korean called for transparency in inter-Korean flexible stance in channels of inter-Korean a virtuous cycle of with the inter-Korean dialogue between the two Koreas. Inter-Korean , the Administration will seek faithful easily as well. There is now full-fledged but this kind of view is not right. Only mutual trust. In my judgment, inter-Korean 
dialogues dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue 
and exchanges between the South and North from being deadlocked due to circumstances in Beijing was a meaningful beginning of , and human and material exchanges have with China eventually resulting in the should be used to contribute to resolving and exchanges, which I accepted. The idea and economic cooperation. With many North . Progress in the Six-Party Talks is enlivening , in turn, accelerates the success of the and persuasion in order to have the proposal on the North Korean nuclear issue, but , not only any form of pressure, will persuade will promote the success of the Six-Party 
 
Table 4.9 Occurrences of dialogue as a subject 
the issue should be resolved peacefully. Last month in Beijing, the first phase of maintaining close coordination. It was good to see of the North Korean nuclear issue through have been ups and downs, but channels of a show of power, and a precondition for implementation shouldn’t disrupt dialogue. normalisation of diplomatic relations and that 
Dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue dialogue Dialogue dialogue 
is the only way to a solution. I will try was held in a bid to resolve the North started. Yet it is hard to resolve the is essential for the maintenance of peace are always open and economic cooperation is to acknowledge the existence of the is the only viable option. The North made is the only way to solve inter-Korean issues 
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There are two major ways in which we can do this, namely a relatively hard-line response of pressuring with sanctions on the one hand, or the current situation notwithstanding, a peaceful resolution through dialogue on the other. […] However, this is not a matter of choosing one policy alternative over another. A strategic situation of this nature entails the use of proper combination of both measures. […] What is clear for now is that both options are still valid. […] Either way, a peaceful approach is an important task and carries a substantial value. (Roh 2006c: : 11 October) 
Nonetheless, as confirmed by the result of the corpus-assisted DA, Roh scarcely 
used the term ‘sanctions’ throughout his presidency, and as the above quotation 
demonstrates, even at the time of the DPRK’s nuclear test, the supreme and sole 
task for him was to hold onto a ‘peaceful approach’. 
Third, Roh expressed the importance of multilateral talks. It can be easily 
found that he tried to construct a virtuous cycle between the multilateral and inter-
Korean dialogues (Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10) (in Table 4.10, the node word is 
‘North’, ‘dialogue’ is a collocate, and the range between the node word and the 
collocates is ±5 words). To achieve this goal, China and the US’s support was 
essential. Through the multilateral talks, Roh pursued a ‘normalisation of 
diplomatic relations’ among the countries directly involved. For Roh, therefore, 
the SPT would be an important process by which the North Korean nuclear issue 
can be successfully securitised in a peaceful manner through dialogue. It was a 
coordinated form of international community. Roh regarded SPT not only as a 
form of dialogue, but also as an extraordinary means aiming to securitise the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue. In short, the SPT was the backbone of his securitisation 
process: 
Of great significance are their agreement on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, normalisation of US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations, cooperation in energy and economic affairs, and discussions on a peace and security regime in Northeast Asia. I hope that this accord will not only help resolve the North Korean nuclear issue but also bring lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula. (Roh 2007a) 
This quotation is from Roh’s address produced right after the February 13 
Agreement of the SPT in 2007. As can be seen, Roh put an emphasis on ‘peace 
and security regime’ along with denuclearisation, normalisation of relations, 
economic cooperation, and so forth. This concept was one of the main points of 
Roh’s securitisation process, but it was simultaneously controversial between 
conservatives and progressives. This will be discussed shortly. 
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The road to SPT was not easy. In order to make dialogue an extraordinary 
means, Roh had to break through several points. At least two factors had been 
contestable regarding whether Roh broke rules, or whether his securitising move 
was effective enough to deter the North Korean nuclear threat. The first factor 
was about the Roh administration itself, particularly the way it was playing its role. 
As aforementioned, ‘playing a leading role’ was one of Roh’s main principles vis-
à-vis the DPRK’s nuclear issues. As noted before, however, North Korea had 
insisted that the nuclear issue is a matter of the DPRK-US relationship. By 
contrast, the US no longer wanted to deal with North Korea one-on-one. The 
Bush administration thought that the US had been played off by North Korea as 
a result of the 1994 US-North Korea AF, which aimed to provide North Korea with 
two 1,000MW LWRs and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year in exchange for 
freezing North Korea’s ability to make nuclear arms and remaining in the NPT. 
The confrontation between North Korea’s bilateralism and the US’s 
multilateralism resulted in the three-way dialogue (China-US-DPRK) in April 2003. 
The Roh administration explained that the three-way dialogue (3-ja-hoeidam) 
would soon be a form of multilateral dialogue including South Korea (Lee 2014b), 
but the fact that South Korea was excluded from the dialogue format caused 
controversy (NA 16/4/2003; NA 18/4/2003). Although the three-way dialogue was 
developed into the SPT in August of that year, the format itself showed the ROK’s 
limit. Another contradicting point arises from here. The real impetus for achieving 
the dialogue format came from the US and China. Since the US alone did not 
have sufficient carrots to induce North Korea to take part in multilateral 
arrangements, the US could not help but persuade China, which had been 
Table 4.10 Co-occurrences of dialogue and North 
international community, and through dialogue with all-out efforts, through dialogue with the without fail. We must revitalise dialogue with Union. I will do my best to help resolve the should engage in the dialogue with sincerity. first step in the dialogue for solving the view that the peaceful resolution of the international community and dialogue with will be no reason to reject dialogue if United States is engaged in the dialogue. we cut the channel of dialogue with the principle and discontinue contact with the have worked toward building trust with the our efforts to engage in a dialogue with there is now full-fledged dialogue on the never given up its efforts to engage the  
North North North North North North North North North North North North North North North North 
Korea. I am deeply aware of the fact that , to find a way in solving the problem. Korea, coordination with the United States Korean nuclear issue through dialogue. Korea is now at a grave crossroad determining Korean nuclear issue and welcomed the role Korean nuclear issue through dialogue is Korea. Beginning in May, I visited the Korea comes onto the path that China and Korea at first was against the Six-Party . The government may adjust the speed and when it disrupted dialogue and to reject through dialogue and persuasion while rising Korea and build trust by showing tolerance Korean nuclear issue, but negative views in dialogue even when the going was tough 
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exercising its influence to North Korea, to bring North Korea to the negotiating 
table. 
Ironically, the US used a military option for North Korea to motivate China, 
which is actually what Roh attempted to securitise against even as they had taken 
the trust between the ROK-US to the lowest point. Rice described the time when 
President Bush called Chinese then President Ziang Jemin with an eye to 
persuading him to bring North Korea to the multilateral table: 
I suggested that he raise the spectre, ever so gently, of a military option against North Korea. He [Bush] liked the idea, and when Ziang began to recite the timeworn mantra about the need for the US to show more flexibility with the North, President stopped him. A bit more directly than I'd expected, he told Ziang that he was under a lot of pressure from hard-liners to use military force and added, on his own, that one also couldn’t rule out a nuclear Japan if the North remained unconstrained. (Rice 2011: 248) 
This quotation implies that the political rhetoric of using military force against 
North Korea from the US was in part due to their aspiration to win China over to 
the US’s side as far as the North Korean nuclear issue is concerned. Of course, 
this is written from the US perspective, and therefore no one knows exactly what 
kind of mechanism finally moved China to get North Korea to the multilateral 
negotiation table. However, what needs to be reiterated is that the Bush 
administration paid great attention to China’s growing influence and they 
understood that the US-China relationship is critical to the international system 
(Bush 2010; Rice 2011; Rumsfeld 2011). It was also under the Bush 
administration that the US began to use the term ‘responsible stakeholder’ to refer 
to China. In other words, for the US, the North Korean nuclear issue could be a 
litmus test for the future US-China relationship that forms not only a regional 
system but also an international one. 
Seen in this light, it can be said that the strategic room for South Korea was 
very small from the outset. Ban Ki-moon, former Foreign Minister of the ROK in 
the Roh administration, also acknowledged that South Korea’s role is limited in 
solving the DPRK’s nuclear issue (NA 6/7/2006). The broad outlines of the 
regional and international system tell us that there was no significant leverage 
that South Korea could take as a leading actor. In order to make a breakthrough 
under these circumstances, Roh found the inter-Korean relations invaluable, as 
he thought that the ROK would be able to take a leading role in the SPT based 
on stable inter-Korean relations. To put it differently, Roh tried to use inter-Korean 
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relations as diplomatic leverage of the SPT and its securitising process. This is 
why he inadvertently fell into yet another trait of securitisation: rule-breaking and 
the limit of discourse. 
The second factor that caused controversy in Roh’s securitising moves was 
whether it is possible for Seoul to acknowledge Pyongyang as a legitimate entity. 
This is a very sensitive and important factor. It may be safe to say that 
conservatives and progressives are divided on this point. This issue lasted for the 
entire period of the Roh administration, as the peace treaty, peace/security 
regime, and normalisation of US-DPRK relations had been at the centre of the 
SPT. The issue of acknowledging the DPRK as a legitimate political entity, as 
noted before, is closely connected to the principle of the Constitution of the ROK. 
Given that discourse is a kind of the aggregation of certain rules and meanings, 
one might observe what rules and meanings had been challenged during the Roh 
administration, and consequently what discourse had emerged as a result of 
Roh’s securitisation against the DPRK’s nuclear issue.  
The following four debates, each of which is extracted from the minutes of 
the National Assembly of the ROK, reflect those conflicts concerning South 
Korea’s identity that refers to a representation of the other, DPRK. All quoted 
texts are debates amongst members of the National Assembly (MP, a Briticism) 
and the Roh administration’s cabinet members. 
[A] 1. CHOI BYUNG-KUK (MP): What is securing the North Korean regime? Doesn’t that  2. mean that we attempt the adhesion of a divided nation? Doesn’t that mean that  3. we forsake unification? 4. YOON YOUNG-KWAN (Foreign Minister): What North Korea wants from the US  5. is not securing their regime but security assurance. 6. CHOI: What is the difference between security and regime? 7. YOON: Regime includes a country’s economic and social system, while security 8. is a matter of whether they are invaded by external influences.  9. CHOI: You keep talking around. We should either adjust ourselves to North Korea or just 10. let this divided situation be fixed, if we secured the North’s regime.  11. YOON: Every system in every country is likely to change as time goes by. 12. CHOI: You mean we must wait until they change? 13. YOON: …… (NA 29/4/2003b: 23–24)  [B] 1. CHOI BYUNG-KUK (MP): Where is the foundation of North Korea? Their ultimate goal is  2. to communise the entire Korean peninsula. It means you’re saying that we should 3. secure their activities that try to communise the entire peninsula? […] 4. CHUNG DONG-YOUNG (Unification Minister): I don’t think so. Both Koreas have 5. already agreed to acknowledge each other’s regime and system and cooperate in  6. July 4th North-South Joint Statement, the Basic Agreement in 1991 and 7. June 15th North-South Joint Declaration. Inter-Korean cooperation is proceeding  
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8. on that basis. […] 9. CHOI: I didn’t mean it. The point is whether we allow their activities aimed at 10. communising the entire peninsula under the name of securing the North Korean regime.  11. CHUNG: How can we allow that kind of activities given the mutual acknowledgment  12. between the two Koreas? Neither is it possible nor acceptable. (NA 21/2/2005: 41–42)  [C] 1. PARK JONG-GEUN (MP): On the condition that we agree to a permanent Korean  2. peace regime, will you ask North Korea to abrogate their unification theory of 3. communisation, which is still expressly stipulated in their regulation of the NKWP? 4. SONG MIN-SOON (Foreign Minister): That kind of issue also needs to be dealt with 5. when we finish establishing the task of building trust politically and militarily. 6. PARK: North Korea is asking us to abrogate our NSA, isn’t it? 7. SONG: Yes. 8. PARK: Then why aren’t we asking North Korea to change their constitution or regulation? 9. SONG: We are doing that in the process of inter-Korean relations. 10. PARK: Are we? Minister, are you not slipping your tongue? (NA 20/2/2007: 43–44)   [D] 1. CHOI JAE-CHUN (MP): We’re thinking peace too passively. Peace tends to be regarded  2. as an attainable goal, once either the military tension between the two Koreas is defused  3. or we’re out of danger of the North Korean nuclear threats. But this idea makes us fall into 4. a trap; that is, it puts our divided peninsula into an unalterable form. […]  5. Therefore, although the SPT or a four-way summit is important, we need a more active 6. peace regime, which is led by South and North Korea themselves.  7. LEE JAE-JEONG (Unification Minister): I do share with your overall opinion. What we 8. need to keep in mind is that the peace regime that is inclined to bring adhesion of division 9. is not desirable. The Peace regime should be unification-oriented. […] 10. KIM WON-WOONG (MP): Given the situation in which American neocons are proactive, 11. I understand that the Roh administration has difficulties in dealing with North Korea; 12. nonetheless, you need to show your desire to make a breakthrough in order to 13. overcome a simple peace management. (NA 13/4/2007: 36–37) 
 
All of the above quotations raise the questions in relation to the divided status of 
the Korean peninsula. However, [D] is somewhat different from what [A], [B] and 
[C] implicate.  
Let us look at quotations [A] and [B] first. Choi Byung-kuk, a conservative 
MP, is raising two points. First, he is arguing that concluding a peace treaty with 
North Korea and the resultant peace regime in Northeast Asia runs the risk of 
making the current divided status unalterable (lines 1–3, [A]). He seems 
concerned that any kind of agreements endorsed by surrounding powerful 
countries could make the DPRK regime legitimate. As noted above, this kind of 
viewpoint is in line with the ROK Constitution (Articles 3 and 4). For him, North 
Korea should be seen as an enemy that still tries to communise the entire 
peninsula (lines 1–3 and 9–10, [B]). Second, Choi seems very pessimistic about 
North Korea’s change. He insists that securing the North’s regime is equivalent 
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to abandoning the ROK-centred unification (lines 9–10, [A]). This shows that a 
perspective on the possibility of North Korea’s change could be an integral part 
on which conservatives and progressives are divided. 
In response to Choi’s comments, then Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan 
made a division between regime security and security assurance, saying that 
guaranteeing North Korea’s security does not mean securing its social or 
economic system (lines 7–8, [A]). By saying this, Yoon vindicates Roh’s position: 
under no circumstances can the South Korean government tolerate North Korea 
as a nuclear state, and therefore securing the North’s regime should be 
interpreted to the effect of halting its developing nuclear capabilities, not to the 
extent that the South condones a lasting divided situation on the peninsula. In 
addition to this, he seems to believe that North Korea would change (line 11, [A]). 
The Roh administration’s basic perception of unification started with the belief 
that a change of the North Korean society is not impossible, even though the 
DPRK regime’s will to change is weak (Yoon 2014). 
In [B], Chung Dong-young, former Unification Minister, reminds Choi of de 
facto inter-Korean relations. Chung does not deny the fact that North Korea, 
which is still dreaming of unification under the flag of socialism, is an anti-
government organisation. Yet he relates the issue of securing the North’s regime 
to several inter-Korean agreements in which both Koreas agreed to acknowledge 
and respect each other’s political system. Put differently, he integrates the North 
Korean security assurance issue into the unavoidable reality in which the two 
Koreas coexist. This shows exactly how the Roh administration legitimised its 
securitising moves towards the North Korean nuclear issue. In [C], conservative 
MP Park Jong-geun also brings up a question related to North Korea’s raison 
d'être. He points out that the regulation of the NKWP is based on the aim of 
communising the entire peninsula, and wants the ROK government to demand 
that North Korea should abolish its hostile provision that repudiates the South’s 
values (lines 1–3). 
An excerpt [D] also deals with the issue of the divided status of the Korean 
peninsula. However, progressive MP Choi Jae-chun is demanding a more active 
peace regime, which is to be achieved beyond a simple absence of nuclear threat 
or military tension (lines 1–4). For him, the construction of the peace regime 
should be led by the two Koreas, not by surrounding powers, even though he 
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acknowledges the importance of the SPT or a four-way (South and North Korea, 
China and the US) dialogue (lines 5–6). This implies that the concept of 
establishing a peace regime in the peninsula as the Roh administration’s 
extraordinary measures against the North Korean nuclear weapons remains 
vague, in the sense that it is not enough to resolve audiences’ doubts about the 
future of a united Korea. As progressive MP Kim Won-woong points out, even to 
the liberal perspectives, the Roh administration’s securitisation can be seen as 
an attempt at simply attaining a ‘peaceful solution’ that can lead to a long-lasting 
divided status on the Korean peninsula (lines 12–13). 
In general, the progressives’ view does not raise the question of whether 
the Roh administration broke a rule of the Constitution (Article 3). Admittedly, they 
encourage the government to interact with North Korea. At the same time, 
however, they have concerns that a period of the divided peninsula might be 
extended, which can be seen as an impediment to unification. To borrow legal 
terminology, Roh’s extraordinary measures could be dolus eventualis (willful 
negligence); that is, concluding a peace regime with North Korea may be helpful 
to securitise the North Korean nuclear issue, but it would be conniving in an 
enduring division of territory. Furthermore, many conservatives raised a concern 
about the DPRK’s real intention behind its calling for a peace treaty with the US: 
the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea (Terry 2013; Lee 2016). Of course, 
the main securitising actors of the Roh administration do not accept this logic. 
The following excerpts are from the interviews with high-ranking actors in the Roh 
administration: 
North Korea keeps developing its military capability and regime system even as inter-Korean relations are in bad shape. In the longer term, do you think that it is possible for us to prepare for the period of unification and to induce North Korea to change, if we are consistent in applying coercion or a hostile policy? We make North Korea’s systematic conversion gradually through engagement. Of course, I think that the ultimate change of North Korea hinges on the change in China. (Interview: 20 June 2014)  North Korea cannot help but change in the midst of the changes of world circumstances. Changes are predicated on the market economy. Basically, a political system based on the market economy cannot be monolithic nor a system based on communism. Therefore, we are pursuing a de facto unification; that is, economic community, through exchange and cooperation. And we think that the current North Korean regime style would not be possible in the process of such integration. […] We have to remember that North Korea has land boundaries not only with South Korea [238km], but also with China, which is 1,416km long. North Korea would not die even if we don’t have any relationship with the North, as they are bound into China.  (Interview: 3 July 2014) 
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These quotations demonstrate the actors’ perceptions of the possibility of 
change in North Korea. Firstly, they firmly believe that North Korea will be 
changed in the long/medium term through the process of inter-Korean exchange 
and cooperation. Secondly, they think that the current style of the North Korean 
regime cannot help being changed in the process of developing inter-Korean 
relations. Thirdly, they acknowledge that North Korea’s change ultimately 
depends on China’s attitude. To put it differently, insofar as inter-Korean relations 
are in unfavourable circumstances, even if the North Korean Kim regime is 
toppled, it is highly likely that a new regime which is hostile towards South Korea 
would take power in Pyongyang under the patronage of China. To sum up, for 
the Roh administration, securitising the North Korean nuclear issue by 
constructing a peace regime is to gain momentum to transform the DPRK system 
into a market-based one, which is supposedly to involve liberal democracy, albeit 
it far into the future. 
With regard to this, what is more interesting is that the Bush administration 
started to see a peace treaty as a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue in 
its second term: 
We thought that the SPT might ultimately lead to a final resolution of the Korean War, even a peace treaty. This would have been a big leap from where we were presently, but it was worth contemplating. What if the North could be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons—really give them up verifiably—in exchange for the recognition that would come from actually ending the Korean War legally? (Rice 2011: 524) 
Figure 4.2 Peace process as extraordinary measures 
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The problem is that even the US was not sure about the outcome of this new 
approach. The term ‘verifiably’ was a bigger problem. It was a harbinger of 
difficulties in agreeing on a verification system between North Korea and the US 
(e.g. conducting forensic measurement of nuclear materials and collecting 
samples of nuclear materials, etc.). Moreover, the Bush administration had no 
trust in the Kim regime. In an NSC meeting held in early 2005, when Secretary of 
State Rice laid out her thoughts that had been shared by Henry Kissinger, neither 
Vice President Dick Cheney nor Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld explicitly 
dismissed the idea (Rice 2011: 524). However, both of them felt a deep sense of 
scepticism at the suggestion: 
By 2006, Rice and the State Department envoy to North Korea, Christopher Hill, made clear that North Korea was the State Department’s issue alone, […] Rice and Hill seemed to believe they could obtain an agreement with North Korea to end its WMD programmes.  (Rumsfeld 2011: 642)  When our actions don’t match our rhetoric, diplomacy becomes much more difficult, and ultimately it becomes more likely that terror-sponsoring states will feel they can defy the will of the US impunity. […] there is often an inclination on the part of the State Department to make preemptive concessions to bad actors in the hope that their behaviour will change. (Cheney and Cheney 2011: 492–493) 
 
What is more, what Bush actually wanted was to see the Kim regime toppled 
by the treaty, since he thought that Kim Jong-il would never survive if North Korea 
was opened up (Rice 2011: 525). In other words, signing a peace treaty was 
accepted as another way of regime change in North Korea. This is important, 
because this means that the Bush administration accepted, at least superficially, 
that SPT could be an extraordinary measure for securitising the North Korean 
nuclear issue. It also means that Roh succeeded in gaining American 
acknowledgment of his own version of securitisation (regardless of whether the 
SPT was a result of the US-China diplomatic mechanism). However, were Roh’s 
extraordinary measures sustainable? This question leads to the last traits of his 
securitising move. 
 
4.2.3 Stranded dialogue 
A tangible result of such extraordinary measures that Roh achieved was the 
September 19 Joint Statement, which was signed in 2005 (as a concrete form of 
means). The Joint Statement was the first major result of the SPT. It included 
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almost all of the core points of what Roh had underscored throughout his speech 
acts. The main contents of the statement are as follows (italics are the principal 
collocations that are noted earlier as Roh’s keywords): (1) verifiable 
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner; (2) normalisation 
of the DPRK-US relationship; (3) promoting economic cooperation of the Six 
Parties; (4) negotiating a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. 
Notwithstanding this achievement, as Roh himself thought that the North Korean 
nuclear issue essentially came out of DPRK-US relations (Yoo 2010: 248), its 
securitisation process was doomed to failure without the cooperation of both 
countries. 
As expected, right after the agreement, Roh could not help but begin his 
second round of double securitisation towards North Korea and the US. 
Regarding the US role, its sanctions against a Macau-based bank, Banco Delta 
Asia (BDA), significantly influenced the process of the SPT. In September 2005, 
the US Department of the Treasury designated BDA an institution of ‘money 
laundering concern’ based on the Patriot Act (Article 311). It was known that the 
Kim Jong-il regime ‘had used BDA for the majority of its international transactions’, 
and the US asserted that the DPRK had been counterfeiting their money (Niksch 
and Weiss 2008: 6). As a massive bank run occurred, the authorities in Macau 
froze some $25 million related to the North Korean account of the bank. Not 
surprisingly, North Korea criticised the US, saying that the imposition of the 
Patriot Act is another way of pressurising them and the SPT would not progress 
without solving the issue of BDA. However, the US position was that the BDA 
problem should be separated from the nuclear issue, since the Treasury 
Department’s action is just a matter of American law-enforcement. The following 
conversation, extracted from Bush’s press conference in the White House, 
highlights the US’s position: 
1. QUESTION: Mr. President, last year, your administration imposed a package of economic  2. sanctions on North Korea. Now North Korea says it will not come back to the table 3. on the nuclear talks unless those sanctions go. […] Would you consider removing them, 4. suspending them, making some gesture to get North Korea back to the negotiating table? 5. BUSH: Actually, I think what you're referring to is the fact that we are cutting off the 6. transfer of monies generated by illicit activities. When somebody's counterfeiting 7. our money, we want to stop them from doing that. […] And we are working with others  8. to prevent them from illicit activity. That's different from economic sanctions. (Bush 2006: 26 January) 
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Bush clearly emphasised that the BDA measures are unconnected to its 
economic sanctions on North Korea (lines 5–8). However, he inadvertently 
acknowledged later that the sanctions on the banking system were a part of the 
pressure on North Korea’s nuclear programmes. The next quotation implies the 
context in which Bush connected the BDA sanctions to its nuclear issue:  
With support from all parties in the SPT, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1718. The resolution imposed the toughest sanctions on North Korea since the end of the Korean War. The US also tightened our sanctions on the North Korean banking system and sought to deny Kim Jong-il his precious luxury goods. The pressure worked. In February 2007, North Korea agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor and allow UN inspectors back into the country to verify its actions. (Bush 2010: 425) 
Bush seems to have believed that the February 13 Agreement in 2007, the 
second major agreement of the SPT, was caused by pressure and sanctions. 
Contrary to Bush’s interpretation, however, the pressure did not work as much as 
he had expected. If anything, the implementation of the Agreement was possible 
only after the US dissolved the frozen North Korean money (PCPP 2008; Rice 
2011). 
What happened in February 2007 can be regarded as the second concrete 
form of Roh’s extraordinary measures against the nuclear threat. The February 
13 Agreement was dubbed ‘initial actions to implement the 2005 Joint Statement’. 
In the Agreement, North Korea agreed to shut down and seal the nuclear facility 
at Yongbyun, and to invite IAEA personnel for monitoring and verifications in 
exchange for getting emergency energy assistance of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel 
oil. In addition to this, all parties agreed to establish working groups concerning 
the issues of normalisation of the DPRK-US/Japan relations and the peace 
regime in Northeast Asia. The Agreement was supposed to be conducted within 
60 days. However, it took 120 days for the parties just to ‘start’ part of the initial 
actions, and Pyongyang announced it only when they could see that the ‘illicit’ 
funds in Macau were finally transferred to their Foreign Trade Bank on 25 June 
via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Russian Central Bank. 
In this process, the US State Department was criticised for buckling under 
Pyongyang’s demand. Indeed, as the US bank itself engaged in transferring 
North Korea’s illicit funds that they had already frozen, it could be interpreted that 
the Bush administration broke its own rule so as to make a breakthrough for the 
Agreement. In regard to this, ‘a group of Republican lawmakers asked the US 
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Government Accountability Office to examine whether’ the involvement of the 
Federal Reserve, which transferred the North Korean assets, violated the money-
laundering and counterfeiting laws (Kessler 2007). From the Roh administration’s 
perspective, the implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement was largely stymied 
by the US government’s BDA measures (Lim 2008; Jeong 2014; Lee 2014a; Suh 
2014). Nevertheless, although the US did not appear to genuinely want to have 
a dialogue with North Korea, the Roh administration successfully made them sit 
on the negotiating table with the DPRK in one way or another, even to the extent 
that the Bush administration was accused of breaking its own rules as to 
withdrawing BDA sanctions. 
The second parameter that scuttled the ROK government’s securitisation 
was North Korea itself and its typical brinkmanship tactics, and it made Roh 
frustrated. Roh’s securitising move was structurally fragile as its extraordinary 
measures hinged totally upon the other’s good faith. As noted before, it was 
important for Roh to maintain a close relationship with North Korea because inter-
Korean relations could have significant diplomatic leverage in the process of its 
securitisation that is developed within the context of the SPT. Therefore, 
whenever North Korea made provocative remarks and actions, it was inevitable 
that Roh would face criticism for his ‘seemingly’ weak-kneed policy. 
What is worse, Roh was not able to show that his administration had enough 
political leverage by which they could deter Pyongyang from taking actions that 
exacerbated the tensions. With the benefit of hindsight, although the Roh 
administration stressed that they had a phased or preconceived plan for solving 
the North Korean nuclear issue in 2003 (NA 29/4/2003a: 9), one cannot easily 
grasp what kind of phased plan (which should be developed and introduced to 
the audience (public) in an organised manner) they have conducted while North 
Korea kept heightening tensions on the peninsula from declaration of a nuclear 
state to test its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon. In other words, despite its 
frequent speech acts about the North Korean nuclear issue, Roh’s attempts at 
securitising the issue were short of material capabilities whereby he could 
substantialise the discourses. Later, the dilemmatic situation is clearly expressed 
by Roh in his memoir: ‘I had feelings of helplessness and was deeply angered by 
the situation in which the ROK cannot play a leading role in a dangerous battle 
between the DPRK and the US’ (Yoo 2010: 252). 
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The following quotations demonstrate how the Roh administration 
‘discursively’ dealt with each situation: 
[A: DPRK’s declaration of nuclear power (10/2/2005)] 1. RYU GEUN-CHAN (MP): I felt that the Roh administration seems to be obsessed with 2. consistency or humanitarian parts in terms of economic cooperation with North Korea. 3. CHUNG DONG-YOUNG (Unification Minister): It doesn’t mean that we maintain the 4. keynote of our North Korea policy no matter what happens. It means that there should be 5. no more actions that exacerbate the current situation. (NA 24/2/2005: 12)  [B: DPRK’s ballistic missile test (5/7/2006)] 1. LEE JONG-SEOK (Unification Minister): We’ll considerate necessary actions while 2. standing on the issue, and examine actions that can give North Korea substantive pressure […]  3. We’ll take a cautious approach not to make the current tensions be heightened. (NA 6/7/2006: 3)  [C: DPRK’s announcement of conducting a nuclear test (3/10/2006)] 1. LEE JONG-SEOK (Unification Minister): We’ll focus our energy on managing the  2. current situation not to be exacerbated, given that a real preparation for the North’s  3. nuclear test has not been detected yet. […] 4. YOON GWANG-UNG (Defence Minister): We’ll strengthen the cooperation system  5. via military diplomacy, which is in collaboration with other Governmental Departments’  6. measures, so that North Korea cannot make the situation worse. (NA 4/10/2006: 3–4)  [D: DPRK’s nuclear test (9/10/2006)] 1. LEE JONG-SEOK (Unification Minister): We regard North Korea’s nuclear test as a 2. grave challenge to the international nuclear order and peace, so we’ll cope with this issue 3. with resoluteness and cool-headedness. […] We’ll focus our energy on managing 4. the current situation not to be exacerbated. […] 5. BAE KI-SEON (MP): The people who have pursued the peace and prosperity policy are 6. now in an awkward situation. Nonetheless, we still have to solve this issue through  7. dialogue and cooperation, don’t we? 8. LEE: Dialogue is important but now coordinated action of the international community  9. is also important. However, inter-Korean relations include several sections that are 10. still needed to be solved by dialogue. (NA 10/10/2006: 6–9) 
The excerpts above clearly show the Roh administration’s limit to its 
securitising measures. Each quotation implies the moment when North Korea 
maximised its brinkmanship tactics with discourse and material power. Excerpt 
[A] reflects the situation of February 2005. On 10 February 2005, North Korea 
declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons in the strongest terms, and it 
would withdraw indefinitely from the SPT. It is known that Roh was outraged by 
this, and he raised the question of whether it would be contradictory if South 
Korea keeps pursuing inter-Korean economic cooperation at the GIC, while North 
Korea is developing its own nuclear programme (Lee 2014b: 307). Roh’s anger 
is understandable given that he had tried to set up the SPT as the main part of 
extraordinary means for his securitisation. 
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Despite his wrath, Roh could not help pursuing consistent economic 
cooperation with the North as it was one of only a small handful of businesses 
that bridge the two Koreas, something which is seen as an important tool for 
peaceful inter-Korean relations, and more importantly the GIC could be utilised 
as South Korea’s political leverage in the long term. Therefore, it can be said that 
former Unification Minister Chung’s comments reflect Roh’s rage and dilemma 
(lines 3–5). In the same quotation, Chung underscores that North Korea must not 
take more actions exacerbating the tensions between the two Koreas. However, 
a discursive chasm was too deep to be reclaimed. As can be seen from [B] to [D], 
even though the Roh administration officials underlined that they would ‘focus on 
managing current situations not to be exacerbated’, the situation continued to 
deteriorate as Pyongyang built up its nuclear capabilities. 
There were few things that Roh could do in terms of substantively deterring 
the North’s nuclear provocation. On 5 July 2006, when North Korea tested a 
ballistic missile called Taepodong-2, which was carried out in two or three stages 
with an estimated range of 4,000km, the Roh administration expressed its deep 
regret and deferred the decision to provide rice and fertilisers. The Taepodong-2 
test also led Seoul to support UNSC resolution 1695, but these measures were 
not able to prevent North Korea from carrying out further nuclear-related activities. 
Three months later, when North Korea pledged their first-ever nuclear test, the 
Roh administration again stressed that they would manage the situation and keep 
it from worsening. However, less than one week after this, on 9 October of that 
year, North Korea pushed ahead with a nuclear test. 
Excerpt [D] demonstrates the dilemmatic situation that Roh faced. Lee 
Jong-seok acknowledged that the coordinated action of the international 
community is definitely needed to deter North Korea’s further provocation (lines 
8–10). The problem for Roh was that the coordinated action of the international 
community essentially required teamwork between the ROK and the US. Again, 
he had no choose but to ask for the US’s understanding for keeping the SPT as 
the main frame for the extraordinary measure, taking the opportunities of the 
ROK-US summits held in September and November 2006 respectively. In the 
meantime, however, the US congress passed the North Korea Nonproliferation 
Act on 25 July and Bush signed it in October of that year, while Roh agreed with 
Chinese President Hu Jintao on 21 July that they would not take part in the US-
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led coercive diplomacy against North Korea (PCPP 2008; KINU 2013a). For Roh, 
his double securitisation seemed to be never-ending, as long as the US Neocons 
were in power. 
An inter-Korean summit held in October 2007 between Roh and the DPRK’s 
supreme leader Kim Jong-il was the culminating point for Roh in terms of 
articulating the DPRK’s nuclear threat. Roh made it clear that the inter-Korean 
summit could not be held unless the SPT had some success (Roh 2007c), and in 
any case he kept his promise as the summit was held with the October 3 
Agreement in 2007 being successfully produced. The Agreement could be seen 
as an additional tangible result that Roh gained in his securitising moves.32 At the 
summit, Roh confirmed again his view that the DPRK’s nuclear issue could be 
securitised within the SPT framework. Interestingly enough, Kim Jong-il agreed 
with Roh about the value of the SPT: 
Our perception is that our nuclear programme has become an issue due to the US’s hostile policy towards us [North Korea]. Sometimes they say “we’ll change our [hostile] policy”, but they did a flip-flop on that at other times blurting out harsh language. This is the first problem. The second one is that we want the entire Korean peninsula denuclearised, but they think that the denuclearisation would be finished once they rob us of nuclear weapons. The third one is that while we need to keep a peaceful nuclear energy program, the US forbids us to do every nuclear-related activity. However, we’re still observing them closely to see whether there’s a change of attitude. So I think this problem can be solved within the SPT framework, and the framework is actually really good. In this sense, I think we have a common thread. (Kim Jong-il, 3 October 2007) 
The above excerpt is from the summit transcript, therefore it gives Kim Jong-
il’s perception of the Korean Nuclear Crisis in a most direct way, which was not 
embellished by the North Korean media or a third party.33 From this excerpt, one 
may observe that Kim acknowledged the necessity of the SPT. More importantly, 
however, Kim emphasised that there were still wide discrepancies between the 
DPRK and the US in terms of the denuclearisation issue. Contrary to Roh’s 
expectations, this became a mark of the failure of the implementation of the 
October 3 Agreement, and the DPRK nuclear issues relapsed after Pyongyang 
and Washington could not reach an agreement about the way of nuclear 
verification. 
                                            32 A formal title of the Agreement is ‘Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’. Under the terms of this Agreement, North Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities and to provide a complete declaration of its nuclear programmes by the end of 2007. The main contents of the October 3 Agreement was actually agreed beforehand at the bilateral working-level talks between the US-DPRK, in Geneva, Switzerland, 1–2 September. 33 The summit transcript was supposed to be closed, but in June 2013, Nam Jae-joon, the director of the NIS, disclosed a full text of the transcript, and it caused a huge amount of controversy. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
What are the motivations of Roh’s securitisation? Roh was sworn in as president 
in the midst of the division between conservativism and progressivism that was 
partly caused by Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. Roh basically inherited the 
policy of his progressive predecessor and developed it as a peace and prosperity 
policy. Although Roh clearly preferred engagement to coercive policy, he was 
somewhat indecisive between the two options when North Korea carried out its 
nuclear test. In general, Roh advocated the social reform (Yoo 2010). In that 
respect, it would be correct to say that he is a progressivist. In terms of inter-
Korean relations, Roh wanted to change the conservative-centred 
anticommunism (or anti-North Korea) discourse. For him, by overcoming the 
anticommunism discourse South Korea could become an active actor that can 
decide its own future-oriented security agenda (Yoo 2013). However, it did not 
mean that he condoned the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. He claimed that 
the threat must be dealt with instantly. From his perspective, however, the way of 
pursuing the denuclearisation of North Korea should not be based on the 
assumption that the regime in Pyongyang could collapse soon (Yoo 2010; Yoo 
2013). In this regard, Roh took up the mantle of progressivism that Cho Bong-am 
initiated in the 1950s. 
Roh’s securitising move could be summarised as follows. First, from the 
perspective of discursive practice, particularly from ST’s viewpoint (the 
articulation of the threats and extraordinary measures), Roh manifestly and 
plainly securitised the DPRK’s nuclear threat throughout his presidency. The 
North Korean nuclear issue was actively and consistently manifested ‘as security 
problems on the political agenda’ by Roh’s speech acts (Buzan and Hansen 
2009). In other words, securitising actors and the audience were considerably 
exposed to Roh’s discursive practices, which led them to articulate the risk of the 
DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. 
Second, in the process of the securitising move, Roh put top priority on 
dialogue and, accordingly, he considered it an extraordinary measure. While 
dealing with the nuclear issue within the SPT framework, he also held fast to the 
concept of the peace and security regime, which in turn brought about the issue 
of the legality of the DPRK regime. Meanwhile, he also securitised the US (the 
Bush administration) in regard to its possible military action against the DPRK. 
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However, his discourse seemed to be short of persuasive power whereby the 
issue of the ROK’s conflicting referent objects could be resolved. 
Third, and lastly, even though Roh’s attempts to securitise the DPRK’s 
nuclear issues were stymied not only by a structural factor, such as DPRK-US 
relations, but by a discursive limit that could not alleviate the immediate threat 
level, it is still interesting to see that his efforts resulted in relatively unambiguous 
forms of extraordinary measures, including the September 19 Joint Statement 
and the February 13 and October 3 Agreements, all of which aimed to acquire 
the establishment of a peace and security regime in Northeast Asia. Nonetheless, 
neither had Roh substantive power of implementation of the measures nor his 
securitising move was successful, and this in part contributed to the launch of the 
Lee Myung-bak administration that repudiated the validity of Roh’s securitisation 
and wanted to show toughness in the face of Pyongyang’s nuclear threat. Having 
outlined the main elements of Roh’s securitisation, the following chapter will trace 
the details of Lee’s. 
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5.  
Lee Myung-bak’s Security Discourse 
5.1 Did Lee securitise the DPRK’s nuclear issue? 
In this chapter, readers may conceivably see how President Lee Myung-bak’s 
security discourses on the DPRK’s nuclear threat both differ from yet are also 
similar to those of Roh. Just as has been shown in the previous chapter, through 
this chapter one can grasp again how ST, as a theoretical framework, can be 
applied to the Korean Nuclear Crisis within the context of the Northeast Asian 
regional system. This chapter is split into two parts. The first part deals with the 
discursive traits of Lee based on the conceptual components of ST, which need 
to be complemented by corpus-assisted DA. On the basis of that, the second part 
explores several points that could be said to be the main characteristics of Lee’s 
securitisation. Through this process, it may also be possible to grasp the ROK’s 
style of security discourse, as well as the effectuality of the ST in regard to 
analysing seemingly complicated security discourses. 
 
5.1.1 Security as speech act 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide points of entry to this chapter. They show the most 
frequent patterns of word usage by Lee during his presidency (February 2008 ~ 
February 2013). The former is based on a trigram, while the latter is based on 4 
and 5-grams. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the latter may be better to understand 
the broader context in which Lee’s words were used. The words shown in these 
tables are taken from the same corpus (253,106 words): Lee’s official speeches, 
which were originally written in Korean and later translated into English by the 
Presidential Office team. It is expected that every single word used in the 
presidential speech was carefully selected, hence the corpus represents the crux 
of Lee’s thoughts. Differently put, no matter how many of the speeches were 
embroidered or embellished, they can show the points upon which Lee and his 
speechwriting team wanted to put more weight at the time of writing. As was the 
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case for Roh, the corpus used in these tables is not limited to security issues. It 
covers all issues, such as economy, social problems, culture and so on. That is, 
it covers all speeches made by Lee during his presidency, which range from 
congratulatory messages to his periodical radio and internet addresses. 
In both tables one can find the raw frequency of the words used in Lee’s 
speeches in the second column of each year. Even though the corpus covers all 
issues, one of the most noticeable traits in these tables, however, is that there is 
Table 5.1 Lee’s top-twenty patterns of word usage (3-grams) 
2008 2009 2010 
word Freq. word Freq. word Freq. 
as well as Republic of Korea the Republic of of the Republic the United States The Government will be able to the National Assembly the Government will the Korean people would like to the Korean Peninsula one of the President Hu and I would like of the nation you very much Thank you very Hu and I the intl. community 
43 42 38 35 32 32 30 27 26 20 19 19 18 18 18 17 16 16 16 15 
be able to as well as will be able I would like the Government will one of the would like to the intl. community The Government will you very much the fact that Thank you very around the world the National Assembly My fellow citizens the end of the same time of the world will not be will continue to 
77 42 39 30 29 29 28 28 27 25 25 25 23 20 20 19 18 17 16 16 
Republic of Korea the Republic of be able to as well as of the Republic in the world of the world around the world the intl. community you very much Thank you very will be able of the Korean the United States I would like the government will The Government will the same time of the nation the Korean people 
77 61 43 39 36 35 34 34 32 31 30 29 29 27 27 26 26 25 25 23 
2011 2012 Total 
word Freq. word Freq. word Freq. 
Republic of Korea the Republic of in the world as well as the Government will be able to the United States you very much the intl. community of the world The government will Thank you very of the Republic around the world a fair society The Republic of would like to one of the will be able I would like 
92 60 48 46 40 40 37 31 31 31 31 31 27 27 26 26 25 25 24 24 
Republic of Korea as well as in the world the Republic of The Government will the Government will around the world the Korean Peninsula you very much the National Assembly be able to global economic crisis Thank you very the intl. community members of the the Government has the United States the Korean people one of the of the Republic 
69 54 50 47 42 40 37 33 30 30 30 28 28 27 27 26 25 24 24 24 
Republic of Korea as well as be able to the Republic of in the world the Government will The Government will the United States you very much the intl. community of the Republic Thank you very around the world will be able one of the would like to I would like of the world the same time the Korean people 
295 224 220 218 162 161 158 135 133 133 133 130 128 126 119 118 118 117 98 98  
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no indication of using words, such as ‘North Korea’ or ‘North Korean nuclear 
issues’. This seems rather unusual, since it has long been known that the DPRK 
nuclear issue was of great importance to Lee and, therefore, relevant words were 
expected to be shown in the tables. Even though the tables include various kinds 
of function words and self-referencing words (e.g. as well as, will be able to, would 
like to, Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea is, etc.), given that they contain 
some lexical words (e.g. a fair society, global economic crisis, the United States, 
etc.), the results of the tables based on n-grams seem to be beyond expectations. 
This would particularly be the case for those who are aware of Lee’s policy ‘Vision 
3,000: Denuclearisation and Openness’, which was one of the major flagships of 
Lee’s policy. Vision 3,000 was a process by which South Korea would actively 
assist North Korea in achieving a US$3,000 per capita income within 10 years 
once the DPRK regime makes a resolution to denuclearise (Moon 2012: 119; 
MoU 2013: 17). 
Of course, being excluded from the above tables does not necessarily mean 
that Lee dealt carelessly with the DPRK’s nuclear issue, nor was the issue totally 
neglected in terms of practising security discourse. In the trigram table, for 
example, the frequency of terms ‘the North Korean’ is 36, and ‘North Korean 
nuclear’ is 19 during Lee’s presidency (February 2008~ February 2013), albeit 
not shown in the table because of its low frequency. These somehow show that 
Table 5.2 Lee’s top-twenty patterns of word usage (n-grams) 
4-grams 5-grams 
word Freq. word Freq. 
the Republic of Korea Thank you very much will be able to I would like to of the Republic of The Republic of Korea At the same time as well as the on the Korean Peninsula for the sake of the global economic crisis take this opportunity to Republic of Korea is the end of the On top of this of the National Assembly Now is the time we will be able one of the most in the international community 
211 130 126 114 92 59 55 51 41 37 36 36 34 33 33 32 32 31 31 31 
of the Republic of Korea we will be able to to take this opportunity to like to take this opportunity I would like to take would like to take this Now is the time for As a matter of fact members of the National Assembly the Republic of Korea will the Republic of Korea is the Republic of Korea has men and women in uniform in the years to come stand on their own feet The Republic of Korea is will do all it can to stand on their own peace on the Korean Peninsula the March First Independence Movement 
88 31 29 25 23 22 21 21 20 19 17 17 17 17 16 16 15 15 15 15  
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the DPRK’s nuclear issue was not adequately articulated by Lee (in a relative 
sense). Even though there are several actors who can officially do the speech 
acts about the same issue, including the Unification Minister, Foreign Minister 
and Defence Minister, given their limited power compared to that of president, it 
can be said that the DPRK’s nuclear issue was paid relatively little attention to by 
Lee at least in terms of his speech acts pattern, which in turn would have major 
effects on the security discourse among the public. 
Despite this, there might be another way for Lee to articulate his concerns 
about the North’s nuclear programme as an existential threat. Perhaps a bigram 
or other n-grams based on statistics that ruled out function words can shed light 
on this problem—lack of speech acts on the DPRK’s nuclear issue—or possibly, 
Lee tried to express the threat by way of articulating other subjects that are 
closely related to the DPRK. Therefore, one needs to delve into each word that 
has lexical meaning in the above tables. In the tables, although function words, 
such as ‘be able to’, ‘as well as’ and ‘would like to’, are ranked in high positions, 
one can still find several lexical words that indicate Lee’s discursive practice. 
Apart from words indicating self (in this case, ‘Republic of Korea’, ‘the Korean 
people’ and ‘the Government will’), some words, including ‘the United States’, ‘the 
international community’, ‘Hu and I (former Chinese President Hu Jintao and Lee 
himself)’ are worthy of further investigation. 
First of all, the high frequency of ‘the United States’ is not surprising, given 
its influence upon South Korea throughout many quarters. This means that Lee’s 
speeches on the subject of the US cover various issues, such as the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), the ROK-US summit, and the 2008 financial crisis emanating 
from the US. Collocational behaviour of the words ‘the United States’ used 
regarding the DPRK’s nuclear issues will be examined later in this chapter. 
Secondly, the appearance of former Chinese President Hu Jintao is interesting, 
for this implies China’s influential role in solving the DPRK issues. In the trigram-
based table, the term ‘President Hu and’ is recorded 18 times in 2008. Further 
analysis of this shows that many of the sentences including these terms are 
related to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue, and strategic cooperative partnership between the ROK 
and China, which again would be connected to the DPRK issues (Table 5.3). In 
light of this, one can infer that Lee articulated the nuclear issues by way of the 
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ROK-China partnership. This implies that Lee acknowledged the importance of 
China’s role in the issue. 
Thirdly, the word ‘international community’ also appear oftentimes. A few of 
the sentences that contain this term are used to mention the DPRK’s nuclear 
issue or the DPRK itself. For instance, at the 53rd Memorial Day’s address, Lee 
said ‘I think it is a particularly positive move that the North is working together 
with the international community for its denuclearisation’ (Lee 2008b). In 2009, 
he said ‘North Korea must fully give up their nuclear ambitions and become a 
member of the international community’ at his remarks held at George 
Washington University (Lee 2009b). At the 66th session of the UN General 
Assembly, he said ‘It is my hope to see the DPRK enjoy peace and prosperity by 
becoming a responsible member of the international community’ (Lee 2011b).  
Fourthly, it goes without saying that the term ‘peace on the Korean 
peninsula’ would be closely related to the DPRK’s nuclear issues, as Lee 
stressed that the root cause of the instability of the Korean peninsula and 
Northeast Asia is the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions (Lee 2009c; Lee 2011b). Lastly, 
the term ‘men and women in uniform’ appear 17 times in the 5-grams table. 
Although Lee did not use this term to link with the DPRK’s nuclear threats in any 
case, it might be reasonable to think that the existence of the ROK Armed Forces 
is one of the foundations upon which Lee relied in terms of taking extraordinary 
measures. 
Judging from the above discussion, several points come to the fore when it 
comes to Lee’s speech acts. First, it is unexpected that Lee did not articulate the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue enough to be seen in the tables. As mentioned, the 
frequencies of the terms directly linked to the DPRK’s nuclear threats are 
Table 5.3 Selected sentences including President Hu (Jintao) 
Today, President Hu and I engaged in candid and extensive discussions on the future direction of friendly and cooperative ties between South Korea and China, issues surrounding the Korean peninsula such as the North Korean nuclear problem, regional and international circumstances and ways to cooperate in the global arena. (Lee 2008d) 
President Hu and I engaged in extensive and in-depth discussions on the future direction of the development of ties between Korea and China, issues regarding the Korean Peninsula such as the North Korean nuclear problem as well as ways to cooperate in the region and the global arena. (Lee 2008d) 
During the visit, I held separate meetings with President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and had very useful discussions […] We reaffirmed the common goal for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, including denuclearisation of North Korea, and agreed to continue to work together toward that goal. (Lee 2012b)  
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relatively low compared to other lexical chains. Second, Lee expressed his 
concerns about the DPRK’s nuclear issues by way of articulating other terms, 
such as ‘President Hu Jintao’, ‘the international community’, and so forth. This 
means that Lee was fully cognisant of the fact that the DPRK’s issue is not only 
the ROK’s problem but also that of the international community, and thereby 
demands a coordinated effort based on an international or regional system.  
Third, in this sense, it can be said that Lee firmly regarded the DPRK’s 
nuclear programme as an existential threat that had caused instability on the 
Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Fourth, despite this recognition, it seems 
that Lee’s speech acts based on absolute frequencies are not enough to show 
his perception of referent objects and extraordinary measures that can deter 
North Korea’s further threats. This issue might be supplemented by additional 
corpus-based DA and qualitative DA including documentary analysis and 
interviews. The sections following this section deal with the issues of referent 
objects and extraordinary measures that Lee tried to regulate in the process of 
establishing his security discourse. 
 
5.1.2 Uncongenial referent objects 
The previous section has shown the big picture of Lee’s speech acts, as it only 
dealt with the absolute frequency that includes all areas, including the economy 
and social issues. In that sense, Table 5.4 provides a useful groundwork for an 
in-depth analysis whereby one can see Lee’s way of constructing security 
discourse. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the keywords in this 
table are extracted using the keyness score, which has a higher statistical 
significance in terms of contextualising languages. The keywords not directly 
related to North Korea are excluded, so that readers may focus on Lee’s 
perception of the DPRK’s nuclear issues. The main corpus is the same with the 
preceding tables in this chapter and the reference corpus enTenTen [2012] is 
comprised of 11,191,860,036 words. Keywords shown in the table indicate Lee’s 
speech acts pattern on North Korea in a comprehensive manner. As the 
keywords range from the words directly linked to the DPRK’s nuclear issue to 
wider ones that surround the issue, this table may clarify the way in which Lee 
practised his language in the process of securitising moves against the DPRK’s 
nuclear threats. 
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The first word that stands out in this table is ‘denuclearisation’, since this 
word was not shown in those tables based on absolute frequencies. This means 
that the word ‘denuclearisation’ was meaningfully articulated by Lee. However, 
the appearance of this word does not guarantee that there were enough speech 
acts as a form of securitisation against the DPRK’s nuclear threats. The in-depth 
analysis of this keyword will be dealt with later in this chapter. Second, the table 
shows that Lee was not free from the values of the Constitution that was 
mentioned in the previous chapter: peaceful unification based on a fair market 
economy and democratic order, and maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations. 
The words ‘unification’, ‘compatriots’, ‘prosperity’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘coexistence’ 
can be subsumed under this category. In other words, even though North Korea 
kept engaging in provocative acts, Lee could not forsake the possibility of 
peaceful coexistence with the DPRK until unification is achieved. 
At the same time, the other side of the Constitutional value—national 
security—could not be ignored, for the ROK government must not let a DPRK 
regime that holds on to the Juche ideology pose a threat to the South either by 
nuclear weapons or by other means. Keywords like ‘countermeasures’ and 
‘unwavering’ clearly show that Lee regarded national security as one of the most 
important referent objects, and that he recognised the North’s regime as 
something that should be controlled, because otherwise it would cause another 
Table 5.4 Extracted keywords in Lee’s speeches 
keywords keyness score main corpus frequency reference corpus frequency 
Cheonan democratisation denuclearisation provocations(provocation) reunification(unification) Yeongpyeong peninsula compatriots bilateral(diplomacy) prosperity(coprosperity) Pyongyang Myanmar cooperation(cooperate) Hu(Jintao) countermeasures(watertight) unwavering coexistence sacrificed armed Geumgangsan 
143.63 82.15 63.65 59.06(27.89) 58.19(37.06) 52.21 51.41 42.80 40.96(26.62) 40.88(32.89) 37.46 37.18 32.10(26.05) 31.89(31.69) 27.13(20.99) 26.92 25.75 24.24 22.67 18.70 
43 41 19 27(17) 27(28) 15 124 20 63(34) 123(9) 21 36 227(44) 40(13) 12(9) 17 13 28 149 5 
885 10,132 958 4,374(15,519) 8,584(22,111) 487 98,153 8,815 58,047(46,231) 125,671(5) 13,149 31,886 312,508(65,167) 45,097(6,229) 7,842(7,359) 16,545 10,739 40,677 289,726 15  
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problem. The following quotations reflect both sides of the Constitutional value, 
each of which includes some of the keywords (in italics): 
My fellow Koreans and our compatriots in North Korea. The overriding goal of the ROK is not military confrontation. Our goal has always been the attainment of real peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Our goal is to bring about prosperity for all Koreans. Our vision is to realise the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. (Lee 2010d: 24 May)  We have learned an invaluable lesson from the North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. All of us have yet again demonstrated unwavering determination, after keenly realising the fact that if we merely let the North have its own way, national security and peace cannot be guaranteed. (Lee 2010b: 27 December) 
In essence, the issue of conflicting referent objects of the ROK governments 
mentioned in Chapter 4 lingered in the Lee administration. Differently put, in the 
process of establishing security discourses, Lee was also struggling with the 
fundamental issue that represents contradictory facets of the ROK’s referent 
objects. This vital gap between the DPRK as compatriots whom the ROK should 
somehow embrace and the DPRK as the main enemy that causes grave 
concerns for the ROK’s security matters seems not to be well bridged in Lee’s 
speeches, just as it had not been in Roh’s speeches. With regard to this, as 
suggested before, Roh tried to make dialogue extraordinary in order to bridge the 
gap, which was absolutely limited in controlling the threats. What about Lee? Can 
other keywords shed light on this problem? 
Thirdly, perhaps most importantly, many of the keywords shown in the table 
implicate the DPRK’s provocative behaviours and the potential ways in which the 
DPRK’s bad behaviours could be altered. The words ‘Cheonan’, ‘provocation(s)’ 
and ‘Yeonpyeong’ are directly suggesting the DPRK’s negativity, whereas 
‘Myanmar’ and ‘Hu (Jintao)’ are the words that partly represent a model of reform 
and openness for the DPRK: 
Since the end of the Korean War, the North has perpetrated incessant armed provocations against us, including the bombing attack against the presidential delegation at the Aung San Martyr’s Mausoleum in Myanmar and the bombings in midair of Korean Air Flight 858. The North Koreans, however, have never officially admitted the crimes they committed. (Lee 2010d: 24 May)  Even though Myanmar is rich in natural resources, the country has long remained underdeveloped since it gained independence because it has walked on the socialist path. Quite recently, however, the nation has embarked on economic development by deciding to democratise, reform and open its doors. There is no reason for the North not to do likewise. (Lee 2012e: 16 April) 
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These keywords may provide useful ground to test both referent objects and 
extraordinary measures of the Lee administration. The ratio of this type of 
keyword—emphasising the DPRK’s bellicosity and the need for it to change—
leads us to delve into Lee’s perception of North Korea, and this can be 
supplemented by another type of corpus-assisted DA. 
Table 5.5 provides the top-twenty collocates of North (Buk in Korean, 
referring to North Korea) with the highest t-scores and MI scores respectively 
(The range between the node word and the collocates is ±5 words). The corpus 
is the same as the previous ones. As aforementioned, both scores are measured 
to prove the strength or certainty of association between a node word and 
collocates. In this table, since the word North is used as a linguistic node, one 
can see the list of words that appeared frequently with the node word. In other 
words, through this table, readers can grasp the way in which Lee described the 
DRPK regime by using his own words. The way of extracting the collocations is 
exactly the same as Roh’s case. In the t-score part of the table, function words, 
including prepositions and conjunctions, are excluded. Except for the general 
words like Korea, Korean(s) and North, this table gives us an additional 
opportunity to identify how North Korea was perceived by the Lee administration.  
First, it can be said that the DPRK’s nuclear issues were articulated during 
Lee’s presidency. Relevant collocates are ‘nuclear’, ‘issue’, ‘programme’, 
‘resolution’, ‘Six-Party’, ‘pushed’, ‘rocket’, ‘long-range’, ‘denuclearisation’, and so 
Table 5.5 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of North 
Collocate T-score Collocate MI score 
Korea Korean South (Korea) nuclear Koreans (nuclear) issue time North (Korea) help compatriots provocations brethren attack engage  (nuclear) weapons (nuclear) program change perpetrated resolution dialogue 
11.932 7.876 6.455 6.283 3.569 3.562 3.356 3.316 3.015 2.991 2.990 2.825 2.819 2.804 2.801 2.784 2.719 2.640 2.639 2.625 
brethren perpetrated principled pushed (ahead with) rocket residing resolution persuade provocative anytime compatriots tourists attack provocations Yeonpyeong long-range provocation South (Korea) Six-Party (Talks) denuclearisation 
9.528 8.876 8.791 8.791 8.721 8.721 8.635 8.528 8.528 8.528 8.376 8.359 8.281 8.239 8.207 8.069 8.026 7.955 7.943 7.850  
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on. This implies that Lee’s discourse on North Korea was essentially linked to its 
nuclear activities (including launching long-range missiles) just as it was during 
the Roh administration. Second, the words ‘compatriots’, ‘engage’, ‘brethren’ and 
‘dialogue’ demonstrate that Pyongyang is an object with which Seoul must 
engage in order to maintain peaceful inter-Korean relations. In that regard, it is 
right that Lee’s North Korea policy can be recognised as engagement in 
diplomacy. This table in part proves Lee’s discursive propensity for engagement 
policy. This view is also corroborated by Pyongyang watchers who themselves 
were engaged in the Lee administration. They adamantly denied the contention 
that the Lee administration was inclined to sanction or isolate the North: 
No government can survive in the ROK without the North Korea policy based on engagement and dialogue. There is no policy saying that “if you don’t do this, we’ll hit you”. Can the ROK government strike the DPRK first due to the mere fact that the DPRK does not give up their nuclear weapons? It is not possible. What the Lee administration did was that when they said “we’ll assist you when you do this (give up the nuclear weapons)”, the DPRK responded “we won’t”, so they said “then we cannot assist you”. I think all South Korean governments have had engagement policies towards the DPRK since the Park Cheong-hee military regime. (Interview: 9 July 2014)  The Lee administration’s ‘denuclearisation first’ policy sparked the North’s strong opposition. The North blocked off everything (inter-Korean dialogue) in the early phase of the Lee administration, while claiming “do not mention our nuclear weapons”. The persons in the liberal bloc do not see the incident in which South Korean employees were kicked out from the GIC in less than a month after Lee’s inauguration. In July of that year, a South Korean tourist was shot dead at Mount Keumgang on the same day when President Lee proposed an inter-Korean dialogue. Under this circumstance, then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had a stroke. One should look at these circumstances and contexts before criticising the Lee administration’s North Korea policy. (Interview: 4 April 2014)  To my knowledge, it is North Korea and not us that blocked and repudiated the inter-Korean relations. We offered food assistance last year, and we also proposed the inter-Korean dialogue through which to negotiate the problems for implementing the June 15 and October 4 declarations based on the respect for those declarations, but Pyongyang kept rejecting our suggestions. (Yoo Myung-hwan, Then Foreign Minister: NA 26/5/2009) 
The problem, however, comes out of the third point, which seems to have 
made the Lee administration’s North Korea policy more hawkish. As shown in the 
above table, many of the words are related to the concepts aiming to show the 
DPRK’s belligerence or to mention its negative behaviours. These words are 
‘attack’, ‘perpetrated’, ‘provocation(s)’, ‘provocative’, ‘Yeonpyeong’, ‘tourists’, and 
so forth.34 It is worth noting that these words are also included in Lee’s keyword 
list. 
                                            34 With regard to ‘tourists’, on 11 July 2008, Park Wang-ja, a middle-aged South Korean tourist 
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What needs to be taken into account here is to understand how this kind of 
pattern influenced his articulation of the DPRK’s nuclear threats. Differently put, 
it is highly likely that North Korea’s provocations and resultant measures are 
inextricably linked with Lee’s security discourse on North Korea’s nuclear issues. 
This is important in that not only did it transform Lee’s referent objects—
maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations along with the achievement of the 
DPRK’s denuclearisation (establishing a nuclear-free-zone on the Korean 
Peninsula)—into another realm, but it also regulated the entire direction of 
extraordinary measures on the issue of DPRK’s nuclear threats, which will be 
investigated in the next section. Below are some excerpts from Lee’s addresses 
which show his perceptual change in terms of dealing with North Korea. The 
words included in the above table and the keywords are in italics: 
I would like to make myself very clear. The highest priority of my administration’s North Korea policy is to ensure the denuclearisation of North Korea and in tandem, we will seek mutual benefit and co-prosperity of the two Koreas. In the interest of genuine reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean peninsula, it is essential that the North Korean nuclear issue be first resolved. (Lee 2008c: 11 July)  During this single year when we marked the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, North Korea perpetrated two armed provocations. […] We have thus far shown patience time and again. We have struggled hard to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula one way or another because we do not want to see any more national tragedies. […] The North Koreans, however, have misread our intentions and aspiration for peace and committed provocations against us without the slightest hesitation. (Lee 2010b: 27 December)  
One might argue that Lee had already established his ‘hawkish’ perception 
of the North Korean regime even before the two incidents—the sinking of the 
Cheonan corvette and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island—like many 
progressivists assert. However, it is not actually an assertion based on facts, at 
least according to Lee’s discursive practice. He had hardly used such words 
indicating the North’s negativity—e.g. provocative and provocations—before the 
outbreak of the incidents (Table 5.6). Lee’s speech act pattern clearly shows that 
the words indicative of the North’s negativity (except for the nuclear and long-
range missile issues) had not been standing out on a large scale before 2010, 
                                            was shot dead by a North Korean soldier while walking along the beach near Mount Keumgang (The Mount Keumgang is a special tourist administrative region of the DPRK). The North asserted that Ms Park intruded a military zone, but South Korea suspended the Keumgang Tour project after the North’s refusal to conduct an on-the-spot survey and offer an official document for preventing a recurrence. 
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when the two incidents occurred. In other words, Lee’s speech acts on the DPRK 
issue have shifted from the North’s nuclear issue itself to a mixture of 
Pyongyang’s provocative characteristics and nuclear-related activities. This could 
be the very point where his securitisation against the nuclear threat is distracted. 
In the end, for Lee, the DPRK’s Kim regime was just not compatible with the 
process by which the ROK pursues its referent objects. 
A channel of dialogue with North Korea needs to be open at all times. Basically, however, I think that dictators cannot be changed, inasmuch as reform and openness mean the end of dictatorship. I believe that a motive power to change the North Korean society will arise from the North Korean people, not from the regime. (Lee 2015: 220) 
Lee seems to have come to the conclusion that the DPRK regime, which 
itself should be partnered with the ROK, is uncongenial in the process of 
achieving Seoul’s referent objects. As a result, this drastically led his security 
discourse to the ROK’s ultimate referent object without considering the DPRK’s 
existence: peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula based on a liberal 
democratic order. This change of security discourse seems to have made the 
ROK’s extraordinary measures against the DPRK’s nuclear threats much more 
ambiguous. This problem will be dealt with in the next section, for Table 5.4 and 
Table 5.5 also include several (in-) direct hints of extraordinary measures that 
Lee accentuated. What practical measures were frequently articulated by Lee to 
keep the ROK’s referent objects safe and to deter the DPRK’s nuclear threats? If 
there is something that Lee bore in mind as extraordinary measures, it must have 
been exposed in his speech act patterns. The next section discusses that issue. 
 
5.1.3 Equivocal extraordinary measures 
The preceding section introduced several notable keywords. Some of them 
helped readers to examine Lee’s way of thinking about the DPRK regime and his 
perception of its nuclear threats. It reflected the reality of the ROK’s referent 
objects that Lee had faced, which are not only conflicting but also uncongenial. 
Table 5.6 Occurrences of provocation(s)/provocative 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0 (0) 2 (40.42) 25 (385.40) 12 (195.70) 6 (113.70) 
* () is per million 
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As mentioned, from ST’s perspective, securitising actors have the special right to 
use extraordinary measures when they think that a threat would considerably 
increase without taking immediate action. Therefore, there are some activities 
that could be differentiated from a standard or normal political process. It was 
also suggested that in the process of taking exceptional means, the actors often 
legitimise the breaking of rules—the rules that are applied to a process by which 
standard or normal political activities are conducted—and the form of breaking of 
rules can vary: breaking the positive law or international law, enacting a special 
law that circumvents existing laws, purporting to being an act of state doctrine, 
and so forth. As quoted earlier, Lee clearly expressed that the highest priority of 
his administration is to denuclearise North Korea. He made it absolutely clear that 
the North’s nuclear weapons and programmes are existential threats. What then 
could be chosen as extraordinary measures? What are Lee’s keywords telling us 
about his measures on the threats? 
This research has already shown that dialogue itself was chosen as an 
extraordinary measure during the Roh administration in terms of the discourse 
level. It was also suggested that even this could be seen as a securitising actor’s 
activity related to the breaking of rules, given that the DPRK is an anti-
government organisation according to the ROK’s Constitution. As noted before, 
this is where the concept of tongchi-haengwe (prerogative or acts of state) arises 
from. Since the 1990s, inter-Korean dialogue has come to be known as part of a 
standard political process with the introduction of the IECA. At the same time, 
however, political tensions between the IECA and the NSA still remain, and this 
is why Roh was not able to be free from the criticism made by the conservative 
bloc, that the Roh administration’s dialogue with the DPRK ended up 
strengthening the DPRK’s Kim regime. For Roh, as noted in the previous chapter, 
dialogue was the sole solution as far as the North’s behaviour is concerned. That 
was evidently expressed throughout his speech acts. In that respect, the Roh 
administration’s extraordinary measure was an engagement policy based on 
consistent dialogue. 
What is interesting, however, is that the basic situation in which Lee was 
placed was exactly the same as that of Roh. In other words, the boundary of the 
ROK’s extraordinary measures was fairly and fundamentally circumscribed due 
to its limitations. As mentioned, owing to the risk of war, any type of pre-emptive 
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strike could not be imagined in South Korea. Such offensive action could not 
guarantee the denuclearisation or dissolution of the DPRK regime, nor could they 
gain support from China, with which the ROK should be partnered when it comes 
to reunification under Seoul’s control. Even showing just a little sign of pre-
emptive strike would increase the possibility of the North launching nuclear 
missiles (Kim 2015a). 
What then can be seen as Lee’s ‘rational’ extraordinary measures on the 
DPRK’s nuclear threats? As shown in the previous quotations, the government 
officials in charge of the inter-Korean relations during the Lee administration 
insisted that their North Korea policy was principally based on an engagement 
policy. Is engagement itself not a policy that is predicated upon dialogue? As the 
word ‘dialogue’ is central to the engagement policy, which is one of the 
collocations of ‘North (Korea)’ in Lee’s speeches, we need to look into how Lee 
used this word within the context of the DPRK issue (Table 5.7). Table 5.7 
includes all co-occurrences of ‘dialogue’ and ‘North’ from the corpus. What this 
table is indicating is that Lee acknowledged the importance and inevitability of 
dialogue with North Korea. Although this table does not show it, the top-five 
collocates of ‘dialogue’ are all the DPRK-related words according to the MI scores 
(Pyongyang, inter-Korean, engage, open, North). 
This table shows, at the same time, a slightly changing pattern of Lee’s 
perception of dialogue as well. For example, the sentences from the first to the 
third line were spoken by Lee before the outbreak of the Cheonan and 
Yeonpyeong incidents. In these sentences, Lee showed his belief in the 
usefulness of dialogue, albeit not satisfactorily processed. He also showed his 
willingness to engage in dialogue with the North at any time. This kind of thought 
can be found even after the incidents of 2010, as shown in the fifth and the sixth 
lines. This means that Lee could not help but keep looking for a way for the 
North’s denuclearisation through dialogue. Nevertheless, the two incidents 
Table 5.7 Co-occurrences of dialogue and North 
of peace in Northeast Asia. The South and  I hereby make the following proposals to  am willing to engage in dialogue with the  , South Korea has striven to resolve the is ready to engage in dialogue with the agreement that we must also pursue dialogue with the inauguration of a new leadership, the 
North North North North North North North 
have so far continued dialogue, exchanges Korea. Full dialogue between the two Koreas at any time and am ever ready to cooperate Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and  anytime with an open mind. Peaceful unification Korea. However, we must also maintain our resumed dialogue with the United States 
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caused by North Korea seemed to have made Lee’s perception on dialogue with 
the North different, just as was shown in the previous quotations. The whole 
contexts of the fourth line and the sixth line of this table demonstrate his position 
in a clearer way: 
Over the past 20 years, therefore, South Korea has striven to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and collaboration while at the same time providing unstinted humanitarian assistance. North Korea, on the other hand, responded with a series of provocative acts, including the development of a nuclear programme, the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan by an explosion and the shelling of Yeonpyeondo. At long last, we came to a realisation that it no longer makes sense for us to anticipate that the North would abandon its nuclear programme or its policy of brinkmanship on its own. (Lee 2010a: 29 November)  We are in full agreement that the SPT is an effective way to achieve tangible progress. We are in full agreement that we must also pursue dialogue with North Korea. However, we must also maintain our principled approach. A North Korea policy that is firmly rooted in such principles is the key that will allow us to ultimately and fundamentally resolve the issue. North Korea’s development is in our collective interest and this is what we want; however, this depends on its willingness to end all provocations and make genuine peace. (Lee 2011c: 14 October) 
In his 2010 address, Lee bluntly expressed his disappointment with North 
Korea. He even said that there is no point in anticipating the North’s 
denuclearisation on its own. This logic led him to think about a more principled 
approach, as is shown in his 2011 address. He still seems to acknowledge the 
necessity of the SPT as a dialogue form for the North’s denuclearisation. At the 
same time, however, he put more weight on the principled approach, which he 
thought was essential to resolve the nuclear issue in a fundamental manner. This 
makes us think about the relationship of the SPT and Lee’s principled approach 
in the process of the DPRK’s denuclearisation. With regard to this, Robert Gates, 
former US Secretary of Defence, clarified this matter: 
Lee was adamant that there could be no return to the SPT on the North’s nuclear programme “until they admit their wrongdoing and renounce it.” I concurred: “Resumption of the SPT would be seen as a reward—the sequence must be consequences, then talks.” (Gates 2014: 416) 
In short, particularly after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, Lee was 
determined that the SPT could not be held until the North’s regime sincerely 
apologised for the provocations and altered its hitherto characteristics. Although 
dialogue was still an important option for Lee, a dialogue between the two Koreas 
must be based on the North’s sincerity and genuineness. This analysis leads us 
to consider the next step. If the SPT, which is virtually the sole and viable option 
 
 
149 
for resolving the North’s nuclear threat by means of dialogue, is not possible, 
what then could the extraordinary measures be that could induce North Korea to 
seriously consider its own denuclearisation? What could the principled approach 
be that might correct the North’s ‘provocative’ behaviour? 
The words like ‘Myanmar’ in Table 5.4 and ‘persuade’ in Table 5.5 in part 
show Lee’s way of thinking in terms of the denuclearisation of the DPRK. It is 
worth noting that ‘Myanmar’ occurred 36 times in Lee’s speeches. This is nearly 
twice as much as the frequency of ‘denuclearisation’ (19 times). It is interesting 
to see that the frequency of Myanmar is higher than those of ‘Yeonpyeong’ (15 
times) and ‘Pyongyang’ (21 times). An in-depth analysis of the sentences 
including ‘Myanmar’ reveals that this word is closely related to the words 
‘persuade’ and ‘time’. The link is identified by the following quotations from Lee’s 
other addresses. 
[Myanmar’s] progress has stagnated due to the closed socialist economic system and the long-standing rule of the military authorities. Making matters worse, international sanctions over the past 20 years have left his country disconnected from the world. As a result, its national per capita income stands at around US$700, similar to North Korea. Against all the odds, however, Myanmar changed its constitution in 2008, and last year saw the inauguration of a civilian government. (Lee 2012c: 28 May)  At the summit meeting with President Thein Sein, I said, “Just as Myanmar has opened a new age, I hope Myanmar will be able to persuade the North to learn from its experience and follow suit.” Recently, a wind of liberalisation, reform and opening has been sweeping the whole world. The wind now blows toward Asia through North Africa after originating in Eastern Europe constituting a historic trend against which no one can stand. (Lee 2012d: 6 June) 
In these addresses, Lee compares Myanmar directly to North Korea. It is no 
exaggeration to say that every single situation in which Myanmar was placed 
could be replaced by North Korea: closed socialist economic system, long-
standing rule of the military authorities, international sanctions, national per capita 
income, and so forth. In that sense, the logic of Lee’s Vision 3,000 policy was 
perfectly in sync with his opinion on Myanmar’s change. Lee emphasised that the 
Pyongyang regime must follow Myanmar’s example, saying that Myanmar saw ‘a 
civilian government’. Moreover, he seemed to firmly believe that a wind of 
liberalisation, pointing to the collapse of the Eastern European communist bloc 
and the Arab Spring alluding to the demise of the authoritarian regimes, would 
blow towards North Korea. Simply put, Lee wanted the DPRK to be transformed. 
 
 
150 
As an interim conclusion, it seems clear that Lee had originally had hope for 
the resolution of the DPRK’s nuclear threat by means of continuing dialogue (e.g. 
SPT) with North Korea. However, the consecutive incidents that occurred in 2010 
made him much more sceptical about the DPRK’s willingness to denounce its 
nuclear weapons. As a consequence of this, Lee’s security discourse on North 
Korea seems to change to a way in which he put top priority on changing the 
North’s behaviour before its denuclearisation. In particular, his Myanmar 
speeches were inevitably alluding to the change of the North Korean ruling elites 
themselves. This is because Lee thought that the DPRK’s nuclear issue could 
only be resolved this way. However, this does not give any answer to the following 
questions: how can we change the North’s behaviour? In what way can Lee 
persuade North Korea? However much Lee stressed the significance of 
‘persuasion’, ‘Myanmar’ and ‘principled’ policy, it would not be possible to deter 
North Korea’s nuclear armament without substantive measures that could 
fundamentally change the North’s perception. Even though military responses 
(e.g. purchasing advanced weapons from abroad and extending the range of 
ballistic missiles) are to some degree able to deter the DPRK’s nuclear 
adventurism, this kind of military response cannot dissuade the DPRK from 
developing its own nuclear weapons, nor can it enfeeble the already heightened 
security dilemma in the region.35 
One might see at this point why Lee oftentimes mentioned ‘Hu Jintao’. As 
shown in Table 5.4, President Hu was mentioned 40 times in Lee’s speeches. 
The number is higher than the appearance of Myanmar. As noted earlier, Lee 
acknowledged the importance of the Chinese role in dealing with the DPRK 
issues. Apart from the numerical result of Lee’s speech acts, his memoir also 
shows how much effort he exerted during several meetings with Beijing’s ruling 
elites in order to press Pyongyang for its provocative activities. It was essential 
for the ROK government to collaborate with China, particularly regarding the 
DPRK issues, through which Lee intended to make the North’s regime change. 
Although Lee himself struggled with the Chinese position on the DPRK’s attacks 
on the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island, he seemed to 
believe that China’s perception of North Korea would change. This logic 
                                            35 The US allowed South Korea to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800km in October 2012. South Korea had only been able to develop its ballistic missiles with the maximum range of 300km since 2001. Before that, South Korea’s ballistic missile range was 180km.  
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eventually led him to the concept of the inevitability of reunification on the Korean 
peninsula driven by South Korea: 
As China is trying to expand their influence in the world, they may felt burdensome to stand up for North Korea’s provocations that are condemned by the international community. From my early tenure, I concentrated my efforts on altering China’s thoughts about North Korea. Although I could not disclose the episodes one by one, throughout my presidency, the most important agenda for the ROK-China summits was North Korea. […] China’s change of view on North Korea is also revealed, given that there have been discussions on the collapse of the North’s regime and South-led unification in China. (Lee 2015: 297) 
One may notice from the keywords (Table 5.4) that the words ‘reunification’ 
and ‘unification’ (55 times) were also frequently used by Lee. Lee used these 
words nearly twice as often as Roh (29 times). As both words translate into the 
same word in Korean (Tong-il), they can be regarded as one word. The unification 
discourse was very important for Lee, for it gives the ROK government an 
opportunity to solve the DPRK’s nuclear threat once and for all, as long as it takes 
place under the South’s control. Although Lee used these words throughout his 
presidency, the raw frequency of his reference to (re)unification increased in 
particular after 2010 when the two accidents occurred. In short, Lee’s speech 
acts on the DPRK’s nuclear threat can be the sequence of his perception leading 
up to the ROK-led unification. 
Unfortunately, Lee’s hope—making North Korea’s perception alter by 
means of China, which is relatively more realistic—does not seem to have been 
achieved. Contrary to Lee’s evaluation, Chun Young-woo, former National 
Security Advisor to Lee, who was one of the closest aides to the president, came 
to a different conclusion: 
I think there has been a lot of change in China’s rhetoric and attitude toward North Korea. But I see no basis and grounds to conclude that China’s fundamental policy toward North Korea is changing or it’s likely to change anytime soon. […] I don’t think they are willing to use any of the leverage they have to push North Korea into denuclearisation. They are giving more effusive lip service to the virtues of denuclearisation. […] I’m not seeing their harsh language translated into real action to change North Korea’s behaviour or policy. (CSIS and KF 2015) 
To summarise, all the relevant keywords frequently used by Lee have not 
so far provided any measures whereby the audience can regard them as 
convincing. In this sense, Lee’s extraordinary measures which had hitherto been 
suggested (e.g. dialogue, Myanmar, President Hu, unification, persuade, etc.) are 
the concepts based on a mid/long-term aim at best, not on a threat-urgency 
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modality. Given that Lee put the top priority on the DPRK’s nuclear threat, this is 
a quite interesting result. According to an in-depth analysis of each keyword, 
other words in the above tables do not say much about the way that Lee tried to 
construct a substantive method for this problem. 
There might be some reasons for this. One possible reason is that Lee just 
failed to come up with extraordinary measures that could deal with the threat in 
an urgent manner. Another possibility is that they were able to produce something 
resembling extraordinary measures, but Lee did not articulate these enough due 
to some confidential reasons. Either way, the absence of articulation means that 
there was no room for securitisation. In other words, it means that there was no 
language practice. It also means that there was the absence of a process of 
Table 5.8 T-scores and MI scores for collocate of nuclear 
Collocate T-score Collocate MI score 
weapons North (Korea) power summit security plants Korea Korean safety energy issue world terrorism program Seoul international security development missiles plant 
6.921 6.432 5.816 5.790 5.735 5.093 4.713 4.560 4.223 3.965 3.579 3.425 3.311 3.294 2.945 2.871 2.772 2.749 2.643 2.640 
dismantle weapons missiles ambitions plants safety proliferation terrorism security arms plant construct test materials power resolution accident safety threat construction 
10.229 9.956 9.867 9.814 9.801 9.381 9.381 9.296 9.296 9.229 8.949 8.814 8.744 8.644 8.644 8.114 8.059 7.727 7.693 7.644  
Table 5.9 Co-occurrences of dismantle/ambitions/resolution and nuclear 
Talks so that the North will dismantle its  to have Pyongyang totally dismantle its  imperative that the North dismantle its survive is to voluntarily dismantle its 
nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear 
programme. We will try to persuade Pyongyang arsenal. We need to be convinced of the arsenal and take the path of openness and weapons and to cooperate with the international 
goal. North Korea must fully give up their their best interest to fully give up their  to encourage North Korea to give up its  too late for North Korea to give up their exchange for North Korea fully giving up their Peninsula. And North Korea must give up their  
nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear 
ambitions and become a member of the international weapons ambitions. When North Korea takes weapons ambitions. Up until recently, ambitions. It is never too late to embark  weapons ambitions. Let us not concern ambitions. Korea and the United States 
expediting a resolution of the North Korean peaceful resolution of the North Korean support for a resolution to the North Korean  
nuclear nuclear nuclear 
issue and expanding the scope of economic issue and to bring about peace and stability impasse through the Six-Party Talks and  
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constructing a set or system of meanings that could give rise to more discussion 
between securitising actors and audiences. 
Let us move on to the collocates of ‘nuclear’ (Table 5.8). This table includes 
the top-twenty collocates of ‘nuclear’ in the corpus representing all of Lee’s 
speeches. The collocates are presented by t-scores and MI scores respectively. 
Had Lee’s extraordinary measures against the DPRK’s nuclear threat been 
articulated in a substantive manner, the relevant concepts should have come to 
the front at the table. First, the words ‘North’, ‘weapons’, ‘programme’, 
‘development’, ‘test’, ‘missiles’, ‘arms’ and ‘threat’ clearly show that Lee 
recognised North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a threat and he linked the North 
with its nuclear programme. Second, many words in this table, such as ‘summit’, 
‘security’, ‘world’, ‘terrorism’, ‘Seoul’, ‘proliferation’, ‘materials’, and ‘accident’ are 
closely related to the ‘Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)’ held in Seoul in 2012, 
rather than referring to Pyongyang’s nuclear issues. Apart from this, the reason 
why the words ‘power’, ‘construct(ion)’ and ‘plants’ are frequently seen is that Lee 
placed a high priority on building nuclear power plants overseas. 
Third, more importantly, the words ‘dismantle’, ‘ambitions’ and ‘resolution’ 
are possibly linked to some potential extraordinary measures on the issue. 
However, what an in-depth observation of these words shows is that most of the 
contexts are about Lee’s style in terms of demanding the denuclearisation of 
North Korea; that is, the DPRK should fully give up their nuclear weapons and 
open up to countries like China, Myanmar and Vietnam in order for them to 
become a responsible member of the international community (Table 5.9). 
Although the SPT and dialogue can be seen in his early speeches, it seems 
difficult to figure out what could be regarded as Lee’s real extraordinary measure. 
Nonetheless, one concept that is found from these contexts is ‘Grand Bargain’, 
which can be regarded as an extraordinary measure that Lee came up with in 
2009. The whole sentence of the fifth line of the second row (among collocate 
ambitions) is as follows: 
‘Our Grand Bargain proposal aims to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by providing security assurance and economic assistance in exchange for North Korea fully giving up their nuclear weapons ambitions’. Let us not concern ourselves with when the SPT resumes. Instead, we must hammer out a grand bargain to fundamentally resolve the North Korea issue through the SPT. (Lee 2010c: 5 June) 
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In this excerpt one can see that Lee put the Grand Bargain before the SPT, 
although he still recognised that the SPT would be the ultimate framework to 
securitise the DPRK’s nuclear issue. According to this definition, the Grand 
Bargain seems to be similar to the contents of the several important agreements 
signed during the Roh administration, in that there is a kind of transactional 
relation between the complete denuclearisation of the DPRK and the security 
assurance plus economic assistance to the North. The Lee administration 
acknowledged that the Grand Bargain is in line with the principle of the 
September 19 Joint Statement. However, they differentiated the Grand Bargain 
from the February 13 and the October 3 Agreements, for they thought that the 
two agreements were just in charge of a partial process of dismantling the 
DPRK’s nuclear programmes. The core argument of the Grand Bargain initiative 
was that it pursued irreversible steps from the initial stage so that North Korea 
cannot reverse a denuclearisation procedure (Ha 2013: 89–92). 
As a more comprehensive and fundamental approach for resolving the 
North’s nuclear issue, the Grand Bargain, however, failed to be positioned as one 
of the major security discourses in Lee’s speech acts. This may be due to several 
reasons, including the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents that happened in the 
following year and the DPRK’s continuous rebuff to that initiative. As has already 
been suggested in the tables indicating keywords and collocates, particularly 
after the two incidents in 2010, Lee shifted his discursive weight from the North’s 
nuclear issues to its provocative traits and the necessity for its change.  
What makes the Grand Bargain initiative more ambiguous was that both the 
initiative and Lee’s other principal North Korea policy, Vision 3,000, were 
considered in the same vein (Ha 2013: 90). Since Vision 3,000 was predicated 
on the political value that seeks liberal democracy, market economy and human 
rights, all of which are fundamentally based on the ROK’s referent objects, it 
would somehow be contradictory to the core part of the Grand Bargain 
(remember that the Grand Bargain’s core argument was that the international 
community secures the DPRK regime in return for denuclearisation). The 
discursive relationship between Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain will be 
further investigated along with the May 24 measures in the following section. 
In effect, the problem of ‘equivocal extraordinary measures’ was always 
controversial throughout Lee’s presidency. Regarding this, the National 
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Assembly Minutes demonstrate that even ruling party members often brought up 
this problem. All quoted texts below are debates between MPs and the Lee 
administration’s cabinet members. 
[A: DPRK’s ballistic missile test (5/4/2009)] 1. YOO SEUNG-MIN (MP): Our government’s response to this situation is equivocal, and 2. the government seems like ‘The Boy Who Cried Wolf’, because we had said that  3. “we would impose sanctions on you”, even when we didn’t have any means to 4. do that. […] What kind of concrete things do you have to impose sanctions? Do you? 5. LEE SANG-HEE (Defence Minister): What I said was that we need to consider  6. both international measures and bilateral measures in a comprehensive way  7. to get a balance in the process of imposing sanctions. 8. YOO: Is the GIC not a powerful measure for us? You should insist that we need to 9. shut down the GIC at the NSC meeting. -- It’s no use saying these things  10. because we don’t have any measures to impose sanctions.  (NA 5/4/2009: 21–22)  [B: DPRK’s announcement about confiscation of the South’s assets in Mt. Keumgang] 1. CHUNG OK-IM (MP): I’m very sceptical about the efficiency of our government’s  2. principled policy, because it seems not to be based on action.  3. HYUN IN-TAEK (Unification Minister): We think that our measures should be something 4. whereby North Korea ultimately realises that what they’re doing at the moment would 5. not be helpful for them. […] 6. SONG MIN-SOON (MP): How long would it take for the North to realise that? 7. HYUN: Well, that question is really difficult to be answered. […] 8. SONG: Why then did you bring up such a concept that cannot be answered? […] 9. Regarding Vision 3,000, I think the concept of ‘denuclearisation’ turned into  10. de facto admitting the North’s nuclearisation. […] and ‘openness’ is turning into the 11. one, which is not between inter-Korean relations but between China and North Korea. 12. HYUN: Would you mind if I suggest that you seem not to understand the  13. Vision 3,000 policy thoroughly. This is not a policy aiming for the North’s isolation or  14. based on coercion. This is rather close to exchange, dialogue and engagement. […] 15. SONG: You should first get the North denuclearised. Without measures that can 16. denuclearise North Korea -- (NA 13/4/2010: 11–13)   [C: North Korea’s third nuclear test (12/2/2013)] 1. PARK JOO-SEON (MP): The Lee administration was launched with Vision 3,000, but  2. during this period the North conducted nuclear tests twice along with long-range rockets. 3. Don’t you think this government’s North Korea policy is a failure? 4. RYU WOO-IK (Unification Minister): You’ve always demanded me to admit that  5. our North Korea policy is unsuccessful, but I can’t agree with you. It is clear that it is 6. the North that should be blamed for strained inter-Korean relations, not us. […] 7. PARK: You mean that the policy is still in the process of success? 8. RYU: Yes. Our policy would be effective when we push it forward in a consistent manner. (NA 13/2/2013: 15–16) 
The most conspicuous point that can be extrapolated from the above 
excerpts is that MPs are complaining about the lack of substantive measures that 
can change the DPRK’s provocative pattern. In quotation [A], Yoo Seung-min, a 
conservative MP, criticises the government for not implementing sufficient 
measures in order to impose sanctions on North Korea for its missile provocation. 
He even proposed to scrap the GIC, which is virtually the sole symbol of inter-
Korean cooperation, but right after that insistence he seemed to realise that it is 
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in fact not a plausible option and acknowledged that the ROK government does 
not have substantive measures (lines 8–10).36 
In [B], another conservative MP Chung Ok-im also expressed her 
scepticism about the so-called ‘principled North Korea policy’ for its lack of 
substantial means (lines 1–2). In the same quotation, Hyun In-taek, then 
Unification Minister, emphasised that Vision 3,000 was based on engagement 
that aims to make North Korea ‘realise’ their wrongdoings. In response to this, 
progressive MP Song, former Foreign Minister under the Roh administration, 
pointed out that Vision 3,000 does not guarantee the North’s realisation of what 
they had done, nor its denuclearisation. The same controversy occurred again in 
[C], when the DPRK carried out the third nuclear test at the end of Lee’s term. 
Then Unification Minister Ryu Woo-ik nonetheless showed his firm belief that the 
Lee administration’s policy would be capable of changing the North’s behaviour 
with a proviso: that this policy needs to be pushed ahead with. 
In sum, two points can be briefly suggested as a result of the uncovered 
pattern of Lee’s speech acts. First, the relatively low frequencies of the terms 
related to the DPRK’s nuclear issue clearly show that the articulation of the 
nuclear threats was not made enough to be discursively practised. Second, 
nevertheless, the previous results also show that Lee did try to solve the nuclear 
issue comprehensively and fundamentally by adopting Vision 3,000 and the 
Grand Bargain. Differently put, despite launching these policies, Lee failed to 
securitise the DPRK’s nuclear issue to the level of animated discourse due to the 
unexpected events, such as the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents and North 
Korea’s unchanging traits. However, what we need to put more weight on is the 
fact that Lee’s speech acts did not show a clear way that audiences can 
understand: how can the problem of the contradictory goals—making North 
Korea open society (Vision 3,000) and securing the DPRK regime (Grand 
Bargain)—be solved in the securitising moves towards the North’s nuclear threat? 
Under these circumstances, Lee tended to securitise the North’s ‘bad’ behaviour 
itself, rather than focusing on securitising its strengthening nuclear capabilities. 
Subsequently, this made Lee’s extraordinary measures more equivocal in terms 
                                            36 The ROK’s Park Geun-hye administration closed the GIC in February 2016, which has sparked ongoing controversies afterwards. 
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of security discourse. Further analysis of these issues will be dealt with in the 
following section. 
 
 
5.2 Main characteristics 
Having provided a certain pattern of Lee’s speech acts, there is an opportunity to 
highlight more particular aspects of its security discourse. The main purpose of 
this section is to elucidate Lee’s discursive characteristics by means of analysing 
supplementing texts, leading up to a comprehensive delineation of his security 
discourse on the DPRK’s nuclear issue. 
 
5.2.1 The pursuit of complete securitisation 
According to the white papers and the policy reports, the Lee administration put 
the top priority of their security policy on ‘denuclearisation of North Korea’. This 
is the very point where they wanted to differentiate themselves from the Roh 
administration, for they thought that the former administration’s approach to the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue was not strong enough to make North Korea renounce 
nuclear weapons; if anything, Roh fortified the North’s willingness to become a 
nuclear state by supplying economic assistance. For Lee, therefore, the nuclear 
issue should be seen as a problem that must be solved once and for all. To 
borrow his expression, a ‘paradigm shift’ in North Korea policy was needed (Ha 
2013: 54–56). It was against this backdrop that Vision 3,000 was proposed. 
Vision 3,000, which represents Lee’s North Korea policy, was at the centre of the 
process of denuclearisation. Lee and his aides called this a policy based on 
strategic thinking, since it manifested a clear benefit that North Korea can enjoy 
once they make a decision on denuclearisation in a complete manner (MoU 2013: 
17). Their perspectives on Vision 3,000 can be found from many sources, and 
they regarded this as an epoch-making and realistic policy that could induce 
North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons: 
The North Korean regime would not change its current path unless there is an epoch-making and tremendous policy that can make them abandon nuclear weapons. North Korea may start to think that they can use nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip once this kind of policy is proposed. This is why the Lee administration came up with the ‘Vision 3,000’ policy as an epoch-making one. (Interview: 9 July 2014)  
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When we thought about the idea, we brought very prominent economists for our team, thinking whether we can really make North Korea a country of having $3,000 within ten years. The economists said “yes” and I trusted their calculation. There was a comprehensive task, and we finally came to the conclusion that we can change North Korea within ten years. (Interview: 9 June 2014) 
The interviewees quoted above were all in the loop on making and 
implementing North Korea policy during the Lee administration. They regarded 
Vision 3,000 not only as measures to develop the North’s economy and inter-
Korean relations, but also as extraordinary measures whereby the North can 
make a decision about abandoning nuclear weapons. This kind of thinking can 
also be found from the National Assembly minutes:  
1. HYUN IN-TAEK (Unification Minister): The issue of the Korean peninsula is not only 2. a problem between the two Koreas but also an international one. In terms of policy tools, 3. I think that we’ve got plentiful measures. 4. KWON YOUNG-SE (MP): I did not think that the government has plentiful measures. 5. Can you let me know what could be the plentiful measures? 6. HYUN: For example, with regard to the Vision 3,000 policy, 7. I think that it’s a grand plan whereby we assist North Koreans in making a US$3,000 8. per capita. This is a very forward-looking plan that has never been attempted.  (NA 19/2/2009: 34-35) 
In this quotation, when conservative MP Kwon Young-se showed his doubts 
about whether the government had had measures to persuade North Korea, then 
Unification Minister Hyun In-taek mentioned Vision 3,000 again, claiming that it 
is very forward-looking and it had never been attempted. Why then was this 
‘epoch-making’ policy not able to forge its discursive domain? Why did the Vision 
3,000 discourse fail to make itself conspicuous among other keywords or terms? 
As suggested above, even conservative party members were often in doubt about 
the feasibility of the Lee administration’s North Korea policy. Below is another 
example of such a discussion between a conservative MP and Hyun: 
1. HYUN IN-TAEK (Unification Minister): I think North Korea’s policy that keeps developing 2. nuclear weapons while at the same time choosing isolation has double dilemmas. 3. HONG JUNG-WOOK (MP): It seems to be our arbitrary interpretation. If I put myself in 4. Kim Jong-il’s position, his desire for nuclear weapons would be increasing as he is seeing 5. [Muammar] Gaddafi standing on the edge of a precipice. […] In that sense, many other 6. MPs concur with me that Vision 3,000 is becoming a policy 7. that does not have any practicality, nor influences on the inter-Korean relations. […] 8. HYUN: I have a different point of view on that. I think that kind of thought— 9. the regime can survive by developing nuclear weapons—is totally wrong. 10. If anything, I think it is developing nuclear weapons that creates the root causes  11. anxiety over their regime. […] The North’s regime can be secured by abandoning  12. their nuclear weapons and opening the country to foreign intercourse. (NA 4/3/2011: 26) 
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The logical structure between the two discussants here is simple. MP Hong 
Jung-wook thinks that North Korea would not abandon nuclear weapons, for they 
recognise it as the sword of the State that can sustain the Kim regime. Therefore, 
Vision 3,000, which demands the North’s denuclearisation first, cannot be 
applicable nor reliable anymore, particularly while the Kim regime is seeing the 
collapse of a Gaddafi regime that forsook nuclear programmes. By contrast, 
Minister Hyun argues that the very reason that causes North Korea’s concerns 
about regime survivability is its obsession with nuclear programmes, since it 
keeps them isolated from the international community and isolation itself causes 
another unstable factor towards the regime. 
Put differently, the Lee administration launched Vision 3,000 predicated on 
the logic that the DPRK’s regime can be secured by abandoning nuclear weapons 
and adopting an open-door policy. However, can the DPRK regime, which has 
secured its legitimacy and political authority by isolating its own society, accept 
this logic? According to the Lee administration, Pyongyang at first expressed its 
interests in the South’s proposal on Vision 3,000, which means there was 
strategic room for the Lee administration to manoeuvre that policy. One of the 
core members of the Lee administration said that the North Korean counterparts, 
Kim Yang-gon and Won Dong-yeon, Pyongyang’s top point men on the South, 
took a deep interest in the South’s proposal: 
I met Kim Yang-gon and we talked about a lot of things. I first explained about our policy, Vision 3,000. It was almost a one hour and forty minutes conversation. After finishing our conversation, when we came out of the room, Won Dong-yeon, Kim’s right arm, asked me, “Is Vision 3,000 really a serious policy? Can we trust it?” I told him “You should trust me. This is really a serious policy. We can help you.” I mean, they were very much seriously considering whether they had to accept our policy or not. Of course, after that, they finally declared that Vision 3,000 is a bad policy. […] What I felt was that at least they were seriously calculating it under their specific conditions: Kim Jong-il’s illness, bad domestic situations, and social instability, especially in local areas, etc. (Interview: 9 June 2014) 
What these excerpts have so far shown us is that the purpose of Lee’s North 
Korea policy was actually to show the DPRK regime’s compatibility with the 
process of its denuclearisation and openness, at least according to their official 
speech acts. This logic led him to propose another method of extraordinary 
measures, Grand Bargain: a negotiation plan for the DPRK’s denuclearisation. 
As noted before, the Grand Bargain was first and foremost for the DPRK’s 
irreversible denuclearisation. According to the Foreign Ministry under the Lee 
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administration, the Grand Bargain aimed at capturing all steps of the DPRK’s 
irreversible denuclearisation and corresponding measures by the international 
community, such as security assurances, normalisation of relations, and 
economic assistance (MOFA 2010). For Lee, initiating Grand Bargain also means 
enhancing the ROK’s stature as a leading party in this process: 
Now we should push forward with a package settlement, Grand Bargain, which dismantles the core part of the DPRK’s nuclear programme while at the same time providing a certain security assurance and international assistance. […] The North’s regime should not misunderstand this process as threatening or isolating policy towards them. North Korea can create new relationships with the US and international community by abandoning their nuclear programmes, and this will be the sole path for the North to make themselves live and develop. There are no countries that would take a hostile policy toward the North when you make a resolution to discard nuclear weapons. (Lee 2009a: 22 September) 
In this quote, Lee stressed that the DPRK regime does not have to be 
concerned about the intention of the Grand Bargain initiative, in that it is not 
antagonistic to their regime. Both Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain policies 
are extraordinary measures in an ironic way, for both policies aim to secure the 
DPRK’s regime, which ultimately goes against the ROK’s Constitutional value, as 
suggested in the previous chapter. What is more, these policies could not be 
meaningfully carried out, because Lee failed to devise a discursive process by 
which the North Korean regime survives while abandoning their nuclear weapons. 
In other words, the logical process that Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain laid 
out—the DPRK’s irreversible denuclearisation in return for corresponding 
measures such as securing its regime and economic assistance—did not tell 
enough about Pyongyang’s real concerns: the regime’s stability in the case of 
abandoning their nuclear programme and adopting an open-door policy. In sum, 
this point raises a contradiction in regards to Lee’s security discourse: (a) 
denuclearisation of the DPRK must be prioritised; (b) the denuclearisation can 
secure the DPRK regime, meaning the incumbent Kim regime; and (c) the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue can be fundamentally solved by implementing Vision 3,000 
and the Grand Bargain, which pursues ‘universal’ values, that is, liberal 
democracy and a market economy (Ha 2013: 88; Lee 2015: 318). 
Among these arguments, (b) is against the ROK’s referent object or its 
Constitutional value, but (c) is based only on the ROK’s referent object 
(materializing a society of liberal democracy and market economy). As 
aforementioned, the current North regime is essentially against the value 
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emphasised in (c). Pyongyang has been extremely vigilant ever since the end of 
the Cold War owing to fear of regime collapse or absorption. North Korea looks 
rather like a country that bears all the hallmarks of socialism (perhaps it would be 
more accurate to say that it is operated by the North Korean style of socialism: 
Juche Ideology). For the DPRK, on one hand, there is no reasonable point that 
can explain the relationship between securing their regime and founding a society 
based on liberal democracy. For Lee, on the other hand, referent objects written 
in (c) must be secured, but it also broke its own rule by proposing measures that 
include (b). To reiterate, Lee’s security discourse did not explicate enough about 
a discursive point that should be located somewhere between (b) and (c). One of 
the discursive chasms of the Lee administration arose from this point. 
The contradictory security discourse ended up coming down to the ‘May 24 
measures’ in 2010, when North Korea carried out an unparalleled provocation: 
the sinking of the South’s Navy ship Cheonan in March of that year, leading to 
the death of 46 ROK sailors and one military rescue diver. Since the incident 
occurred in a surprise attack by the North, the South was not able to find who 
was behind the attack at first:  
As president, I promise that every detail concerning the cause of the sinking of the corvette, the Cheonan, will come to light. I will resolutely deal with the outcome and make sure this sort of incident never recurs in the future. We will safeguard our nation with watertight security measures and make our armed forces stronger. (Lee 2010e: 19 April) 
On 24 May, after an investigating team consisting of South Korea, the US, the 
UK, Canada, Australia and Sweden concluded that Cheonan was sunk by a 
torpedo attack, Lee announced the ‘May 24 measures’.37 The May 24 measures 
are an important discursive point for Lee, for it officially changed his 
representation of the DPRK: 
Starting from the Cheonan incident, the Lee administration changed its perspective on North Korea that caused military provocation trampling the ROK government’s goodwill. In order to make the North realise that there are consequences to such provocative acts and to urge North Korea to change its belligerent attitude, the ROK government convened a NSC meeting on 21 May, immediately after the findings of the Cheonan investigation were released, and decided to take systematic and stern measures in order to prevent any reckless provocations by the North in the future. 
                                            37 The main contents of the ‘May 24 measures’ are as follows: (1) not allowing North Korean vessels to enter into the South’s waters; (2) suspending trade between the two Koreas; (3) not allowing South Korean citizens to visit North Korea; (4) prohibiting new investment in North Korea; and (5) suspending assistance programmes towards North Korea except for humanitarian aid for vulnerable groups (MoU 2011: 49).  
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(Ha 2013: 111) 
This quotation corroborates Lee’s previously suggested changing speech 
acts patterns. From the discursive or ST’s viewpoint, the May 24 measures mark 
a watershed in that it changed Lee’s rule-breaking point in his securitising moves 
towards the DPRK’s nuclear threats. To put it differently, before the Cheonan 
incident, as stated, Lee put more weight on a dialogue framework that included 
the exchange of securing the North’s regime and accomplishing its 
denuclearisation. After the incident, however, the discursive weight was sharply 
changed to criticism of Pyongyang, which was belligerent and obsessed only with 
nuclear weapons without caring for its people. At this stage, Lee put top priority 
on altering North Korea’s behaviour and, therefore, its value outweighed peaceful 
inter-Korean relations and the denuclearisation of the DPRK. For him, unless the 
Kim regime transforms themselves into more responsible actors in the 
international community, any kind of securitising moves on the DPRK’s 
denuclearisation would be meaningless. 
What is worse, the North’s artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island of the same 
year made Lee’s security discourse on North Korea more critical. This perhaps 
led to an important reason that explains why his original extraordinary 
measures—Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain—failed. To summarise, although 
it does not seem that Lee intended to do so, his rule-breaking point for the DPRK’s 
denuclearisation ended up as something that denies the current regime in North 
Korea altogether; that is, Lee concluded that the North’s nuclear threats could be 
fundamentally solved by maintaining the principled North Korea policy at the 
expense of peaceful inter-Korean relations. This point also indicates the reason 
why the ‘(re)unification’ discourse became popular in terms of North Korea policy 
in the latter half of Lee’s presidency, which consequently seemed to replace the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue. 
One big discursive difference between Roh and Lee arises from this point. 
Roh emphasised that the DPRK regime needs to be recognised as a normal 
country, even if it would be very difficult to change the regime’s characteristics, 
whereas Lee virtually denied it because he firmly believed that the dictatorship in 
North Korea cannot be accepted as a normal one, nor can it survive in the long 
term. Even though Lee’s official security discourse was not the same as the 
Hegelian perspective, he changed it into the Hegelian one: a goal-oriented 
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account of history. Lee’s hope—inevitability of the dissolution of the current DPRK 
regime—is seen several times in his memoir (Lee 2015: 298–299), and finally he 
seems to acknowledge that the purpose of his North Korea policy was to topple 
the DPRK regime:  
Why are the North’s regime concerning about the unification discourse coming out of the South, even though they themselves have stressed the importance of unification under a federal system? Perhaps they are afraid of being absorbed into the South and being replaced by the change of the North Korean citizens and society, which can be caused by our consistent North Korea policy. (Lee 2015: 380) 
 
5.2.2 Unarticulated securitisation 
As suggested above, the focus of Lee’s security discourse on the DPRK’s nuclear 
threats saw a change, and it has some contradictory points. In this process, the 
extraordinary measures—Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain—were not seen 
enough in his speech acts pattern. The previous section has shown that the major 
reason for this falls on the two incidents: the sinking of Cheonan and the shelling 
of Yeonpyeong. These events changed the points of Lee’s speech acts from 
articulating the imminent necessity of denuclearisation to criticising the North 
Korean regime. This section further investigates some factors that affected Lee’s 
securitising move. 
The analysis of Lee’s speech acts pattern suggests that the international 
system in which China and the US are competing for hegemony, particularly over 
the Korean peninsula, put a huge constraint on Lee’s securitising move. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the role of China, as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the 
world, was continually increasing during Lee’s presidency. This is why the word 
‘Hu (Jintao)’ often appeared throughout Lee’s speeches. What is interesting is 
that just as Roh struggled with Washington in the process of making an SPT 
framework as an extraordinary measure, Lee also strived to persuade Beijing to 
get them involved in the process of changing Pyongyang’s behaviour. As Lee’s 
extraordinary measures were inextricably linked to the DPRK’s strategic 
decision—abandoning nuclear weapons and adopting an open-door policy—
China’s role in inducing North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons was vital. 
Moreover, it was not just the persuasion that China could do. Lee was eager 
to seek China’s help to put pressure on North Korea, particularly after the North’s 
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provocations in 2010. When Lee came up with the May 24 measures after the 
Cheonan incident, he also strived for extending the measures’ effect onto the 
international level by adopting a UNSC statement that clearly denounces the 
DPRK. However, the UNSC statement of denouncing North Korea was not able 
to be adopted due to the fact that China, holding veto power in the UNSC, was 
reluctant to criticise Pyongyang. Beijing’s reluctance recurred when North Korea 
attacked Yeonpyeong Island. When South Korea and the US decided to carry out 
a joint military exercise after the North’s attack, China even officially objected to 
the naval exercise, as a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George 
Washington, which symbolises the US’s military might, had been scheduled to be 
dispatched to the Korean peninsula (Page et al. 2010). Not surprisingly, China’s 
seemingly lukewarm responses to the North’s provocation enraged Lee: 
President Hu Jintao still kept taking an equivocal attitude on the Cheonan incident, in which our 46 sailors were killed. It made me so furious that I even used some strong words. “I wish South Korea and China could not be red in the face with anger because of this problem.” It was a strong expression that is seldom used at a summit meeting. Hu seemed embarrassed and looked to other attendees including Dai Bingguo and Li Keqiang38; all of them talked in whispers about my words. (Lee 2015: 292) 
This excerpt shows how much effort Lee exerted to get China involved in 
the measures that aimed to put pressure on North Korea so that the North’s 
combatant traits could be altered. It has been evident through these incidents that 
even though China might have begun to reassess the strategic value of North 
Korea and there is a difference in the way that they talk about North Korea, they 
have not made any fundamental strategic changes on the DPRK. China’s 
equidistance policy to both Koreas, which they think is conducive to maintain 
stability on the Korean peninsula, remains (Hill 2013; Cha 2015; Song and Lee 
2016). Maintaining regional stability is one of the most important policies that 
constitute China’s core interests (Oster et al. 2013; Feng 2014). Despite the 
North’s intrusive attitude, China’s tendency to offer ‘minimum-security assurance 
for Pyongyang’ is likely to continue, given that a sudden collapse of the DPRK 
could give rise to a big threat to China’s stability (Chung 2007: 120; Bluth 2011a; 
Yu et al. 2016). This point raises fundamental questions about Lee’s securitising 
                                            38 Dai Bingguo, a Chinese politician and diplomat, was President Hu’s special representative to the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Li Keqiang served as the first-ranked Vice-Premier from 2008 to 2013. On March 2013, he was elected as Premier. 
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move. The reason why Lee tried to persuade China was because he believed 
that the DPRK’s nuclear provocation could ultimately blow out only by changing 
its behaviour, and China’s role was essential in order to modify the nature of the 
North Korean regime. 
In the process of exercising measures against North Korea, it was not just 
China that circumscribed the ROK’s area of activity. The US, which should be 
partnered with China in terms of making a ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’, 
also needed to manage the situation in a stable fashion: 
South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery. We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously. The president [Barack Obama], [Hillary] Clinton, [Michael] Mullen, and I were all on the phone often with our South Korean counterparts over a period of days, and ultimately South Korea simply returned artillery fire on the location of the North Koreans’ batteries that had started the whole affair. (Gates 2014: 497) 
In the case of the US factor, as quoted, although they also limited the ROK’s 
military action radius in terms of responding to the two incidents, their security 
discourse on North Korea was generally in line with that of the Lee administration. 
For Lee, at least as far as the North Korean issue is concerned, the US discourse 
should represent an unshakable ROK-US alliance. Table 5.10 shows all three 
cases in which the words the ‘United States’ and ‘North (Korea)’ are used in one 
sentence in Lee’s speeches (the node word is the ‘United States’ and ‘North’ is a 
collocate, the range between the node word and the collocates is ±5 words). What 
is interesting in this table is that although Lee emphasised that North Korea would 
not have direct bilateral talks with the US in 2009, he seemed to have conceded 
the US-DPRK bilateral talks at his 2012 address. 
What then made Lee change his keynote of the nuclear negotiation? It 
needs some background. Lee’s original objection to the US-DPRK bilateral talks 
Table 5.10 Co-occurrences of the US and North (whole sentences) 
US President Barak Obama remarked that though he is aware that North Korea wants a direct bilateral channel with the United States, North Korea will not be able to drive a wedge between the United States and the Republic of Korea. (Lee 2009d) 
[…] they are saying that the United States military mistakenly fired at the ship and caused it to sink. Such outlandish assertions are laughable and they continue to say that the Republic of Korea and the United States are trying to frame North Korea by calling on them to take responsibility. (Lee 2010c) 
Earlier this year, with the inauguration of a new leadership, the North resumed dialogue with the United States and was given a precious opportunity to transform. It is therefore, regrettable that it is again losing another opportunity by launching the missile. (Lee 2012e)  
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was partly because of the North’s persistent tong-me-bong-nam strategy, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, which aims to rule out South Korea in the 
course of negotiation for its denuclearisation with the US. This is of course 
unacceptable for any heads of state of the ROK. Hence, one of the most 
important principles for Lee was to hold inter-Korean nuclear talks first because 
South Korea must be the party directly involved in the process of the DPRK’s 
denuclearisation. This principle was embodied by establishing a ‘three-stage 
process (inter-Korean talks → US-DPRK talks → SPT)’, as a principle for 
denuclearisation talks, in collaboration with the US (Ha 2013: 126). As noted 
above, after the military collisions in 2010, Lee made it clear that there would be 
no SPT until North Korea apologised for its actions. 
There was an important change in the DPRK’s nuclear issues. North Korea 
disclosed its Uranium Enrichment Programme (UEP) in November 2010, 
confirming the previous allegation that the North had been secretly developing its 
UEP. The absence of an alternative to the SPT was another big reason. The US-
China summit held in January 2011, in which the North Korean nuclear issue was 
high on the agenda and then Presidents Hu Jintao and Barack Obama agreed on 
the importance of ‘sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue’, ‘the need for 
concrete and effective steps to achieve the goal of denuclearisation’, and ‘calling 
for the necessary steps that would allow for early resumption of the SPT’, etc. 
(WhiteHouse 2011), put more pressure on South Korea. It was against this 
backdrop that Lee put forward the three-stage process. 
In terms of holding nuclear talks, Lee demanded that the DPRK show its 
sincerity for denuclearisation first as ‘pre-steps’, by suspending its UEP and 
reinstating IAEA inspectors. South Korea’s effort was not in vain: the two Koreas 
held two rounds of talks on denuclearisation respectively in 2011 (July and 
October). It was indeed an opportunity for Lee to explain the Grand Bargain and 
the pre-steps for denuclearisation to North Korea (MOFA 2012; Ha 2013). What 
is interesting is that even the South seemed to hold out little hope for 
accomplishing such an approach (having inter-Korean nuclear talks before 
moving on to the US-DPRK talks), given that the North has held fast to bilateral 
nuclear talks with the US. With regard to this, after the first inter-Korean talks on 
denuclearisation in Bali, Indonesia, one high-ranking official, who directed the 
ROK’s nuclear talks with the North in the Lee administration, recalled that they 
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had been a bit surprised to hear that the North had accepted the South’s 
suggestion.39 
Despite the two rounds of the working-level inter-Korean talks, the pertinent 
issue could not be elevated to the level of Lee’s speeches. This may be partly 
because the talks failed to lead to substantive results, such as the SPT. The 
ROK’s ‘three-stage process’ plan did not last for long. Meanwhile, the third US-
DPRK nuclear talks were held in Beijing, China, in February 2012, bypassing 
inter-Korean talks, which should have been held before that. With regard to this, 
Lee’s 2012 address in Table 5.10 refers to the agreement between the US and 
North Korea signed on 29 February 2012 (Leap Day agreement). In this 
agreement, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile launches, 
nuclear tests and nuclear activities including uranium enrichment activities in 
return for 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance along with the US’s 
commitment to respect the DPRK’s sovereignty and equality (Nuland 2012). This 
was the sole agreement signed with North Korea regarding the DPRK’s nuclear 
issues during Lee’s presidency. 
There are at least two points that this Leap Day agreement implies in terms 
of limitations of Lee’s security discourse. First, however much the ROK justifies 
the agreement by claiming that the ROK government had been maintaining a 
close contact with the US regarding the US-DPRK talks, strictly speaking, it was 
an agreement between the US and DPRK, not between the two Koreas. Second, 
even though the Leap Day agreement was a stage that aimed to substantialise 
the pre-steps towards the SPT, it was not able to lay any groundwork pointing to 
a complete and comprehensive solution to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. If 
anything, the Leap Day agreement also ended up with a phased approach, just 
like the February 13 and October 3 Agreements of 2007, which Lee had always 
tried to avert.  
What is more, it also did not include any measures that could make the 
North apologise for its military provocations, which was a prerequisite to resuming 
the SPT. What is worse was that the Leap Day agreement itself was stranded 
after the North launched its long-range missile in April 2012 (Swenson-Wright 
2013: 148). The point here is not that the agreement was not enough to 
                                            39 In an interview with a high-ranking government official in charge of nuclear negotiations with the DPRK (September 2011). 
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denuclearise North Korea, but that Lee’s security discourse on denuclearisation 
of the DPRK fell short of a stage in which his discourse can be implemented.  
 
5.2.3 Elusive representations 
Another factor that affected Lee’s securitisation was the other (North Korea). To 
reiterate, identity is a perspicuous representation or interpretation of the other, 
and it is ‘defined as self-ascription to a particular group’ (Julios 2008). For 
instance, Victor Cha, former Director for Asian Affairs in the White House’s 
National Security Council, referred to North Korea as the ‘Impossible State’, a 
regime which is fraught with contradictions and Cold War anachronism (Cha 
2012). According to the above definition, it can be said that Cha sees the self, 
here, the US or South Korea, as the ‘Possible States’, which are neither 
contradictory nor anachronistic in the post-Cold War era. The image of the DPRK, 
as the impossible state, is well reflected in the Lee administration’s discourses. 
This kind of image, subsequently, was used to vindicate its North Korea policy by 
claiming that the reason why the inter-Korean relations during Lee’s presidency 
were not smooth was not because of the extraordinary measures, such as Vision 
3,000 and the Grand Bargain, but because of the other. The following excerpts 
show the cabinet members’ perceptions of the North’s behaviour:  
[A] 1. RYU WOO-IK (UNIFICATION MINISTER): I can’t agree that our government is 2. responsible for the North’s missile test. This is because the North has consistently 3. pursued with its nuclear development programme. But you said -- 4. SIM JAE-KWON (MP): What I call this government to account is that what you 5. have done for the last five years. I think we should hold this administration accountable. 6. I’m not saying that the North is not responsible for the launching of its missile. […] 7. RYU: It is the North that has aggravated the situation. I can’t agree with the opinion at all  8. that the South had made the situation worse. We have coherently -- 9. SIM: Look. It goes without saying that the North should be blamed for the missile test. 10. I’m saying that our government is incompetent in terms of responding to it. 11. RYU: So the situation is -- (NA 6/12/2012: 19–20)  [B] 1. HONG IK-PYO (MP): […] Everyone can impose sanctions and use force, but the  2. Foreign Ministry’s role is to prevent and manage these situations. In terms of military 3. response, Defence Ministry can do that. What is your role? 4. KIM SUNG-HWAN (FOREIGN MINISTER): If you insist that the Foreign Ministry is  5. dealing with diplomatic matters wrongly, I’ll not argue that. What I want to say, however,  6. if you think … the Ministry did well the North wouldn’t have developed its missiles  7. or nuclear weapons, I cannot agree with that 100%. (NA 6/12/2012: 24) 
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Both excerpts include debates between progressive party members and 
conservative cabinet members. When MPs Sim and Hong raised questions about 
whether the Lee administration had coped well with the DPRK’s missile and 
nuclear threats, the Ministers all argued that North Korea should be held liable 
for its military provocations. What needs to be taken into account here is that they 
were struggling with the absence of ‘effective’ extraordinary measures. Minister 
Kim acknowledges that there are virtually no immediate measures to deter the 
North from engaging in further provocations (lines 6–7, [B]). Several days after 
this discussion, North Korea launched a long-range rocket, and two months later, 
on 12 February 2013, the North carried out its third nuclear test. 
As mentioned, Lee’s ambitious measures, shown as extraordinary 
measures against the North’s nuclear threat at the initial stage of his presidency, 
could not be effectively implemented. Accordingly, his denuclearisation discourse 
failed to gain momentum to be shown in his speech acts. Perhaps, just as the 
Lee administration argued, it was mainly because of the DPRK’s intransigence. 
Indeed, apart from its already established recalcitrant image, the DPRK regime 
was caught in a vortex of leadership transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un.40 
Regarding this, Stephen W. Bosworth, former US special representative for North 
Korea policy, recalled that the reason why the Obama administration was not able 
to engage the DPRK was ‘because of the internal situation in North Korea’. He 
said that since Kim Jong-il became visibly ill in 2008, ‘there was a predisposition 
on the part of North Korea to make sure everybody understands the US was the 
enemy’; hence, there was no possibility for compromise (CSIS and KF 2015). 
This perspective can be seen throughout the Lee administration’s speech acts. 
In other words, a continual usage of the concepts pointing to the ‘North Korea’s 
intransigence’ and ‘internal situation (e.g. death of Kim Jong-il)’ has been forming 
another security discourse through which the securitising actors justify their own 
policy measures: 
The reason why Vision 3,000 policy was not able to be implemented during President Lee’s tenure was because North Korea did not make a decision on denuclearisation. The reason why North Korea never gave up its nuclear weapons was not because they felt the lack of the security assurance or economic assistance from the international community, but because they regard nuclear weapons as a last resort that insures the hereditary dictatorship.                                             40  After Kim Jong-il had a stroke in August 2008, North Korea accelerated its hereditary succession. Following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, Kim Jong-un was formally appointed as the Supreme Commander of the NKPA, and subsequently became First Secretary of the NKWP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the NKWP. 
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(Ha 2013: 58) 
In the above quotation, it can be seen that the Lee administration ascribes 
the failure of the Vision 3,000 policy to North Korea that put the supremacy of 
value on its autocracy. The following quotes show how they perceived the death 
of Kim Jong-il: 
It wasn’t because of the Lee administration that the North carried out repeated nuclear and missile tests and resorted to those acts of military provocation. Pyongyang suffered its gravest crisis in history in the summer of 2008 when Kim Jong-il fell ill, and this period lasted until his death in December 2011. The need to bolster the regime internally had everyone on edge, and Pyongyang had to fabricate an external threat, even, literally, by force. That period just happened to coincide with the first four years of the Lee administration. Had Kim Jong-il been in good health, the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong attack would not have occurred. (Hakoda 2013) 
Kim Tae-hyo was one of the most influential security policy advisers to Lee, who 
also had a secret meeting with the DPRK. For him, the death of Kim Jong-il was 
the prime variable that determined the inter-Korean relations during the Lee 
administration period. This kind of perception is corroborated by another high-
level official: 
We started working level meetings in late 2009, and interestingly enough, when they bombed the Cheonan warship, there were still conversations going on between the two Koreas. It was a kind of sudden attack. You have to look at the domestic situation in North Korea. Kim Jong-il was very weak, and in order to succeed his power to Kim Jong-un, he had to rely heavily on the military; in other words, the military at that time had very strong power to control the regime. (Interview: 9 June 2014) 
In sum, according to the Lee administration’s security discourse, their measures 
against the DPRK’s nuclear threats were doomed to be obstructed by North 
Korea and some unexpected variables.  
It is clear that the North regime believes our policy measures (except for providing cash, rice and fertiliser, all of which are needed to maintain their power) like a comprehensive economic assistance that can fundamentally change the North Korean economy could cause more dangerous results such as an open society and bringing social change.  (Ha 2013: 58) 
This kind of assessment—the DPRK regime’s averseness to reform and 
openness—is exactly the same as Lee’s: 
Since taking office, the North showed interest in our Vision 3,000 initiative for a time. They even asked for detailed data on the progress plan. I think this was because they needed some time to explore whether they could keep receiving strategic materials while leaving the nuclear issues behind. (Lee 2015: 319) 
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However, at the same time, this perception is at odds with the original intention 
of his extraordinary measures, because he actually thought that the Vision 3,000 
initiative was a policy that is tailored to dictatorship like North Korea: 
I thought that this kind of opinion [President Roh’s opinion about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons] emanated from a lack of understanding regarding dictatorship. We can rarely see examples in history in which dictatorship itself changes. A more active strategy that can induce North Korea to reform and open was needed. Moreover, we should take the initiative in dealing with the North’s nuclear and relevant military issues that are directly connected to the peace on the Korean peninsula. (Lee 2015: 316) 
In this quote, Lee emphasised that his extraordinary measures against the 
North’s nuclear threat were introduced based on his understanding of the traits 
of dictatorship. He also said that the measures were active, thereby giving the 
ROK a leading role in dealing with the nuclear issue. However, this kind of 
assertion is different from what he realised about the ‘real’ dictatorship—a regime 
filled with uncertainty and recalcitrance—during his presidency. In the above 
quote, Lee concluded that Pyongyang just tried to take advantage of his Vision 
3,000 initiative while putting aside the nuclear issue. To put it differently, Lee 
inadvertently acknowledged that his extraordinary measures were not based on 
a practical perception of the regime in Pyongyang in dealing with the North’s 
nuclear issues. 
The image of the self (South Korea) that Lee held was another issue that 
affected his securitising move. Broadly speaking, in terms of the self, there were 
two conflicting points in the Lee administration’s security discourse on North 
Korea. Firstly, one of the important principles that the administration adhered to 
was the concept of sincerity (NA 29/11/2010: 25; MoU 2013: 15, 21). They 
consistently demanded the DPRK to show its sincerity, while arguing that Vision 
3,000 is firmly based on liberal democracy and a market economy. Given that 
Lee himself knew about the DPRK’s traits well, which would never accept such 
liberal values that can endanger its dictatorial regime, the ROK’s sincerity initiated 
by the Vision 3,000 could not be accepted by the DPRK regime. In other words, 
regardless of the DPRK’s sincerity, Lee was confounded by his own sincerity, 
which was actually caused by the ROK’s ambiguous situation. That is, the ROK’s 
Constitutional value was just incompatible with the DPRK’s. 
Pertaining to the previous point, the administration confirmed that Vision 
3,000 is a policy that regards the DPRK regime as its counterpart (NA 15/6/2011: 
 
 
172 
48). In this context, the Grand Bargain aiming at securing the DPRK regime on 
condition of its complete denuclearisation was able to be introduced. At the same 
time, however, the Lee administration did not give adequate reason for why and 
how the DPRK regime should be secured. Furthermore, as shown before, the 
increasing use of the word ‘(re)unification’ obscured the ROK’s discourse that 
connects the DPRK’s denuclearisation with providing security assurance to 
Pyongyang. Secondly, the Lee administration seemed to be lacking consistency 
in judging the North’s willingness to renounce its nuclear weapons.  
1. KIM YOUNG-WOO (MP): Do you think that the North would renounce nuclear weapons 2. once the peace regime is settled? 3. RYU WOO-IK (UNIFICATION MINISTER): That is the same as the North’s demand. 4. Our position is that we can discuss such things after the North denuclearises first. The  5. time is not yet ripe for discussing the peace regime while they are developing  6. nuclear weapons and conducting missile tests. 7. KIM: […] What do you think about this opinion, ‘The North would’ve somehow developed  8. nuclear weapons even if we hadn’t assisted them’ then? 9. RYU: […] For the last two decades, what North Korea has consistently done was  10. to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. They did this even when  11. inter-Korean relations were invigorating in the early 2000s. […] Therefore it would be 12. correct that the North’s policy for becoming a nuclear state has been proceeding as ever. (NA 25/7/2012: 44–45) 
In this discussion, Unification Minister Ryu Woo-ik responded to a conservative 
MP Kim Young-woo that negotiation for the peace regime on the Korean 
peninsula cannot be imagined before the North’s decision on denuclearisation 
(lines 4–5), while saying that the North is not likely to give up its nuclear 
programme, given its past behaviour (lines 9–12). 
This reflects another contradictory point of the Lee administration’s security 
discourse: having confidence that their extraordinary measures can induce North 
Korea to give up nuclear weapons, while at the same time having mistrust of the 
North’s willingness to denuclearise. The following interview with one of the 
exponents of Vision 3,000 also shows a similar perception: 
Q: Was Vision 3,000 not an ambitious policy aiming to denuclearise North Korea? I heard that you had prepared a lot for that when you were in the Presidential Transition Team. A: Economic incentives are an important condition for North Korea policy. However, there would be no temptation whatsoever—whether it is a political or economic incentive—for the North to give up its nuclear programme. They just cannot give up nuclear weapons. (Interview: 8 July 2014) 
The interviewee expresses utter disbelief. Perhaps he became more pessimistic 
about the DPRK’s behaviour after he had some direct experiences in dealing with 
North Korea. Indeed, it is quite interesting to match the Lee administration’s 
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extraordinary measures filled with confidence in changing the North’s behaviour 
to its later scepticism about the possibility of the DPRK regime’s capacity and 
willingness to change. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The most fundamental reason for starting a war lies within an individual mindset 
that harbours a hostile intention (Clausewitz 1976). What Lee’s speech act 
pattern shows is that Lee’s hostility towards the North Korean regime kept 
growing as time went by. Of course, Lee was not in a position where he could 
wage a war against Pyongyang. However, he was in a position where he could 
articulate his negative perception of Pyongyang regardless of the efficacy of such 
an articulation. For him, inter-Korean relations must be reciprocal. However, in 
his speech acts, the reason for the lack of reciprocity must be placed upon North 
Korea’s irresponsibility. In his discourse, the North Korean regime is rogue, 
reckless and irresponsible. In that regard, it could be said that Lee inherited Rhee 
Syngman’s conservativism—anticommunism (or anti-North Korea in a more 
contemporary sense)—that insisted North Korea must be held solely accountable 
for the division of the Korean peninsula as well as the Korean War. 
Lee’s way of dealing with the nuclear issue was therefore ineluctably linked 
to his perception of the DPRK. Security discourse on the DPRK’s nuclear threats 
was not effectively articulated in his speech acts. Lee’s ambition was to eradicate 
the nuclear threat once and for all, but his securitising move resulted in a mixture 
of inconsistent articulation of the threat and ambiguous representations of the 
DPRK regime. However, since this was not solely Lee’s fault, it is fair to say that 
the reason for the repetitive securitisation should be distributed over several 
factors. 
The first factor was the international (or regional) system. During Lee’s 
presidency, the way the DPRK issue was handled has had ‘great significance for 
the new type of major power relations taking place’ (Dong 2015: 9). What the 
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents proved was that the ROK’s extraordinary 
measures based on security discourse were strongly circumscribed by the 
structural system. Consequently, Lee’s security discourse on the DPRK’s nuclear 
threats was blocked by China’s reluctance, which should be interpreted in the 
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context of the US-China relationship. Secondly, it was not just China that 
obstructed Lee’s securitising move. North Korea’s unexpected provocations, 
including Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events, and internal factors, such as the 
death of Kim Jong-il, were additional obstacles to Lee’s road to securitisation. 
However, the third factor emanated from the ROK itself. Lee was not able 
to articulate a clear discursive connection between the DPRK’s ontological 
illegality and the necessities of providing security assurance to the DPRK’s 
regime, nor could he have final confidence in the North’s willingness to 
denuclearise. More to the point, Lee’s extraordinary measures—Vision 3,000 and 
the Grand Bargain—did not provide a practical path how the current regime in 
Pyongyang could maintain its current grip on power once they open their society. 
As a result, although Lee aimed to reach a concluding stage of securitisation (the 
complete denuclearisation of the DPRK), his speech acts on measures about the 
DPRK’s nuclear weapons could not be articulated in a consistent fashion. Now 
that we have discussed the main characteristics of both presidents’ security 
discourses, Chapter 6 will provide a comparative analysis between the two 
securitising actors in a more direct manner, so that the similarities and differences 
can be more easily shown. The causes of the discursive chasms will also be 
discussed in detail according to the ST framework. 
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6.  
Practical Concerns: Evaluating Security Discourses 
6.1 Comparison between Roh and Lee 
The previous two chapters have attempted to sketch out the main characteristics 
of the Roh and Lee administrations’ security discourses on the DPRK’s nuclear 
threat. This chapter, firstly, will explore some general patterns of the speech acts 
used by Presidents Roh and Lee on the basis of core terms: ‘North Korea’ and 
‘nuclear’. The following section analyses similarities and differences of the two 
actors’ speeches by extrapolating from key terms, MI scores and T-scores 
respectively. This may provide a clue to the causes of repetitive securitising 
moves (or institutionalised securitisation), which connote the discursive chasms 
embedded in the security discourses of the ROK. After an assessment of the core 
terms, this study then appraises the grounds that stymied the ROK’s practice of 
securitisation according to the ST’s framework. 
 
6.1.1 The general pattern of speech acts 
As many critics have pointed out, and as aforementioned, speech acts cannot 
explain all phenomena related to security matters (Stritzel 2007; Wilkinson 2007). 
A major proposition of this study, however, is that security activity, in particular 
when it comes to securitisation (or prioritisation of the security agenda), cannot 
be conceivable without the use of language. That is, if an actor keeps a certain 
security issue in mind, with the aim of persuading audiences and creating 
measures against threats, the source of threat and the relevant objects should be 
articulated in the actor’s speech acts. This is why a securitising actor’s 
language—speech acts—is highlighted in ST (Buzan et al. 1998: 40). A common 
thread that binds all positions on the constructivist spectrum together is the power 
of discourse that is characterised as the ‘use of language’ (Chilton 2004: 16). 
Therefore, ‘looking for patterns’ of language used by an actor is important, in that 
it provides us with a certain entry point whereby analysts can outline 
comprehensive traits of the actor’s speech acts. Furthermore, it gives analysts 
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additional analytical points for further investigation into the actor’s use of 
language (Wetherell et al. 2001: 6). 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 represent the frequency (per 10,000 words) of the core 
terms—‘North Korea’ and ‘nuclear’—spoken by Roh and Lee, respectively. As 
both figures show, for most of the presidency (except for the third year), Roh used 
these words significantly more than Lee did. Regardless of the contents and 
contexts in which the words were used, therefore, it is expected that pertinent 
discursive practice was more active during Roh’s period. The aberration seen in 
both figures in the third year—the year 2005 of the Roh administration and the 
year 2010 of the Lee administration—may denote two points: one is that inter-
Korean relations experienced about one year’s recession from July 2004 (PCPP 
 
Figure 6.1 The frequency of ‘North Korea’ 
 
 
Figure 6.2 The frequency of ‘nuclear’ 
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2008: 39–54) and the other is the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents that 
sparked ‘the North’s provocation(s)’ discourse throughout the year 2010 (Figure 
6.1). The gradual increase in the ‘nuclear’ discourse of Lee is also noticeable 
(Figure 6.2); however, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter and as will be 
discussed in detail in the next section, one of the main causes of the rise was 
because Lee hosted the second NSS. Another reason rested upon winning a deal 
to build and operate nuclear plants for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late 
December 2009, which was of great importance to the Lee administration. Lee 
emphasised that he devoted himself to winning the deal in the UAE and further 
deals in the wider region (Lee 2015). 
By contrast, as will be shown in the following section, most ‘nuclear’ 
discourses used by Roh were focused on the DPRK’s nuclear issue. Given this 
difference, an actual gap between Roh and Lee in terms of articulating the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue is likely to be bigger than the above figure indicates. For 
example, although it is not seen in the figures, the frequency of the term ‘North 
Korean nuclear (Buk-haek or Bukhan-haek in Korean)’ reflects a stark difference 
between the two (190 times by Roh and 19 times by Lee; absolute frequency). 
An additional point is the pattern of the word ‘denuclearisation’ (Figure 6.3). 
This word was used 21 times in Roh’s speeches and 19 times in that of Lee’s 
respectively. Although the number of times the word appears is similar, what is 
interesting here is a pattern of the word usage. While Roh used this word 
increasingly as he was into the second half of his tenure, Lee’s usage of the same 
word saw a sharp decrease as time went by. Given that the DPRK’s first nuclear 
test occurred in 2006, Roh’s pattern is understandable as the issue of 
denuclearisation came to the fore in his latter days. However, the pattern of Lee’s 
usage of the word ‘denuclearisation’ seems incomprehensible given that his 
policy was based on the concept of ‘denuclearisation-first’. 
Regarding this, the previous chapter has already shown why this kind of 
pattern is possible. That is, the pursuit of complete securitisation of Lee (the 
complete denuclearisation of the DPRK) was mainly thwarted by two incidents 
(the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong), and subsequently 
Lee’s discursive points towards North Korea were changed from ‘the hope of 
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denuclearisation’ to ‘a feeling of hopelessness about the DPRK’s incorrigibility’. 
Figure 6.4 represents the mean frequency of each core term of both presidents’ 
speech acts throughout their presidency, which indicates an average of per 
10,000 words. As shown in the above figures, this figure confirms that the core 
terms of ‘North Korea’ (standard deviation = Roh 7.7 / Lee 4.4) and ‘nuclear’ 
(standard deviation = Roh 5.0 / Lee 3.0) were more active in Roh’s speech acts, 
whereas ‘denuclearisation’ (standard deviation = Roh 0.6 / Lee 0.9) saw a similar 
level between the two presidents. 
 
Figure 6.3 The frequency of ‘denuclearisation’ 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Mean frequency of the core terms 
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Figures 6.5 and 6.6 characterise each president’s security discourse on the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue in a more comprehensive way. Every single word was 
extracted by the keyness scores, and the keywords are qualitatively extracted 
since there are many other words that are not relevant to North Korea. The 
keywords were already shown in the previous chapters in the form of a table.41 
Several points can be extrapolated from these figures. 
Firstly, both Roh and Lee articulated the same goals based on the same 
perceptions of the structure (regional system) that surrounds the Korean 
peninsula. In the case of Roh, the word ‘OPCON’ is seen. As aforementioned, 
the ‘OPCON’ was a thorny issue between conservative opposition party and the 
progressive Roh administration, but Roh did not push ahead with this issue to the 
extent that the backbone of the ROK-US alliance was swayed. This is why he 
sent troops to help the US-led war in Iraq.42 Both Roh and Lee were cognisant of 
the fact that the Korean peninsula is a key to sustainable peace of Northeast Asia. 
They were also well aware that Pyongyang’s denuclearisation is a key to the 
peace of the peninsula. Both argued that the DPRK’s nuclear issue was a major 
stumbling block to acquiring a true sense of coexistence and co-prosperity 
between the North and South, which should be a prelude to the two Korea’s 
unification. In that respect, as far as the structure and goals are concerned, there 
is no significant difference in terms of using discourse between the two 
securitising actors. 
Secondly, Roh tended to use words subsumed under the ameliorating 
events and measures based on sympathy, whereas Lee’s speech acts were 
inclined to deteriorating events. Of course, Lee also used the words of measures 
based on sympathy, such as ‘diplomacy’ and ‘cooperate’, but they are not as 
direct and diverse as Roh’s words. Roh’s security discourse shows the absence 
of any measures based on antipathy, instead it includes various means based on 
sympathy such as ‘normalisation (of relations between the US and the DPRK)’ 
and ‘(inter-Korean) summit’. Perhaps it is this point that has made conservatives 
and progressives different from each other. That is, it would be fair to say that 
progressive government attempted to invigorate the ameliorating events between 
                                            41 See Table 4.3 and Table 5.4. 42 Later, Roh recalled that this was ‘a historic error’: ‘Americans could have felt betrayed (if we didn’t send troops), which would not have been good for us […] though we reluctantly sent them, I think it was very effective diplomacy’ (Yoon 2007). 
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the two Koreas, whereas conservatives tended to put emphasis on the 
deteriorating events claiming a further securitising move. 
Lastly, and most importantly, both presidents failed to bridge the gap 
between measures and goals (displayed as a dotted line). As mentioned, both 
presidents’ words were exactly the same in terms of the goals and ultimate goal 
‘unification’. Roh did not articulate how South Korea would attain the ROK-led 
unification when the DPRK regime is secured by a peace and security regime. 
Nor could he persuade the conservative bloc that the DPRK was determined to 
denuclearise. Lee, on the other hand, was not able to persuade Pyongyang how 
they could survive when they open their society and reform the economic system. 
Lee did not demonstrate how the contradictory mechanism between securing the 
DPRK’s regime (as the Grand Bargain initiative argued) and the DPRK society’s 
transformation (as Vision 3,000 suggested) could be compatible. In that respect, 
both securitising actors were not able to articulate in what way and how the 
goal/ultimate goals could be achieved by way of their own measures. 
The figures provide an overall picture of security discourses used by the 
actors. There are certainly some differences between the two in terms of events 
and measures. However, can we really say that the two actors’ security 
discourses are meaningfully distinct? Are they different enough to make it 
possible to discern a different level of securitisation against the DPRK’s nuclear 
threat? If so, can the difference overcome the structure (international/regional 
system) that surrounds the ROK? Put differently, do the differences give the ROK 
securitising actors any specific reasons for changing their national strategy 
towards regional powers, including China and the US? Can the difference 
overcome the issue of the ROK’s identity (conflicting referent objects)? In other 
words, do the differences give the ROK securitising actors any specific reasons 
for changing their representation of the self (as a sole legitimate government 
based on democracy and a market economy in the Korean peninsula)? The 
following section discusses similarities and dissimilarities between the speech 
acts pattern of the two presidents, which will imply the current structure that puts 
constraints on South Korean actors’ security discourse. 
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6.1.2 The discursive divergence and convergence 
The above figures based on the frequencies of each president’s speech acts can 
be corroborated by a list of ‘key terms’ extracted by the keyness score. As Table 
6.1 shows, the DPRK nuclear issue is at the very centre of Roh’s speech acts. 
Many of the terms in the upper ranks of the left column in the table are related to 
North Korea’s nuclear issues (in bold), whereas one can see no relevant terms in 
the right part of the table that represents Lee’s speech acts. It seems clear that 
the DPRK nuclear issue was much more verbally animated during the Roh 
administration. Of course, this does not mean that Roh practically securitised 
North Korea’s nuclear threat. Although the verbal activity was far more visible 
during Roh’s presidency, this alone does not show how Roh’s articulation of the 
issue relates to the referent objects and extraordinary measures against the 
nuclear threat. If one could find effective and cogent measures in Lee’s speech 
acts about the same issue, the abundance of the relevant speech acts of Roh 
would end up in vain. In that respect, the tables indicating the collocates of ‘North 
Korea’ and ‘nuclear’ give us a clearer map from which one can analyse the actors’ 
linguistic patterns in terms of their securitising moves towards the North’s nuclear 
threat. 
Table 6.1 Top-twenty key terms 
Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2) Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2) 
Terms Score Terms Score 
nuclear issue North Korean nuclear issue Korean nuclear issue Korean government Korean economy nuclear problem economic cooperation Korean nuclear problem North Korean nuclear problem common prosperity Participatory government Constitutional revision national defence bilateral cooperation balanced development defence reform Korean business self-reliant defence peace regime national development 
408.48 366.11 365.02 251.48 238.30 186.37 166.69 160.75 160.75 146.86 130.62 129.85 124.57 102.67 96.30 95.07 94.41 89.20 78.85 77.48 
green growth fair society advanced nation Korean government Korean economy Good morning common prosperity global economic crisis advanced country international community foreign exchange crisis exchange crisis economic crisis international arena global financial crisis school violence leading nation ecosystemic development Korean War global economy 
375.70 172.38 171.10 146.62 139.90 138.57 128.31 123.26 99.81 96.15 78.75 78.59 78.13 70.13 69.65 69.15 63.60 61.26 59.85 56.65  
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Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the top-twenty collocates of ‘North (Korea)’ 
according to the MI scores and T-scores, which have already been shown in 
previous chapters. What is different here is that Roh and Lee’s cases are lumped 
together in each of the tables so that the differences can be easily seen. The 
words included in these tables are all expected to be statistically significant 
(MI≥3.0 and T-score≥2.0). Therefore, through the collocations one can see how 
Table 6.2 MI Scores for collocate of North 
Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2) Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2) 
Collocate MI score Collocate MI score 
nuclear dismantlement missiles South (Korea) compatriots missile dismantling abandon solution (nuclear) issue peacefully (nuclear) problem (nuclear) program athletes resolving collapse attack  (nuclear) test (nuclear) weapons resolve 
8.399 8.241 8.104 8.075 7.978 7.978 7.978 7.756 7.756 7.630 7.613 7.592 7.574 7.563 7.563 7.519 7.493 7.486 7.393 7.264 
brethren perpetrated principled pushed (ahead with) rocket residing resolution persuade provocative anytime compatriots tourists attack provocations Yeonpyeong long-range provocation South (Korea) Six-Party (Talks) denuclearisation 
9.528 8.876 8.791 8.791 8.721 8.721 8.635 8.528 8.528 8.528 8.376 8.359 8.281 8.239 8.207 8.069 8.026 7.955 7.943 7.850  
Table 6.3 T-scores for collocate of North 
Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2) Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2) 
Collocate T-score Collocate T-score 
nuclear Korean Korea (nuclear) issue South (Korea) (nuclear) problem (nuclear) program resolve peacefully peaceful help (nuclear) test dialogue solution (nuclear) weapons resolution cooperation resolving trust peninsula 
16.169 15.138 14.080 11.344 8.742 7.511 5.800 5.620 5.073 4.434 4.005 3.978 3.907 3.855 3.584 3.576 3.545 3.446 3.180 3.158 
Korea Korean South (Korea) nuclear Koreans (nuclear) issue time North (Korea) help compatriots provocations brethren attack engage  (nuclear) weapons (nuclear) program change perpetrated resolution dialogue 
11.932 7.876 6.455 6.283 3.569 3.562 3.356 3.316 3.015 2.991 2.990 2.825 2.819 2.804 2.801 2.784 2.719 2.640 2.639 2.625  
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securitising actors perceive North Korea, which in turn leads us to grasp a big 
picture of each actor’s perception of existential threat, referent objects and 
extraordinary measures. With regard to the perception of the DPRK’s nuclear 
weapons as an existential threat, these tables clearly show that Roh linked North 
Korea to the nuclear issue. The word ‘nuclear’ occupied the first place in both 
tables during Roh’s tenure. Moreover, many of the MI score-based collocations 
in Roh’s speeches are directly related to the DPRK’s nuclear issues. The same 
is true for the collocations based on T-scores. In essence, in terms of discursive 
practice, Roh put North Korea and the nuclear issue together. 
By contrast, it is a bit surprising that the word ‘nuclear’ is relatively less 
associated with North Korea in Lee’s speech acts. The overall impression of the 
collocations included in Lee’s speeches seems complicated. In other words, 
instead of directly enunciating the North’s nuclear issue, Lee articulated the issue 
in an indirect manner. Insofar as the MI score is concerned, the notion that North 
Korea is a nuclear threat is not conspicuous. Although some words (e.g. 
‘principled’, ‘pushed’, ‘resolution’, etc.) indicates the North’s nuclear threat, the 
threat itself is shown rather indirectly. Rather, the threat from North Korea is 
delineated as a whole, by mentioning a variety of words and events (e.g. 
provocative, attack, Yeonpyeong, etc.) that remind us of the North’s bellicosity. 
Nonetheless, with regard to the T-score table, several collocations point to the 
linguistic relevancy between North Korea and nuclear issues in Lee’s speeches. 
In the right column of the table, the term ‘nuclear’ itself is ranked high, and the 
words ‘issue’, ‘weapons’ and ‘programme’ are directly associated with the North 
Korean nuclear threat. In sum, although the DPRK’s nuclear issue was more 
actively and consistently articulated by Roh compared to Lee, the issue can still 
be seen as one of the most important security matters in Lee’s speech acts, as 
the T-score table demonstrates. 
Secondly, these tables provide the actors’ perceptions of referent objects 
concerning the DPRK’s nuclear issue. As there is no clear line of demarcation 
between the DPRK regime and its society, South Korean actors’ perceptions of 
North Korea as a whole are of importance to the way in which they securitise the 
North’s nuclear issue. Interestingly, the collocations in these tables show that 
both presidents felt ambivalent about North Korea. The word ‘compatriots’ 
dramatically shows how Roh and Lee perceived North Korea. A similar 
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expression, ‘brethren’, is seen only in Lee’s speeches. What is more interesting 
is that this word occupied the top position of the MI score table in Lee’s speeches. 
The words ‘brethren’ and ‘compatriots’ are seen in both tables, whereas in Roh’s 
speeches the word ‘compatriots’ is seen only once. The point here is that this 
kind of perception—North Korea is our enemy but at the same time it is our 
compatriot—constitutes a root cause of elusive representations and equivocal 
extraordinary measures. As long as the ROK actors must acknowledge the 
current DPRK regime as the chief interlocutor representing the northern part of 
the Korean peninsula, the concept of compatriots or brethren should encompass 
the North Korean regime regardless of its bellicosity or illegality from the South 
Korean perspective. 
It might not be impossible for South Korean actors to officially designate the 
DPRK regime as an incorrigible one, but this would lead the current security 
discourse in Seoul in such a way that inter-Korean relations cannot be improved 
as long as Pyongyang’s Kim regime remains intact. For example, what if South 
Korean presidents regularly use the political rhetoric such as ‘rogue state’ or 
‘outpost of tyranny’ towards North Korea just as the Bush administration did? The 
word rhetoric is often used in a pejorative sense in relation to the use of words. 
As Taylor (2013b: 35) put it, political rhetoric ‘attempts to redefine the nation in 
order to exclude a negatively valued group’. However, can Seoul bear all the 
political, diplomatic and military reverberations from using such rhetoric? Insofar 
as South Korea cannot control the regional order in Northeast Asia by itself, 
excluding the DPRK regime is neither responsible nor realistic. This is why the 
words ‘compatriots’ and ‘brethren’ should be recognised as important, in that they 
constitute not only one of the important principles of South Korea’s referent 
objects but also a stumbling block for devising an extraordinary measure. 
In other words, a dichotomy between ‘the good ordinary people in North 
Korea’ and ‘an evil regime’ cannot easily be made in the formal ROK security 
discourses. In fact, neither the Roh nor Lee administration adopted this kind of 
viewpoint. Even if they had a deep sense of repugnance of the North Korean 
regime, they simply could not cast the Pyongyang partnership away. To put it 
differently, conflicting referent objects—defending the South from the malevolent 
North and embracing them as our compatriots—reflects a foreseeable failure of 
complete representation (or conceptualisation) of North Korea. 
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Lastly, these tables also give us clues in terms of assessing similarities and 
differences between the two president’s extraordinary measures against the 
nuclear threat. First of all, as aforementioned, these tables show a lack of 
concrete measures whereby Seoul can prevent Pyongyang from developing 
nuclear weapons. As can be seen in both tables, the single most conspicuous 
word in Roh’s speeches is ‘peaceful(ly)’. According to Roh, to achieve a ‘peaceful 
resolution’ of the North’s nuclear problem, ‘dialogue’, ‘trust’ and ‘cooperation’ 
between the two Koreas are essential, and by focusing on these measures we 
can make North Korea ‘abandon’ or ‘dismantle’ its nuclear ‘programme’. Chapter 
4 has already shown this. Roh also often asked for ‘help’ from the international 
community, particularly from the SPT members, to solve the issue. In essence, 
what these tables show is that Roh struggled with measure deficiency in terms of 
deterring the threat, despite a high rate of his mentioning the North’s nuclear 
issues. For him, the only way to solve the threat should be limited to ‘peaceful’ 
ways, and he articulated this very clearly throughout his presidency. The biggest 
problem here is that the process and outcome of this is too murky and uncertain 
not only because of the North’s unpredictable behavioural pattern but also 
because of the characteristics of the international system (balance of power or a 
rivalry between world powers). 
The same is true for Lee’s speeches in two ways: peaceful measures and 
ambiguity. Although Lee did not use the certain term ‘peaceful solution’, ‘SPT’ 
and ‘dialogue’ constitute an important pillar as a medium of attaining the North’s 
denuclearisation in his speeches. An in-depth analysis tells us that the words 
‘persuade’, ‘anytime’ and ‘engage’ were all used to underpin the peaceful ways 
in Lee’s securitising moves. Again, the notion that North Korea itself constitutes 
one of South Korea’s referent objects might have affected the discursive pattern. 
In fact, when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear threat, one cannot easily find a 
tangible form of extraordinary measures in Lee’s speeches other than the SPT, 
which in turn puts us in an awkward position: what are the substantial discursive 
differences that make extraordinary measures distinct between the progressive 
and conservative administrations? 
Whereas many of the collocates that Lee articulated are related to the 
DPRK’s negative facets as noted above, the words indicating possible solutions 
to the DPRK’s nuclear threat seem lacking in concreteness. For example, the 
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words ‘principled’, ‘persuade’, ‘anytime’, ‘help’, ‘engage’ and ‘change’ are all 
relevant to the principal points that Lee put stress on in regard to inducing the 
DPRK to denuclearise. As Chapter 5 has shown, although Vision 3,000 and the 
Grand Bargain initiative were suggested as fundamental ways to denuclearise 
North Korea, these policies were only focused on the goal of denuclearisation 
itself, and thereby overlooked the way in which North Korea can be persuaded. 
According to an in-depth analysis of each of the words mentioned above, none 
of them provide concrete ways to achieve such policy initiatives. In other words, 
Lee’s security discourse was limited to a form of a categorical proposition and, 
therefore, the praxis of his words remained unpractised. 
Last but not least, there are certain differences between the two presidents 
in terms of word usage: ‘attack’ and ‘resolution’. Roh used the word ‘attack’ to 
refer to the Bush administration’s possible military action against North Korea, 
which may trigger an all-out war on the Korean peninsula, while Lee used this 
word in order to specify the attacks ‘perpetrated’ by North Korea. Regarding the 
word ‘resolution’, whereas Roh only used the word to signify the act of solving 
(13 out of 13 times), Lee used this to refer to the UNSC resolution (3 out of 7 
times). However, even when mentioning the UNSC resolution after the DPRK’s 
second nuclear test in 2009, Lee pointed out that the sanctions ‘are not aimed at 
threatening the North Korean regime by swamping it with criticism’ (Lee 2009c). 
In other words, Lee’s original and fundamental official remarks on extraordinary 
measures were centred on paving ‘the way for candid discussion’ with the DPRK 
regime, which should be peaceful (Lee 2009c). 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 include the top-twenty collocates of ‘nuclear’, which are 
also arranged by MI and T-scores. Since the word ‘nuclear’ is at the centre of the 
DA of the thesis, alongside ‘North Korea’, exploring collocates of this could further 
flesh out the elements of securitisation: what source is threatening us? What 
values are at stake? And what measures should be chosen to halt the threat and 
protect our values? This time again, however, the collocations (and a subsequent 
in-depth analysis of the collocations) included in these tables do not tell us much 
about lucid answers. ‘North Korea’, as a lexical word, is seen in both presidents’ 
speeches. However, even this word seems to need a clearer description as to 
whether it should be acknowledged as a legitimate counterpart, at least in terms 
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of the discursive level. In particular, there are no collocates that indicate a 
substantial model of extraordinary measures. 
Be that as it may, there are still some traits that represent the two actors’ 
policies on the DPRK’s nuclear issue. First, according to the MI scores, Roh 
manifestly linked the nuclear issues to North Korea, even though both presidents 
put an emphasis on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. T-scores show that 
Table 6.4 MI scores for collocate of nuclear 
Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2) Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2) 
Collocate MI score Collocate MI score 
abandon weapons dismantlement North’s dismantling test program peacefully dismantle missiles waste issue solution resolving North (Korea) problem plants resolve resolved conducted 
9.591 9.350 9.269 9.269 8.913 8.906 8.854 8.810 8.783 8.716 8.591 8.586 8.461 8.398 8.386 8.349 8.269 8.086 8.036 7.928 
dismantle weapons missiles ambitions plants safety proliferation terrorism security arms plant construct test materials power resolution accident safety threat construction 
10.229 9.956 9.867 9.814 9.801 9.381 9.381 9.296 9.296 9.229 8.949 8.814 8.744 8.644 8.644 8.114 8.059 7.727 7.693 7.644  
Table 6.5 T-scores for collocate of nuclear 
Roh Moo-hyun (2003.2–2008.2) Lee Myung-bak (2008.2–2013.2) 
Collocate T-score Collocate T-score 
North (Korea) Korean issue problem program Korea peacefully resolve weapons resolved test resolution solution resolving Pyongyang help power solve give (up) issues 
16.138 13.827 12.812 7.913 7.333 6.830 6.231 6.060 5.736 5.635 5.280 4.106 3.989 3.731 3.724 3.656 3.653 3.144 3.120 3.094 
weapons North (Korea) power summit security plants Korea Korean safety energy issue world terrorism program Seoul international security development missiles plant 
6.921 6.432 5.816 5.790 5.735 5.093 4.713 4.560 4.223 3.965 3.579 3.425 3.311 3.294 2.945 2.871 2.772 2.749 2.643 2.640  
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Lee also linked the nuclear issue with North Korea at a significant level. Second, 
it can be seen that the word ‘missiles’ is closely connected to ‘nuclear’. North 
Korea has always tested intercontinental ballistic missiles before or after each 
nuclear test in 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2016, for it wants their missiles to be armed 
with a variety of warheads, including a nuclear one (McGrath and Wertz 2015). 
The word ‘missiles’ was also seen in the tables, and it was sometimes shown as 
‘rocket’.43 In any case, it is clear that both presidents put ‘nuclear’ and ‘missiles’ 
together, and they recognised them as threats, which constitutes the ‘proliferation’ 
of nuclear weapons technology and therefore must be ‘dismantled’ or ‘given up’. 
Third, many collocates of ‘nuclear’ in Lee’s speeches are related to nuclear 
power plants and nuclear safety, which are not directly pointing to the DPRK’s 
nuclear threat (e.g. ‘proliferation’, ‘terrorism’, ‘security’, ‘materials’, ‘accident’, 
‘safety’ and so forth). As mentioned in Chapter 5, Lee’s security discourse on 
North Korea’s nuclear threat saw a sharp decrease in his latter days. What these 
two tables show is that with regard to the nuclear issues Lee changed his focus 
from North Korea to nuclear safety as South Korea held the second NSS in 2012. 
The NSS was initiated by former US President Obama’s Prague Speech, in which 
he expressed a grave concern about nuclear terrorism. Given that the main 
agenda of the NSS was focused on general nuclear safety, including improving 
the security of nuclear waste and the protection of radioactive sources, this world 
summit certainly did not have a direct link with the DPRK’s nuclear threat. 
Notwithstanding this trait, the NSS was a good opportunity for Seoul to deal with 
Pyongyang’s nuclear issue from a broader perspective since the DPRK had long 
been suspected of being involved in connection with nuclear proliferation 
activities (Cheon 2011). Lee himself also expressed his expectations that North 
Korea would feel pressure from the international community with the NSS as a 
momentum (Lee 2015). Apart from this, as ‘South Korea is a major world nuclear 
energy country’, and nuclear energy constitutes ‘about one-third of South Korea’s 
electricity’, the words ‘waste’, ‘plant(s)’ and ‘power’ are seen in both tables 
throughout the Roh and Lee’s periods (WNA 2016). 
 
                                            43  The words ‘rocket’ and ‘missile’ were used interchangeably among the policymakers (NA 5/4/2009; NA 6/4/2009; NA 6/7/2006; NA 12/12/2012). 
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6.2 Security discourse and security reality: discursive chasms 
 
6.2.1 The origin of discursive chasms 
Before moving on to a further discussion about the fundamental grounds for 
South Korea’s discursive pattern, it may be better to briefly recall some focal 
points of the comparative analysis of the two presidents’ speech acts. With regard 
to similarities—discursive convergence—both administrations clearly articulated 
the North Korean nuclear threat. In other words, they considered the nuclear 
issue as an existential one that gave rise to a significant threat towards the ROK’s 
national security and ultimately its survival itself. Although a detailed pattern of 
describing the threat over the course of each presidency was not the same, there 
is no doubt that both presidents tried to prioritise the nuclear issues. 
Second, both actors failed to grasp the definition of the other, North Korea. 
Whilst the ROK’s securitising actors knew that the DPRK’s Kim regime was the 
source of the threat, they could not help but struggle with conceptualising the 
regime in Pyongyang. As was shown in the previous section, North Korea was a 
referent object, and at the same time it was the source of threat to the South. On 
top of that, paradoxically, it was essential for the South’s actors to collaborate 
with the North in order to have them denuclearised. However, neither actor was 
able to come up with a way in which they could discursively pick out the ‘evil and 
illegitimate’ regime in Pyongyang, while being in cooperation with them. Nor could 
they construct cogent security discourses that could show how the ROK’s 
collaboration with the DPRK would not consolidate Pyongyang’s undemocratic 
and non-marketable regime. 
Third, the collocations of the core terms have shown that both presidents 
had no options other than relying primarily on peaceful measures, meaning that 
they fell far short of creating unequivocal measures that could get rid of the North 
Korean actors’ nuclear ambitions. Even when the ROK wanted to retaliate against 
the DPRK’s attack by using force in 2010, they could not implement it because 
both Washington and Beijing did not want a military collision in the region. In sum, 
as stated, the ROK actors’ goal to achieve denuclearisation on the Korean 
peninsula ran aground because of the other’s (North Korea’s) uncontrollable and 
unpredictable behaviour, the Northeast Asian international system (intensifying 
rivalry between the US and China), and the ROK’s failure of representation of the 
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other, the DPRK. In fact, regardless of whether the measures were peaceful or 
not, the extraordinary measures that the ROK practised seemed intangible. 
Consequently, the actors’ securitising efforts were not fully securitised, but at the 
same time it was clearly beyond the level of politicisation, thereby becoming 
institutionalised (Figure 6.7). 
The traits of security discourses of Roh and Lee, however, are also different 
at certain points (discursive divergence). According to the tables based on the T-
scores and MI scores, one of the most noticeable things is that Lee described 
North Korea in a much more negative way. Other than the words indicating mere 
facts of nuclear weapons and missiles, many of the collocates included in Lee’s 
speeches relate to pessimism about the DPRK (e.g. ‘perpetrated’ and 
‘provocative’). The discursive differences between Roh and Lee were also added 
by the word ‘(UNSC) resolution’ that was shown in Lee’s speeches, in that this 
word gives us an impression that Lee was in favour of sanctions as a form of 
extraordinary measures. However, even in this case, Lee used the words ‘(UNSC) 
resolution’ and ‘sanctions’ in a limited sense. Lee himself stressed that imposing 
sanctions could not be a goal in and of itself. 
The second point is of course the active appearance of the North Korean 
nuclear discourse in Roh’s speeches. Against all expectations, the DPRK’s 
nuclear discourse did not assume a leading place among other discourses in 
Lee’s speeches. Is this just because Lee equally allocated policy priorities 
throughout the policy sectors (e.g. economy, culture, social welfare, etc.) more 
than Roh did? Even if this is the case, at least one of the pertinent discourses on 
the DPRK’s nuclear issue should have been included in the top-twenty key terms 
 
Figure 6.7 The boundaries of the ROK’s securitisation 
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(Table 6.1). Moreover, given the significance of the DPRK problem as security 
issues, it cannot be easily understandable. As was pointed out in Chapter 5, what 
this result demonstrates is that Lee’s attempt to securitise the DPRK’s nuclear 
threat in a complete manner ended in failure as Lee’s relevant security discourse 
lapsed into silence. 
Last but not least, Roh’s securitisation against the US, particularly against 
the Bush administration, needs to be noted. This is an interesting point because 
Roh’s double securitisation—against the US and the DPRK—could be interpreted 
as a result of surrounding circumstances at that particular moment. In other words, 
strictly speaking, the reason why Roh securitised against the US was not because 
they belonged to a ‘progressive political group’, but because, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the US was widely expected to launch military campaigns against 
North Korea. Perhaps Roh’s ‘liberal’ perception brought about an amplification 
effect on his belief in the Bush administration’s belligerence, but the point here is 
that this was a result of an intersubjective discourse practice between the ROK 
and US (i.e. between Roh’s relatively more liberal inclination and Bush’s relatively 
more hawkish perception). 
The same pattern had already occurred in 1994 between South Korea and 
the US. The Kim Young-sam administration (1993–1997), which is well known for 
its conservatism, also securitised the Bill Clinton administration to not attack 
North Korea’s nuclear facilities in 1994. Kim Young-sam said ‘he feared such a 
strike would provoke a full-scale war’ (Kim 2015d). Another important point here 
is that regardless of the position on the political spectrum, forestalling war and 
keeping an atmosphere for peaceful unification are sacrosanct duties that all 
heads of state in South Korea adhere to. Even though Roh’s liberal 
characteristics pulled the trigger on his suspicion of the Bush administration’s 
intention, as mentioned, it did not render him immune to another side of the 
ROK’s fundamental referent object: maintaining the strong alliance with the US. 
What these discursive convergences and divergences mean is that the 
actual difference between Roh and Lee does not rest on their perceptions of the 
DPRK’s nuclear threat, referent objects, and following extraordinary measures. 
The speech acts practised by the two presidents were not that different in dealing 
with the DPRK’s nuclear threat. From the perceptions of an existential threat to 
the referent objects to the ideas on extraordinary measures, both presidents saw 
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a similar pattern of speech acts in many ways. Rather, the initial expectations—
Lee would be more active in practising the DPRK’s nuclear discourse and Roh 
would be reluctant to articulate it—have proved wrong. In any case, both 
presidents must have gone through the limitedness of sanctions and dialogues 
that seriously delimited their options for extraordinary measures. 
What, then, made the real divergence between the two? Why have the two 
presidents been recognised as starkly different actors? Getting a response to this 
question is not easy, for it belongs to an internal realm of security discourse, 
which official discourses may not straightforwardly reveal. The answer might rest 
on whether the ROK actors ‘inwardly’ accept the DPRK regime as legitimate. 
Stated differently, it rests upon whether the ROK ‘fully accept the legitimacy of 
the Kim regime, or guarantee its domestic political stability’ (Bluth 2011b: 1374). 
This is what discursive ambiguity is all about. The obscure definition of North 
Korea, in particular in relation to the future North Korea, and the temporary 
characterisation of inter-Korean relations (special relationship) have contributed 
to the ambiguity of the ROK’s security discourses. If this cannot be fully and 
officially articulated, the discursive ambiguity would remain unless the DPRK 
regime voluntarily succumbs to the South. 
More importantly, this is exactly where the discursive chasms into which 
South Korean actors fell begin. To reiterate, a discursive chasm in this study 
means a discursive structure that profoundly impedes the performance of actors’ 
security discourse, and that distorts or paralyses discursive formation (here, 
securitisation process). Proceeding from what has been said above, the following 
sections investigate the elements that created the discursive chasms in detail 
according to the ST framework. Additional in-depth interviews will be used to look 
into the causes of the chasms that were not disclosed with ease by means of 
corpus-assisted DA. 
 
6.2.2 Elusive threats: imminent or protracted? 
As this study has already explored, Roh and Lee’s speeches clearly showed that 
both presidents made it clear that the DPRK nuclear issue must be the top priority 
in terms of security policy. Policy reports and white papers published by the 
presidential office also demonstrated the urgency of finding a peaceful resolution 
to the issue. Given the results of the analysis, there is no doubt that the DPRK’s 
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nuclear threat has always been recognised as an existential one that sparked the 
ROK’s securitisation process. What is interesting is that the ROK’s securitising 
moves against the nuclear activities have been repetitive while North Korea 
keeps developing its nuclear programmes and increasing the number of nuclear 
warheads and materials. 
According to ST, the reason why actors launch a securitisation process is 
because they believe that existential threats are imminent enough to be deterred 
only by means of extraordinary measures which go beyond a normal boundary 
of politicisation (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). South Korea’s securitising moves, 
however, have failed to prove that the North’s nuclear threat is imminent. Had it 
really been imminent, the ROK-US Combined Forces should have eliminated the 
North Korean nuclear sites in the first place. If anything, it is North Korea’s 
chemical and biological weapons, and its forward deployments of troops and 
multiple rocket launchers near the DMZ, which have long been the real imminent 
threats (Cha 2012: 226–227).44 In that respect, particularly after the 1990s, the 
ROK’s securitisation of the North’s conventional weapons has been paid 
relatively less attention to compared to that concerning the nuclear issues. 
Be that as it may, no actors in South Korea can condone the North’s relevant 
nuclear activities that may well be turned into a material threat at some point in 
the future. North Korea has consistently stepped up its nuclear programmes, and 
they claimed that the fourth nuclear test in January 2016 was carried out as a 
form of a more powerful hydrogen bomb (Davenport 2016). Moreover, North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and capabilities could significantly damage the 
strategic stability of the Korean peninsula and surrounding regions, including 
Japan and Taiwan (Panda 2015). Given the magnitude of the nuclear issue, it is 
safe to say that the ROK’s actors could not help but articulate the DPRK’s nuclear 
activities. However, what needs to be taken into account here is not that it was 
inevitable for South Korean actors to securitise North Korea’s nuclear weapons, 
but that their securitisation processes have failed to retain urgency in terms of 
bringing forth cogent extraordinary measures, thereby resulting in the chanting of 
‘No Nuclear North Korea’ throughout the processes. 
                                            44 It is believed that Pyongyang is able to indigenously produce biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, pest, and so on. Although North Korea joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in April 1997, it is suspected of maintaining such weapons programme. For the concept of biological warfare, see (Whitby 2002; Whitby et al. 2002). 
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That is, the ROK’s securitising moves against the DPRK’s nuclear threat 
have been conducted through ‘ritualised incantation’ (Oren and Solomon 2015: 
313–336). After the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test, Wit (2016) pointed out this 
situation by drawing an interesting analogy:  
I found last week’s [6 January 2016] nuclear test and the events that followed depressingly familiar. They reminded me of Captain Renault’s famous line from Casablanca just before he shuts down Rick’s Café: “I’m shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!” The reactions to North Korea’s 2006, 2009 and 2013 nuclear tests were the same—shock. Yet a decade has gone by and the North Korean nuclear threat has only grown. 
When South Korea’s actors speak about ‘security’ on North Korea’s nuclear 
threat, it has become the norm rather than an imminent threat. In other words, 
the ROK’s securitisation has fallen into institutionalisation. In the meantime, the 
DPRK has multiplied its nuclear capabilities, arming itself with uranium-based 
nuclear weapons and miniaturised nuclear warheads (Nikitin 2013). In sum, from 
a materialist perspective, the DPRK’s nuclear threat, which originally was not that 
imminent when the ROK began to ‘securitise’ it in the early 1990s, has now 
indeed become a substantial/imminent one. 
This paradoxical situation highlights a practical point that ST should 
consider. The crisis of securitisation comes not only from existential threats that 
are recalcitrant, but also from existential threats that cannot easily be split into 
imminent and non-imminent ones, just as the DPRK nuclear issue has shown. 
Most North Korea watchers have agreed that Pyongyang would not use its 
nuclear weapons unless foreign countries threaten the regime’s very existence, 
since they are well aware that the current Kim regime is not expected to survive 
if a full-scale war occurs (Carpenter and Bandow 2004; Smith 2007; Bluth 2011a; 
Cha 2012). In other words, in normal circumstances, insofar as the ROK-US 
deterrence/alliance system, including the so-called ‘extended deterrence’ (or 
nuclear umbrella), is in a robust state, the DPRK’s nuclear threats may not be 
imminent. 45  In addition, the role of Chinese leadership cannot be ignored 
(Swenson-Wright 2011: 21). Nonetheless, North Korea’s ‘all or nothing’ mind-set 
and its belligerent attitude often force South Korean actors to worry that the North 
may use nuclear weapons, which results in securitising the North’s threat. 
                                            45 There is no doubt that the ‘probability’ of North Korea’s provocation will be increasing as they miniaturise their nuclear warheads and develop nuclear capabilities such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In addition, ‘retaining nuclear weapons’ itself could give Pyongyang lots of strategic options. 
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Put differently, in theory, nuclear (or nuclear proliferation) issues should 
always be of great importance to actors, not only because of the terrible 
destructive power of nuclear weapons, but also because actors cannot be certain 
about the other’s future intention. As Walton (Walton 2013: 209; emphasis in 
original) pointed out, ‘there actually is a strong nuclear taboo which prevents 
leaders worldwide from “pushing the button”. It is, however, all too plausible that 
we will instead see the breaking of the long nuclear truce’. In the case of South 
Korea, in particular, which is facing one of the most isolated and vituperative 
countries in the world, grasping the DPRK’s intention is nearly impossible. In 
practice, however, one cannot easily imagine that a country, particularly a weaker 
state like North Korea, bent on developing nuclear programmes would have a 
real intention to attack a stronger party such as the US, despite its hyperbolic 
rhetoric, given that such actions will only bring forward its demise. Thus, North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons can be seen as asymmetric strategies and for regime 
survival, even as they pose perceptions of grave threat for South Korea’s actors 
and audiences. 
This provides another talking point for ST, as the ROK’s securitising moves 
constitute a case in which actors should securitise a specific threat without 
knowing how imminent the threat is. Moreover, the actors do not have much 
information about the degree of threat and the possibility of its realisation. 
Therefore, in a certain sense, the actors securitise a threat by their own beliefs 
(or cognitive structures). The reason why this needs to be considered is because 
such a securitising move could prevent a normal process (politicisation) from 
being carried out. In any case, the ROK’s actors are overwhelmed by or 
preoccupied with the term ‘the DPRK’s nuclear weapons’ when it comes to their 
security discourses. With the benefit of hindsight, the DPRK’s nuclear threat does 
not necessarily have to be ‘securitised’, particularly given the result of a 20-year 
experience of ‘failed’ securitisation. The point here is not saying that the DPRK’s 
nuclear issues need not have been securitised; rather, it is that the ROK’s actors 
became stuck between the politicisation and securitisation that is inclined to 
institutionalisation. This point leads us to additional practical matters that cannot 
be explained by ST: how do actors securitise the other’s threat when the other is 
an essential part of referent objects? 
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6.2.3 Elusive others: misrepresented referent objects 
The problem of the ROK’s referent objects has already been discussed in this 
study in Chapters 4 and 5. We have seen that both presidents struggled to 
establish a stable and consistent concept of referent object in terms of the 
relationship with the DPRK, and sometimes, the US. The above discussion 
should be highlighted because this issue is one of the major causes in regard to 
discursive chasms. In that regard, this section provides further evidences that 
expressly show the securitising actors’ concerns over this issue. 
The fundamental reason that held back the ROK actors’ discourse on 
referent objects lies with a structural situation. It made the actors’ discourses 
dysfunctional or unarticulated. That is, some referent objects, which must be 
inviolable under any circumstances just like other referent objects, did not 
represent the real world, and subsequently this imposed discursive limitations on 
the actors. However from far away they seem each other in terms of political 
ideology, and even though such an ideological gap could make some differences 
with regard to North Korea policy to some degree, neither of their discourses got 
through to the very point of declaring referent objects that had misrepresented 
the reality. The structural situation came out of at least two points: incompatibility 
with North Korea’s Kim regime and a virtual impossibility of declaration of a 
‘nuclear-armed North Korea’. 
Regarding incompatibility with North Korea, the cardinal principle of Roh 
and Lee’s North Korea policy rested upon the premise that North Korea can be 
changed by abandoning nuclear weapons and opening its economic system. 
There were no differences between the two actors’ discourses concerning this 
logic. The ROK government regarded this principle as an established discourse 
in dealing with the DPRK. This logic was also directly related to the ROK’s 
referent objects: maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations towards peaceful 
unification under the flag of democracy and market economy. However, this logic 
lacks one point, which is so significant to the DPRK regime: what would happen 
if the DPRK regime disowned its current social and economic system? This 
shows exactly how disparate the referent objects between the two Koreas are. In 
other words, since Pyongyang regards their regime as a sacrosanct referent 
object, so long as Seoul does not show a clear path on which the Kim regime can 
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survive after its denuclearisation and social reform, the North cannot forsake its 
nuclear weapons, which are ‘the sword of State’. 
The problem was that in no case could Roh and Lee proclaim the way for 
the Kim regime’s prosperity in official discourses, for the ROK’s Constitutional 
principle indicates that North Korea is not so much a state as an anti-government 
organisation, just as the North has not recognised the South as a fully legitimate 
state. This is why former Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, who served under 
the Roh administration that actively carried out an engagement policy, pointed 
out that guaranteeing the DPRK’s security does not mean securing its social and 
economic system, as mentioned in Chapter 4. How can it be possible that a 
certain regime can be secured without a stable social and economic system that 
operates in the interest of the very regime? The same is true of Lee’s Grand 
Bargain initiative, in which he stressed that the DPRK regime would be secured. 
Neither the conservative nor progressive governments have made it clear 
what the DPRK’s regime really means to South Korea. This is partly because 
there has been some strategic consideration. According to the Basic Agreement, 
a legal relation between the DPRK and the ROK is ‘special’. 46  The Basic 
Agreement is in line with neither international law nor domestic law, but rather is 
halfway between them. It is provisional and twofold (Lim 2008; Kim 2014a). No 
agreements between the two Koreas have articulated what exactly this ‘special’ 
means. Hence, this has created a discursive ambiguity for both parties. What 
then is the ‘special’ relations? What is really meant by ‘special’ was that one party 
does not acknowledge the other party as a state. Instead, the other party is not 
so much a state as a political entity. Should either party collapse, the party that 
is in a stable situation can then assert pre-emptive rights over the other.47 Can 
this kind of underlying meaning be articulated as a form of official discourse? Had 
it been possible, the use of the term ‘special’ would not have been needed at all 
from the onset.  
Therefore, the ROK’s referent objects would remain misleading, unless 
there is a regime change in North Korea. As was discussed earlier, even if the 
regime change of the DPRK occurred, there is no guarantee that the North would 
                                            46 An agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea, called the Basic Agreement, signed on 13 December 1991, recognised the ‘special relationship’ between the two Koreas. 47 Author’s interview with a high-ranking government official in charge of secret negotiations with the DPRK for over two decades (April 2014). 
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accept the ROK’s way of referent objects. For the North Korean regime, even 
‘China was considered a dangerous enemy to the Juche ideology of self-reliance, 
forever tempting the isolated North Korean people with the fruits of reform and 
openness from over the border’. The cult of personality, that is, the cult of Kim, 
‘goes beyond mere ideology or politics’ (Jang 2014: 260). The late Kim Jong-il 
stressed in his own article that ‘[economic] reform and openness are a straight 
path to national ruin. Nothing like reform and openness will be allowed. Never 
ever. Gangseongdaeguk (a strong and prosperous nation) should build on 
pursuing self-rehabilitation’ (Hyun 2011: 288; translated by author). 
It is interesting that many Pyongyang watchers in South Korea, regardless 
of whether they served for the Roh or the Lee administrations, particularly those 
who have actively engaged in making and carrying out the policies toward North 
Korea, saw very similar perceptions of Pyongyang and the structural constraints 
on South Korea. Both sides were well cognisant of the legal ground for unification 
that arises from the ROK Constitution, and they also acknowledged that 
articulating the ROK’s own values—having a priority right over the DPRK in the 
event of a state of emergency—on a negotiation table is impracticable. Most of 
all, they all agreed that it would be extremely difficult to change the traits of the 
DPRK regime. Nonetheless, it was a ‘willingness’ to engage in dialogue with 
North Korea that was different. The following quotes show the similarities and 
differences between the two sides: 
We did not begin the SPT with the expectation that it would solve everything about the North Korean nuclear issue. However, should we not make the most out of the given situations? […] The SPT structure implies that the US and China acknowledge the special relations between the ROK and the DPRK. For example, Christopher R. Hill, former chief US negotiator with North Korea, asked me several times, ‘what does North Korea mean to South Korea?’ […] Although I did not publicly say that ‘we have a special right over the North when they collapsed’, there was a tacit consent among other concerned nations that the SPT can endorse a structure in which the South could assume a leading place over the North Korean issue. How can we demand such a right in the event of the North’s collapse even without a framework like the SPT? (Interview: 3 July 2014) 
The interviewee quoted above was one of the top officials in charge of the 
DPRK nuclear issues under the Roh administration. There are two important 
points that need to be highlighted: one is that even the actors belonging to the 
progressive realm implemented their policies with the possibility of North Korea’s 
collapse in their minds. In that process, the SPT could be an important tool for 
Seoul to strengthen its position according to its own referent objects. The other 
 
 
200 
point is that they were also not certain about whether and when North Korea could 
change itself and renounce its nuclear weapons. The following quotes are from 
the actors who served in the inner circle of the Lee administration: 
Although we cannot make North Korea collapse, we should ask ourselves ‘what should we do if North Korea collapses?’ Of course, the only policy that we can use toward North Korea is ‘attempting a gradual change of North Korea’. With regard to unification, we ought to give a consistent message to the North’s elites that ‘you will be safe even if you change yourselves’, because otherwise, they will never accept our suggestion. (Interview: 12 June 2014)  The SPT is nearly a dead fish. The US is not quite interested in the SPT, nor is South Korea. The SPT mechanism is not useful for the DPRK’s denuclearisation. […] We know that North Korea is using salami tactics, brinkmanship and so on. […] It gives the North time to relax and enjoy the dealing. […] Behind the curtain they can develop nuclear weapons. The previous 10 to 15 years showed us that they did like that. We know that. Americans know that. We cannot do that [SPT] in the future. (Interview: 9 June 2014) 
The above interviews strongly show the underlying thoughts of the Lee 
administration’s securitising actors. First of all, it is needless to say that they also 
kept the possibility of North Korea’s collapse in mind. Second, they abhorred 
having negotiations with the DPRK since they felt that the North had always 
deceived negotiating partners while developing its nuclear programme. Third, 
they do nonetheless know that the ROK has to keep an official discourse when it 
comes to North Korea policy: “We do not want to harm you. You would be secured 
even if you abandoned nuclear weapons and change the isolated society”. 
In sum, although it sounds pessimistic, the DPRK’s uncontrollable traits 
proved that the referent objects practised by Roh and Lee, in relation to the link 
between denuclearisation and economic/social reform in North Korea, were 
misrepresented. Even though the DPRK’s obsession with nuclear weapons was 
really due to its fear of the external threats posed by the US and South Korea, 
the systemic way in which they ran the regime sealed off every possibility that the 
ROK’s referent objects could be compatible with it. However different Roh and 
Lee’s discourses on the DPRK’s nuclear threat seem to each other, the structural 
situation imposed the same level of constraints on the ROK actors’ securitisation. 
The role of an individual agent in this situation has strictly been restricted. So 
have the actors’ discourses. 
Last but not least, an additional point needs to be taken into account: non-
proliferation. This is much more related to the international system in terms of the 
discursive realm. It is well known that the NPT system has constituted the highest 
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order of nuclear discourse in the international community since 1970. In other 
words, by not acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear state, the NPT remains 
intact in Northeast Asia. If this were not the case, the denuclearisation of North 
Korea would be a much more difficult goal and the possibility of a nuclear domino 
effect would increase (Baker and Gale 2014). What is more, if North Korea 
secured a position of nuclear state, South Korea accordingly could not help 
accepting North Korea as a nuclear ‘state’, which may well represent quite the 
opposite of what the ROK’s referent objects intended. What if an anti-government 
political entity, which must be united with the South under the ROK’s referent 
objects, acquires a position of nuclear state from the international community?  
It is not that important whether North Korea renounces its nuclear weapons or not. North Korea has nuclear weapons already. Despite this, South Korea and the US does not accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Their policies began with a denial of the fact, because an official recognition of the North’s nuclear weapons would be equivalent to an acknowledgement of a totally different international order in the Northeast Asian region. (Interview: 3 July 2014) 
In short, ‘nuclear North Korea’ is a discourse that cannot be readily 
articulated. Had it been discursively accepted by South Korea and the US’s 
securitising actors, the way of securitising against the DPRK’s nuclear threat 
would have already changed. This clearly shows the role of discourse, in that 
discursive power controls the delineation of reality (e.g. the nuclear taboo), but at 
the same time, it also shows that a strongly established discourse can distort 
reality, thereby reinforcing already misrepresented referent objects. 
 
6.2.4 Intangible extraordinary measures 
Just as South Korea struggled to quadrate its discourse on referent objects with 
the security reality, the lack of ability creating extraordinary measures against the 
other’s threat consistently inflicted a repetitive failure on the ROK’s securitising 
moves. As aforementioned, the actors’ speech acts about the denuclearisation of 
North Korea became a chant or an incantation at the level of deterrence, rather 
than securitisation that has a practical solution. In that sense, this is an issue of 
security discourse that cannot be realised.  
This can be split into two parts: the self-securitising ability and the other’s 
offset ability. The former is about an actor’s ability to create extraordinary means. 
If an actor is strong enough to securitise the enemy’s threat, the actor sometimes 
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does not even need to articulate the securitisation process. The US and Israeli 
governments’ bombing of the Al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Syria in 2007, a country 
which is known for its nuclear collaboration with North Korea, could be a good 
example. Both governments ‘remained conspicuously silent about this veritable 
act of war. There were no proclamations or statements, and officials ducked all 
questions about the incident. But the act spoke for itself’ (Cha 2012: 241). 
By contrast, however, the logic of deterrence on the Korean peninsula (see 
Chapter 4) prevented this kind of securitisation from occurring. This leads us to 
the latter point, the other’s offset ability. As noted before, South Korea simply 
cannot consider a pre-emptive attack against North Korea unless it is under 
attack from the North, due to concerns about the dreadful results of war as well 
as its security discourse according to its constitution. No matter how threatening 
the DPRK’s nuclear weapons are, the ROK’s securitisation should therefore be a 
deterrence-based or discourse-based one: “You must abandon your nuclear 
programme, otherwise, frankly, we have no option but to keep securitising it by 
means of discourse and along with a deterrent strategy”.48 
It is worth noting that most South Korean securitising actors, regardless of 
their positions on the political spectrum, acknowledged the great importance and 
influence of the international system, while at the same time having concern for 
the role of individual actors. For many of them, in order for the ROK actors to 
strategically manoeuvre their own extraordinary measures against the DPRK’s 
nuclear threat, the benign environment of the international system in Northeast 
Asia is vital. Put differently, there is a broad strategic consensus among the actors 
that South Korea’s security discourse can rarely be realised without the consent 
of the great powers. 
[1] Countries that are not able to lead an international order cannot help but decide their policies based on the international system. That is, independent room for individuals and the state is not big. That said, for about 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the ROK could expand its room for manoeuvre, so the individual actors’ tendencies and creativity became much more important. (Interview: 4 April 2014)  [2] China’s current status is so different from that of China 12 years ago. And the ‘China factor’ is so important to the ROK, which should bear unification in mind. Nothing could be done if 
                                            48 Deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system (THAAD) might be the archetype of deterrence-based measures from the ST perspective. THAAD, however, is not only limited to the realm of military deterrence, which cannot discourage the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions, it is also limited because of its own deficiency and as its military effectiveness is undermined by the DPRK’s added nuclear-capabilities (Griffiths 2016). 
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China is unkind to us. […] I realised from my experiences that China is a country that cannot be trusted. I found that they have lots of diplomatic cards. […] This is why we need to enhance our presence based on the ROK, Japan and the US cooperation system.  (Interview 9 June 2014)  [3] South Korea cannot make North Korea change. We are only part of what the international community can do in order to make North Korea act in good faith. After all, China and the US are the keys to this issue. However, China can never discard North Korea regardless of whatever North Koreans do, as long as they are stuck in a situation in which the US-China rivalry continues. This is why I have a pessimistic view of the North Korean issues. (Interview: 12 June 2014)  [4] I think that the ultimate change of North Korea will totally depend on China’s change [giving up North Korea as its strategic asset]. When the timing of the change in China and the improved inter-Korean relations are right, we might be able to make an alternative [whereby the ROK can achieve its own referent objects]. (Interview: 20 June 2014)  [5] How could we change North Korea without even thinking of a possibility of structural change in the world? In other words, our policies ought to be predicated on the premise that the international environment surrounding North Korea will make them have no choice but to be changed. I believe that the structure will finally accelerate the North’s change, and therefore, we should facilitate such a change in the North, although we are not a main character. (Interview: 3 July 2014) 
The excerpts stated above are all from the transcripts of the interviews with 
the top securitising actors in South Korea. The interviewees became deeply 
involved with making and carrying out the ROK’s policies toward North Korea. 
One of the interviewees [1] had worked throughout the Roh and Lee 
administrations. Two of the interviewees ([2] and [3]) worked for the Lee 
administration, and interviewees [4] and [5] belonged to the Roh administration. 
It seems clear that there is a common thread across the interviewees: South 
Korea has been restricted by the international system. However, it does not mean 
that the individual actor’s role is meaningless, for they can manoeuvre their own 
strategies within the context of the structure, as mentioned by interviewee [1]. 
Nevertheless, the actors’ policies can be practically implemented only when 
allowed to do so by the structure. All of the interviewees agreed that their roles 
were gravely restricted by the structure. In particular, their statements show very 
well how the ROK securitising actors are feeling about China’s rise and its 
growing influence on the Korean peninsula, not to mention the US, in terms of its 
policy on North Korea. This is noticeable in that all of them have had a lot of first-
hand experiences in dealing with Pyongyang and countries involved in the North 
Korean nuclear issues. 
Another point that merits discussion is that even though the actors on both 
sides (the Roh and Lee administrations) are cognisant of the structural limitations, 
 
 
204 
they still saw differences in terms of willingness to engage in dialogue with North 
Korea. For example, the actors from the Lee administration either placed much 
emphasis on the necessity of the strengthened relationship among South Korea, 
Japan and the US ([2]) or showed that they have very negative impressions of 
China and North Korea ([3]). On the contrary, the actors of the Roh administration 
showed their firm beliefs that although the international system delimits the ROK’s 
decision, at the same time it also creates a situation that ushers in opening and 
reform of the social system in North Korea ([4] and [5]). They therefore insisted 
that improved inter-Korean relations can make South Korea get the upper hand 
when the DPRK reaches the threshold of a new era—e.g. an open society—
caused by the international community’s pressure. 
Does this mean that the conservative actors of the Lee administration did 
not want to engage with North Korea? This is not right, at least in terms of official 
discourse. It is also worth noting that the actors in both administrations 
recognised their measures as an engagement policy toward North Korea. One of 
the top government officials, who was in charge of inter-Korean relations from the 
Roh Tae-woo administration (1988–1992) to the Lee Myung-bak administration, 
concluded as follows: 
Both progressive and conservative governments are well aware that North Korea was wrong. However, they are only able to work in the government when they are predicated on the belief that North Korea can be changed, aren’t they? This is the essential point of the engagement policy, and it pursues the North’s change by actively approaching them and providing them with economic incentives. Since the Roh Tae-woo administration every government’s North Korea policy was based on one of engagement. (Interview: 4 April 2014) 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that conservative actors seemed to have had a 
deep repugnance to implementing the engagement policy at heart. One of the 
influential securitising actors who was in Lee’s inner circle said as follows: 
Engaging with North Korea is not easy. Basically it is contradicting against pursuing unification, which means getting over the North Korean system and absorption of North Korea into South Korean values and systems. Engaging with North Korea means that we have to reconcile with the North Korean government, […] by doing that we are strengthening the North Korean system and government. It’s really a big dilemma. (Interview: 12 June 2014) 
The point here is that even the conservative blocs, which have put less trust 
in North Korea, had no other options other than ‘engaging’ to denuclearise North 
Korea, at least from the perspective of official discourses. Regarding this, another 
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high-ranking government official who worked for the Lee administration voiced 
his thoughts on what South Korea lacks in its securitisation process: 
There is a common thread between the liberal and conservative blocs that both of them want to get North Korea denuclearised and to achieve peaceful unification based on liberal democracy. However, there has been no concept [as a form of extraordinary measures] that could be accepted by both sides. […] Even though North Korea keeps insisting their nuclear weapons are not a bargaining chip, and even though we know that the North is unlikely to receive our suggestions whatever they would be, what we have to do is to keep continuing our efforts to come up with an epoch-making measure. I think all of the South’s administrations, including Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, were all the same in terms of making that kind of effort. (Interview: 9 July 2014) 
What this quote shows is that South Korea has failed to articulate an epoch-
making extraordinary measure that could change the other (North Korea) and the 
regional structure in Northeast Asia. However, put otherwise, it also means that 
the other’s offset ability and the power of the international system placed 
limitations on South Korea in manoeuvring its measures. 
To summarise, it seems clear that the structural factors—the DPRK factor 
and the international system factor—constitute an important part of the discursive 
chasms in the ROK’s securitisation. The incompatibilities between the two Koreas 
and the irresistible logic of the international system have prevented the ROK’s 
extraordinary measures to be implemented. Can North Korea denuclearise itself 
without change? As James Edward Hoare, former British chargé d’affaires and 
HM Consul-General in Pyongyang, pointed out in an interview with the author in 
May 2013, ‘If Pyongyang continues to defend its right to hold nuclear weapons’, 
which have been established as one of the DPRK’s most important referent 
objects, no one can easily ‘anticipate a particular way to break the impasse’. 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has brought out two mythologies in the ROK’s security discourse 
concerning the DPRK’s nuclear issues. The first was a mythology of speech act 
pattern that was based on the ideological division. The notion that has been 
widely spread among audiences as well as political elites in South Korea—
conservatives are more active in articulating the DPRK’s nuclear issues—proved 
to be wrong. The result of analysing speech acts of the two presidents was 
actually the other way around. From ST’s perspective, Roh, who is categorised 
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as progressive, was far closer to the role of a securitising actor than Lee. That is, 
North Korea’s nuclear issue was more actively articulated and, therefore, more 
often described as an existential threat that requires urgent action during Roh’s 
presidency. 
The second mythology was the policy gap between the presidents, which 
has also been stereotyped by political ideologies. What this study uncovered was 
that regardless of those presidents’ real emotions or intentions toward the 
Pyongyang’s regime, at least in terms of the official security discourse on the 
DPRK’s nuclear issues, the two sides’ securitising moves were not disparate. If 
anything, they were strikingly similar. Both of them wanted Pyongyang to reach 
the threshold of change. Both of them had the same perceptions of existential 
threat and referent objects within the realm of official statements. What is more, 
both argued that their policies—extraordinary measures—toward North Korea 
were based upon engagement. The presidents’ official speech acts and pertinent 
securitising actors’ statements corroborated this. 
The term ‘discursive chasms’ was used as a preliminary concept to 
explicate in what way the ROK securitising actors’ speech acts became stuck at 
some point between politicisation and securitisation, which has led the actors’ 
securitising moves to become institutionalised. The chasms consisted of three 
elusive discourses, each of which was related to the threats, the other (North 
Korea) and extraordinary measures. The elusive threat issue came from the traits 
of nuclear weapons, which evoke both imminent and not imminent threat 
perception. The elusive others issue was about the ROK’s representation of the 
DPRK. The ROK has vacillated between the concepts of enemy and compatriot 
in regard to representing the DRPK regime. That is, Seoul failed to devise a way 
that the ROK-led unification could be possible in the event of Pyongyang getting 
security assurances. Seoul also failed to explain how Pyongyang could survive 
while opening up its tightly controlled society. Last but not least, the structural 
factors caused by the DPRK’s offset ability and the international/regional system 
have made the ROK’s extraordinary measures elusive. 
Even so, this chapter has also suggested that there is a difference between 
the two political sides that may have produced a practical gap in terms of their 
perceptions of securitisation: willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korea. 
In other words, despite the similar perceptions of existential threats, referent 
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objects, and limitations on the ROK’s extraordinary measures between the two 
administrations, they appear disparate in terms of beliefs in North Korea’s change. 
What this study has showed about this is that beliefs in Pyongyang’s willingness 
to change itself soon disappeared among the actors in the Lee administration, 
while the actors in the Roh administration still appeared to have staunch belief in 
the possibility that North Korea could be changed, albeit not easily. 
The practical gap might have emanated from the ideological gap between 
conservativism and progressivism as aforementioned. The deep-seated 
anticommunism and anti-North Korea discourse in South Korea might have made 
conservatives reluctant to engage with Pyongyang in dealing with the nuclear 
issues, whereas progressives might have been less antagonistic to Pyongyang’s 
regime. However, what is important here is that, as this chapter’s analysis has 
demonstrated, such underlying ideological differences—the level of repugnance 
to the other—between the individual actors could not come to the surface in 
relation to the official security discourse whereby the actors could establish their 
policies as well as communicating with counterparts. In short, as an individual 
actor, neither Roh nor Lee could ultimately overcome the structural constraints. 
Finding a fundamental reason ‘why’ they took different approaches to the 
perception of North Korea may be well beyond the aim of this research. Perhaps 
a more rigorous analysis of ‘psychological environment’, ‘belief systems’ or 
‘emotion’ of each actor needs to be conducted in order to find a deep-rooted 
reason (Sprout and Sprout 1965; Larson 1994; Mercer 2010). Either way, this 
kind of research could substantiate real discrepancies among security discourses 
which DA, based on official discourses, cannot grasp. On the basis of this chapter 
and the previous chapters, it seems that we can now come to a conclusion to re-
evaluate the hypotheses stated earlier in this thesis. The last chapter will also 
explore how adaptable the security studies based on discourse are to the ROK’s 
security circumstances, thereby providing momentum for a wider analytical 
sphere of ST, as well as examining its theoretical adaptability and limitations. 
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7.  
Conclusions 
The concluding chapter consists of two parts. The first part summarises the main 
findings of this study along with an evaluation of the hypotheses. The second part, 
on the basis of the findings, considers ‘some viable directions in which future 
research might go from’ where this thesis leaves off (Dunleavy 2003: 207). 
 
 
7.1 A summary of study 
This thesis started with raising a question about the properness of the current 
security discourse that divided the ROK’s political blocs. Presidents Roh and Lee 
were chosen for the case study, as each actor has been characterised as an 
archetype of progressives and conservatives respectively. Roh was accused of 
remaining silent on the DPRK’s nuclear threat by conservatives. Progressives, by 
contrast, criticised Lee on the grounds that he only clung to the nuclear issue 
while exacerbating inter-Korean relations. The deterministic and dichotomous 
security discourse that was amplified as an intersubjective process amongst 
securitising actors has continued. 
This research, however, did not seek an answer as to whether Roh or Lee’s 
way of describing DPRK’s nuclear threat was correct or not. Instead, the ambition 
of this study was to uncover misleading points in today’s discourse so that one 
may perceive the discourse in a critical manner. For instance, one can call the 
actors’ discourses into question as follows: to what extent do the current security 
discourses reflect the discursive reality? Is the dichotomous discourse that has 
divided conservatives and progressives right? Is today’s discourse not a specious 
argument that is based on biased perceptions? Have the securitising actors not 
been producing and reproducing the dominant discourse in order to take power 
and maintain their official authorities? In this light, this study aimed to show the 
reality of current discourse as it is, and this is why it raised the main research 
question as was shown in Chapter 1. 
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It has been over 20 years since the ROK began ‘securitising’ the DPRK’s 
nuclear threat. At the time of writing, the ROK is still securitising the same threat, 
which is now much stronger than two decades ago. Pyongyang’s nuclear threat 
seems to be expanding in an unrestricted manner, particularly after Kim Jong-un 
took power.49 One could still ask this question: did the South Korean actors 
securitise the DPRK’s nuclear threat in a real sense? If so, why have the actors 
had to securitise the nuclear issue for such a long time? Can they ever be free 
from the fetters of securitisation against the nuclear threat? As noted, ST’s core 
argument lies in transforming normal politics into emergency politics (Newman 
2010). For Seoul, Pyongyang’s nuclear issue has always been exigent. The 
words ‘nuclear weapon’ are in themselves horrible. The image of ‘a nuclear 
weapon in the DPRK’s hands’ is even more horrendous. It can be said that the 
ROK’s securitising moves towards the DPRK’s nuclear weapon were inevitable 
in this regard. 
With the benefit of hindsight, however, and given the fact that the ROK is 
still securitising the same threat, which became much stronger, it is also true that 
the ROK’s securitising moves turned into another type of normal politics 
(institutionalisation). In this process, the extraordinary measures taken by Roh 
and Lee were of little avail. In addition, it was more difficult for the ROK actors to 
accept the DPRK as a nuclear state. Even though they internally regarded the 
DPRK as a de facto nuclear state, as noted in the previous chapters, an official 
recognition of the fact could not be easily articulated. The ROK actors’ 
extraordinary measures were also limited accordingly. In that sense, the 
distinction between politicisation and securitisation became more and more 
unclear in the ROK’s security discourse and, therefore, as was shown in Figure 
6.7, both Roh and Lee became stuck in the triangle of ‘politicisation-securitisation-
institutionalisation’. Hence, whether the securitising moves took place in general 
is not a focal point; what is more important is to know to what extent and how the 
securitising actors articulated the relevant discourses in a materially and 
discursively limited security environment. 
 
                                            49 On 13 April 2012, Kim Jong-un revised the DPRK Constitution to refer to North Korea as a ‘nuclear-armed nation’. In the following year, he adopted the ‘Byungjin Policy’, meaning a parallel development policy of economy and nuclear weapons, at a plenary session of the NKWP Central Committee. 
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7.1.1 Evaluation of hypotheses 
In order to answer the main research questions, this thesis juxtaposed sub-
research questions with hypotheses by dividing them into the speech acts pattern 
[A] and the characteristics of each securitising actor’s securitising move [B] (Table 
7.1). Since each hypothesis was designed to answer the sub-research questions, 
summarising the analysis results of the hypotheses would naturally lead to 
answering the questions. As discussed throughout the chapters dealing with the 
practical analyses, this study produced some distinctive results that contradict 
some of the hypotheses. 
The research questions and hypotheses A were about the securitising 
actors’ speech acts pattern. Within today’s security discourse context, Roh was 
dubbed as an actor who was reluctant to securitise the DPRK’s nuclear threat, 
whereas Lee was seen as an actor who seriously securitised the same threat. In 
this structure, Roh was expected to be subsumed under the category of (H.A-1), 
and Lee was under (H.A-2). Most debates about securitising the nuclear issues 
in the ROK have oriented around this structure. However, the analysis results 
based on corpus-assisted DA demonstrated that the aforementioned hypotheses 
A are incorrect. If anything, the subjects of the hypotheses H.A-1 and H.A-2 
should be reversed as far as Roh and Lee’s speech acts are concerned. Against 
all expectations, the level of securitisation (security as speech acts) was much 
Table 7.1 Sub-research questions and hypotheses 
 Research questions Hypotheses 
A 
A-1. To what extent and how were the DPRK nuclear-related issues described in each actor’s speech act pattern? A-2. In what context and how were the core-terms ‘nuclear’ and ‘North Korea’ used in each actor’s articulation of relevant discourses? 
H.A-1. The progressive securitising actor will be less likely to articulate the DPRK nuclear issue. H.A-2. The conservative securitising actor will be more likely to articulate the DPRK nuclear issue. 
B 
B-1. What were the existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures for the discourses of each other? B-2. Did articulations of the threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures differ clearly between the actors? 
H.B-1. If Presidents Roh and Lee’s articulation of existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures are clearly different, there would be few impediments to forming the ROK’s securitisation. H.B-2. If Presidents Roh and Lee’s articulation of existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures are not clearly different, there would be some impediments to forming the ROK’s securitisation.  
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higher in Roh’s case than that of Lee. What this means is that Roh, as the most 
important and influential securitising actor in the ROK during his presidency, 
actively articulated the DPRK’s nuclear threat. 
Interestingly, words related to the nuclear issue were prevalent in Roh’s 
speeches (n-grams based keywords and extracted key terms). In fact, the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue was almost always central to Roh’s speech acts. More 
importantly, the term ‘the DPRK’s nuclear’ was clearly articulated as an existential 
threat that required urgent action. In contrast, words based on the DPRK’s 
nuclear issue were scarcely seen in Lee’s speeches. The words related to the 
nuclear issue were detected only in the context of security speeches. The results 
were corroborated by analysis of documents. In particular, Lee’s speech acts on 
the DPRK’s nuclear issue rapidly decreased after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong 
incidents. After the two events, the focus of Lee’s speech acts changed from the 
denuclearisation of the DPRK to receiving a formal apology from Pyongyang for 
the provocations. As was shown in Chapter 5, the SPT discourse, which had been 
a practical mechanism for the completion of denuclearisation, was pushed aside 
in this process. 
Of course, to reiterate, articulation of threat itself does not guarantee the 
completion of the securitisation process. The securitising actors also need to 
articulate what the ROK’s referent objects and extraordinary measures are in a 
meaningful way. The research questions and hypotheses B, about the 
characteristics of securitisation, were brought in with this context. With regard to 
this, firstly, as the analysis of the speech acts pattern showed, both Roh and Lee 
clearly and vocally expressed that the DPRK’s nuclear issue should be regarded 
as an existential threat that must be dealt with in an immediate fashion. Hence, 
there was no significant difference between the two actors in terms of the 
articulation and security perception of the nuclear threat. 
Secondly, what additional analysis demonstrated was that there were no 
significant differences between the two presidents in terms of articulating the 
ROK’s referent objects. This is not to say that different levels of attention were 
paid to different kinds of referent objects (for instance, it can be said that Roh 
paid more attentions to maintaining peaceful inter-Korean relations, while Lee 
was much more concerned with strengthening the ROK-US relations), but rather 
that both Roh and Lee could not discursively jettison any of the referent objects 
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and, subsequently, the way of articulation of the referent objects (North Korea as 
a compatriot and a negotiating partner that should be embraced in the process of 
peaceful unification; the US as a security pillar; and the unification that should be 
led by the ROK predicated on liberal democracy and a market economy) in their 
discourses recorded a very similar pattern. 
Thirdly, the basic structure of the extraordinary measures between the two 
was strikingly similar. Both presidents adopted the same logic in dealing with the 
DPRK’s nuclear issue. The logic pointed to the following standardised discursive 
structure: undertaking total denuclearisation → adopting reform and open-door 
policies → participating in the international community. The measures were 
reified as cardinal agreements of the SPT (the September 19 Joint Statement, 
February 13 and October 3 Agreements) during Roh’s presidency, and they were 
named Vision 3,000 and the Grand Bargain Initiative during Lee’s term. Although 
the Lee administration wanted to differentiate themselves from the Roh 
administration by paying more attention to receiving Pyongyang’s definite 
decision on denuclearisation from the initial stage, in fact, as the Lee 
administration acknowledged later, the structure of its extraordinary measures 
was in line with the September 19 Joint Statement, in which the DPRK clearly 
said that they would abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programmes.50 
More importantly, both presidents broke the ROK’s Constitutional rule—
South Korea is the sole legitimate political entity—as they offered North Korea 
‘security assurance’. This became clear when the September 19 Joint Statement 
was signed in 2005 and when the Grand Bargain Initiative was released in 2009. 
Even though both sides might argue that offering Pyongyang security assurance 
needs to be differentiated from enhancing its regime security, this did not give the 
audience any practical sense of distinction. Meanwhile, Pyongyang was not 
persuaded by these measures. 
Last but not least, even though the two securitising actors’ articulations were 
broadly similar, there were some differences. For example, as mentioned in 
Chapter 6, Roh tended to use the words related to the ameliorating events 
between the two Koreas, including GIC, whereas Lee put more stress on the 
                                            50 Article 1 of the Joint Statement (19 September 2005) stipulated that ‘The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards’. 
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deteriorating events, such as Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents. Above all, 
further DA has shown that the securitising actors’ willingness to engage with 
North Korea, which might have been caused by different senses of internal 
repugnance to Pyongyang’s regime, was clearly different between the Roh and 
Lee administration’s actors. Nonetheless, these differences were not influential 
enough to change each actor’s official security discourse on the nuclear threat. 
To sum up, it can be said that the analysis results give more credence to 
(H.B-2). Roh and Lee’s securitising moves were built on similar articulations of 
the existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures. What is 
meant by similar articulation is that the actors did not use disparate languages. 
What factors, then, did make the ROK securitising actors’ articulation ambiguous 
and overlap with each other? With regard to the factors, this research suggested 
that the concept of discursive chasms deterred the actors from articulating 
clarified threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures. The traits of the 
DPRK’s nuclear threat (elusive threats), the ROK’s ambiguous representations 
of the DPRK regime (elusive others), and the structural constraints caused by the 
US-DPRK and the US-China relations (intangible extraordinary measures) were 
among the most conspicuous elements that created the chasms. Both Roh and 
Lee were under the pressure of the chasms. 
 
7.1.2 Theoretical and methodological points 
In terms of the theoretical point of view, this thesis pointed out the unreality of 
realism (power politics) in the ROK’s security discourse. First of all, realism 
confused DPRK’s rationality with irrationality. For many conservatives, whose 
perceptions are based on realism, North Korea’s obsession with nuclear 
weapons used to be seen as irrational. From this perspective, Pyongyang has 
always been described as unpredictable and belligerent. This is the very point 
where realists criticised the progressive governments for their proclivity to believe 
what the ‘irrational’ North Koreans say. At the same time, however, conservatives 
argued that North Korea would never renounce nuclear weapons. Given the 
realist concept of self-help as a guarantee of the state’s survival, realists must 
have known that it would be unlikely for the DPRK to denuclearise on its own 
initiative. In that respect, the so-called IR realists of the ROK were suffering from 
self-deception. 
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Second, conservative actors confused realism with constructivism. For 
instance, the Bush and Lee administrations, which acknowledged that the DPRK 
regime would never be changed other than due to strong pressure (realist 
viewpoint), depended heavily on China’s influence (constructivist viewpoint). Both 
strived to gain Beijing’s permission to isolate Pyongyang, by persuading China 
that North Korea had become more of a liability to China. However, what realist 
insights tells us is that China will change its priorities by its capabilities, not by the 
persuasion of others (Waltz 2010; Mearsheimer 2014). In the same vein, Wit 
(2015) opined that realism needs to differentiate between ‘pragmatic objectives 
and means to achieve them [Pyongyang’s denuclearisation]’ and ‘magical 
thinking’ that revolves around ideas of the DPRK’s collapse or Korean 
reunification. 
Liberalism and constructivism (as liberal-wing deviationism) are not beyond 
criticism. First and foremost, they showed a lack of driving force as an applicable 
theory. It goes without saying that every single effort to set up regional institutions 
initiated by the ROK presidents ended without result (e.g. ‘New Asia Initiative’ by 
Lee Myung-bak, ‘Era of Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia’ by Roh Moo-
hyun and ‘Northeast Asia Security Dialogue’ by Kim Young-sam, etc.). Second, 
despite increasing efforts to approach the DPRK regime from various angles by 
means of a constructivist perspective, constructivist-based scholarship has yet to 
come up with a practical idea to be implemented in reality, and it is still stuck in 
the area of analysing identities. The biggest stumbling block to liberal-wing 
theories is that there seems to be no room for an application of these theories 
when states’ indispensable interests collide. This has always been the grounds 
on which progressive governments have been criticised by conservatives. 
It was against this background that ST was adopted as the main framework. 
Not only is ST relatively free from mainstream IR theories (but at the same time 
it took its place firmly in the realm of security studies) (Browning and McDonald 
2013), but it is also closely relevant to a methodological dimension. Since ST 
argues that security is discursively constructed, it made it possible that discourse 
can be central to methods for security matters. Against this backdrop, DA, which 
is comprised of both quantitative and qualitative tools, was used in this research. 
The corpus-assisted DA proved that particular traits and repetitive patterns would 
be sticking out from loads of talks or languages produced by securitising actors 
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in a meaningful fashion. As qualitative tools, interviews and document analysis 
were used to corroborate the quantitative results. These methods also showed 
that the aim of analysing discourse is to map out a route that shows a way in 
which security discourse is constructed and changed. Given that discourse can 
be defined as ‘socially constructed ways of knowing some aspects of reality’ (Van 
Leeuwen 2009: 144), by investigating discourse one can observe not only the 
securitising actor’s discursive traits but also the domestic and international 
circumstances that circumscribe the actor’s world. By means of this method, 
albeit not perfectly, audiences are expected to understand the structure of the 
securitisation process better. 
 
 
7.2 The limitations of Securitisation Theory 
My first priority is to keep the American people safe. Just like I’m sure Prime Minister David Cameron [would answer], if you ask him, “What is your first priority?”, “It’s keeping the United Kingdom safe”. So security is always going to be a top-of-the-list item. […] But, how we address them is important. And recognising that security is not just a matter of military actions, but is a matter of the messages we send and the institutions that we build, and the diplomacy that we engage in, and the opportunities that we present the people. (Obama 2016: 23 April, London) 
Security is ‘a matter of the messages’. ST tried to show a way of sending security 
messages to an audience. A way of securitising security matters should be of 
great importance to all scholars studying security issues in this regard. Analysing 
the way of securitisation is not simply about what threats, referent objects and 
measures were articulated, but about critically examining contradictions and 
distorted points within and between security discourses. This is why this research 
analysed the ROK security discourse by means of the ST framework with DA 
applied to it. 
However, this thesis also raised a question as to whether ST can explicate 
the cases in which securitising actors are surrounded by conflicting concepts of 
existential threats and referent objects. Given that ‘the category of risk is a 
category of the understanding’ (Campbell 1998: 2), it can be said that both Roh 
and Lee failed to offer the audience a clear category of an understanding of North 
Korea. Subsequently, the category of nuclear risk, referent objects and 
extraordinary measures could not be clearly expressed in their securitising moves, 
nor could their securitisation be sustained in a coherent manner. 
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The last section of this study places the aforementioned empirical findings 
within broader theoretical and policy implications, so that one can consider areas 
for future study. Three limits will show the practical issues that need to be taken 
into account concerning the application of security studies based on discourses 
to regional security studies: the limits of official discourses, successful 
securitisation, and a one-sided approach. 
 
7.2.1 Official discourse 
The ROK actors’ security discourses on the nuclear threat posed by the DPRK 
lacked clarity and consistency in terms of showing practical differences between 
conservatives and progressives. Although they wanted to be discursively 
differentiated from each other (thereby making audiences anticipate different 
material consequences), what the results of this study presented were that there 
was no big divergence of security discourse between the two political blocs.  
To recap, the first reason for this is that both administrations did not clearly 
and concretely articulate how the DPRK regime could be secured once it opens 
up its political and social system in the process of denuclearisation. Regarding 
this, the Lee administration gave no practical model to the audience how the 
provision of security assurance for Pyongyang and demanding openness can 
coexist. The second reason is that both administrations could not help upholding 
the ROK’s own referent objects—open democracy and a market economy—that 
can never be compatible with those of the DPRK. In the case of the Roh 
administration, they did not cogently show the audience how ROK-led unification 
would be plausible when Pyongyang’s hereditary system is secured by means of 
peace regime to the extent that conservatives are convinced. 
In essence, although it is true that there are some differences between 
conservatives and progressives in terms of willingness to engage with 
Pyongyang, as long as both groups do not elucidate the future DPRK position in 
relation to inter-Korean relations, the fact that South Korea is in a discursive 
dilemma would remain. In this respect, it is interesting to hear the ROK 
securitising actors’ ex post facto review of their security discourse: 
Politicians differentiate themselves [from the other] in an abstract way in order to seize power, and therefore it is not true that policies are differentiated in a practical manner. (Interview: 4 April 2014)  
 
 
217 
We do not need to pay much attention to the cognitive gap [between the conservative and progressive governments]. Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear weapons one way or another. Neither the conservative nor progressive government has an alternative solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. In the end, what it all boils down to is local politics. It is all about justifying ourselves. Whose voice sounds more plausible? It is after all mere propaganda. The South Korean security discourse is therefore no more than local politics. (Interview: 8 July 2014) 
The actors quoted above were all from the inner circle of the Roh and Lee 
administrations. They recognised two things. One is that there was no practical 
difference in security discourse between the two political blocs. The other is that 
it is assuming power within the context of local politics that was really important 
to the securitising actors. An incessant power struggle within and between 
securitising actors is therefore seen as an effort to assume an exceptional place 
to articulate their own perceptions. 
The crux of the matter is that an underlying mechanism of securitising 
moves may not easily be denoted by an analysis based solely on speech acts 
(official discourse), since official discourses are almost always embroidering the 
reality as if a discursive chasm does not exist. In light of this, both Roh and Lee’s 
articulations of the reality were inconsistent with real challenges. This means that 
although ST can show us how securitising actors’ self-referential practices have 
been formed and structured by way of analysing their speech acts, it does not 
assure us of revealing fundamental reasons that caused the limit of official 
discourses. 
Nevertheless, one should be reminded that even the official discourse has 
the power to shape social reality (Wodak and Meyer 2009). As was shown in the 
ROK’s security discourse, even though the discourse was not able to dismantle 
the DPRK’s nuclear threat, it is clear that it has shaped social reality into a place 
where seemingly disparate policies exist. It also enabled the ROK’s actors to 
conduct endless securitising moves, which in turn made the public vacillate. At 
the same time, however, the actors failed to create a new reality while being bent 
on disguising their flawed security discourse. To borrow Herbert A. Simon’s 
terminology, the ROK security discourses were tainted with ‘bounded rationality’, 
as they had only ‘incomplete information about alternatives’ (Simon 1972: 163). 
The limited information engendered distorted security discourse, and the 
discourse brought about confined social reality. Distorted security discourse can 
therefore be equated with distorted security reality. 
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7.2.2 Successful securitisation 
Was either Roh or Lee’s securitising move towards the nuclear threat of the 
DPRK successful? Given that Pyongyang has steadily enhanced its nuclear 
capability, Seoul’s securitisation was not successful. However, if one lowers 
his/her expectations, it cannot be said that the securitisation of the ROK was 
totally unsuccessful, for the actors managed to keep prioritising the nuclear threat 
all the time. As a result, the audience has been well aware of the necessity of 
securitising the threat. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, for many years the role of the audience has 
been given attention by the so-called second generation of ST scholars. They 
have argued that the audience’s role should be highlighted as a criterion for 
successful securitisation. They have put more weight on the perlocutionary acts 
whereby audiences are persuaded by a speaker. However, this thesis did not 
follow this point of view, since it would render the analytical process unnecessarily 
complicated. To reiterate, this is not to deny the importance of audience role; 
what it says is that the role of audience does still lack conceptual sophistication. 
To exemplify, one cannot easily understand how audiences are able to recognise 
the essence of threats, how they are able to acquire the correct information, to 
what extent they have a decision-making ability as a collective entity, what should 
be a criterion of classification between the audience and securitising actors, and 
so forth. This is why this research has analysed the securitisation process in 
terms of an illocutionary act. It helped us to focus on securitising actors’ speech 
acts, so that one can maintain analytical and methodological clarity. 
Be that as it may, it still seems worth trying to look into how the South 
Korean audience reacted to the actors’ securitising moves. This will further allow 
us to ascertain why an analysis based on the actor-audience model can rarely be 
fruitful in terms of assessing successful securitisation. Figure 7.1 provides the 
South Korean audience’s changing perceptions of the DPRK. The data used for 
this figure were collected from the ‘Unification Attitude Survey’ of the Institute for 
Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University (IPUS) and the Korea 
Institute for National Unification (KINU), both of which are the most significant 
and representative institutions as far as unification and North Korea policies are 
concerned. The IPUS has annually conducted the survey since 2007, and the 
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KINU did the same survey every other year until 2005.51 The data were collected 
together and recreated as a form of an area chart in this figure. 
What this figure demonstrates is clear. First, the audience’s perception of 
the DPRK was fluctuating. It vacillated between the two perceptions that saw 
North Korea as a cooperative counterpart on the one hand and as a hostile one 
on the other. This reflects the very same ambivalent perceptions that the ROK 
securitising actors held toward the DPRK regime. Second, more importantly, the 
level of a vigilant/hostile perspective sharply decreased during Roh’s presidency 
(2003–2007), and it rebounded after Lee took power in 2008. As this study has 
already discussed, Roh was persistent in adhering to a peaceful resolution in 
terms of inter-Korean relations, while Lee came into power claiming that Roh’s 
North Korea policy was meek and inter-Korean relations should be based on 
conditional reciprocity. Roh’s positive image of Pyongyang culminated in the 
2007 inter-Korean summit, while Lee’s negative image of North Korea reached a 
high point after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents in 2010. What does this 
mean? Public opinion, in a general and collective manner, generally followed the 
securitising actors’ perceptions and their policies. Of course, both the audience 
and actors’ perceptions must have been influenced by the material incidents, 
including the inter-Korean summit and military collisions. 
                                            51  The full data are available at: http://www.kinu.or.kr/www/jsp/prg/stats/PollList.jsp and http://tongil.snu.ac.kr/, both of which are written in Korean. 
 
Figure 7.1 South Korean perceptions of the DPRK 
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What can be inferred from this? Firstly, as far as the ROK audience is 
concerned, creating a criterion for successful securitisation is not easy, for the 
audience have long been fluctuating in terms of perceptions of the DPRK 
(Swenson-Wright 2011: 20). Given that the audience itself was divided between 
conservativism and progressivism, they cannot reasonably be expected to 
provide actors with astute decision-making skills as to which type of North Korea 
policy would be better. Secondly, if a perlocutionary act was focused on, both 
Roh and Lee’s securitisation might have been described as a successful one, 
since the audience generally followed the actors’ perceptions (Roh and Lee were 
able to ‘persuade’ the audience for a certain period).  
Thirdly, contrary to the second inference, even if the actor-audience model 
is accepted, Roh and Lee’s securitisation cannot be dubbed as successful 
because their discourses were not able to gain public recognition (Table 7.2) 
(Park et al. 2012: 210). Throughout Roh and Lee’s periods, a majority of the 
audience felt that they had not been seriously considered in the process of 
implementing North Korea policy. Put differently, they were relegated to the 
periphery of the securitisation process in a relative sense. 
Can South Korea’s securitisation against the nuclear threat ever be 
successful? Or is it already successful? What kind of securitising moves can 
ultimately be legitimised by the audience even when the move breaks the rules 
of the standard political system? These questions are seemingly insoluble, and it 
appears that ST and its second-generation scholars have not yet provided a 
competent answer to this problem. 
 
7.2.3 A one-sided approach 
Security studies needs to be based on the assumption that neither materiality nor 
discourse can claim a prerogative of an analytical position, for analysing 
contemporary security practice demands both. As aforementioned, although ST 
challenged the dualism of materiality and discourse by pursuing a performative 
Table 7.2 Is public opinion well reflected? 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
well reflected (%) 18.3 23.4 22.2 28.0 30.4 23.8 
poorly reflected (%) 81.3 76.6 77.8 72.0 69.4 76.2  
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force of language, it has generally been criticised for its overreliance on language 
(Balzacq 2011; Aradau et al. 2015). The case of the ROK dealt with in this study 
also demonstrated the necessity of a more sophisticated theoretical framework 
that can elaborate both discursive and material traits. The ROK case proved that 
there are at least three major factors that need to be considered when it comes 
to applying ST. The factors were referred to as the causes for discursive chasms 
in this study: a discourse on threats that cannot simply be said to be either 
imminent or not imminent; a discourse on the other that cannot easily be 
represented; and a discourse on extraordinary measures that cannot easily be 
realised. 
To recapitulate, the first factor is a discourse on the threat that is imminent 
but at the same time is not imminent. As noted in the previous chapter, it is 
contestable whether the North Korean nuclear threat was imminent or not. 
Needless to say, the degree of the threat has been rapidly growing as Pyongyang 
keeps developing nuclear capabilities. However, it can hardly be imagined that 
the North would use its nuclear weapons as long as it receives assurances from 
the world that its regime is secure. Pyongyang is well aware that it could not 
survive if it used nuclear weapons (Chang 2015). Put differently, ‘no-first-use’ 
discourse of nuclear weapons is still strong (Kim 2014b), which is called the 
nuclear taboo. In addition, from the US’s perspective, the real imminent threat is 
not the North’s nuclear weapons themselves. What matters to the US is the 
possibility of the proliferation of nuclear technology.52 
This does not mean that the US is not seriously considering the DPRK’s 
nuclear issue. What it means is that the US’s perception of the nuclear threat 
cannot be as imminent as South Koreans believe, since the DPRK’s nuclear 
threat sounds much more realistic and horrible for many South Koreans in both 
material and discursive terms. All of these have limited Seoul’s scope of 
securitising move. The ROK has had no option but to securitise the nuclear issues. 
However, setting a standard of securitisation of the threat by means of 
extraordinary measures was not easy. The ROK’s ability to come up with such 
measures was not only limited by the nuclear taboo (as a member state of the 
                                            52 James L. Johns, former US National Security Advisor, clearly said ‘the imminent threat is the proliferation of that kind of technology to other countries, potentially to terrorist organisations and non-state actors’ (Presutti 2009). 
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NPT), but was also restricted by a situation in which actors vacillate between 
politicisation and securitisation. 
The second factor is a discourse on the other that cannot easily be 
characterised. North Korea as a nuclear state appears to be a fait accompli. Most 
North Korea watchers agree that Pyongyang has at least 10 or up to 20 nuclear 
warheads as of 2016 (Klingner 2015; Niksch 2016). South Korean actors also 
acknowledge that North Korea is a de facto nuclear state. An inconvenient truth, 
however, is that under no circumstances could South Korea officially recognise 
North Korea as a nuclear state. The same goes for the US. This shows the power 
of discourse as well as its weakness. It enabled the NPT system—a concept that 
has defined the world—to be maintained in East Asia, but its performative power 
became weaker as the DPRK vehemently challenged the current discursive order. 
Apart from this, incompatible ideologies between the two Koreas 
consistently prevented the ROK securitising actors from articulating relevant 
discourses. A real dilemma that weighed on the actors came out of the fact that 
the DPRK is an anti-government organisation. As noted, the main logic of Roh 
and Lee’s speech acts on the denuclearisation of the DPRK was predicated upon 
the principle of Pyongyang’s change (reform and openness). In other words, for 
the ROK actors, Pyongyang’s denuclearisation should be preceded (or followed) 
by its willingness to change in character towards a democratic and market society. 
What is crucial, however, is that ‘the nuclear programme is merely a symptom of 
a more fundamental problem’ for the DPRK (Bluth 2011b: 1373; Lankov 2013). 
That is, North Korea became stuck in a situation in which it can never change to 
the extent that the Kim regime is deprived of its power. Since reform and 
openness are very likely to put the regime at risk, there was no room for them to 
accept the ‘change’ discourse. The Pyongyang regime, as a material and 
discursive bastion of the DPRK system, in and of itself is not compatible with the 
ROK. This made it extremely difficult for the ROK’s actors to articulate their 
referent objects (i.e. in what way can we get North Korea denuclearised while not 
strengthening its regime?) 
The third factor is a discourse on the extraordinary measures that cannot 
easily be realised owing to a limited securitising ability. This factor is perhaps the 
most significant one that shows the necessity of a combined perspective between 
materiality and discourse. The Northeast Asian regional system should be taken 
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into account. The regional powers constituting the system (or structure) around 
the peninsula are China and the US. The US has been the sole superpower of 
the world since the late 1980s. What about China? As Buzan and Wæver (2003: 
35) put it, the single key ingredient of great powers is being ‘observable in the 
foreign policy processes and discourses of other powers’. In this sense, China is 
absolutely a great power, if not a superpower. Therefore, it can be said that the 
structure surrounding the Korean peninsula needs to be interpreted as a quasi-
international system that has virtually reflected the traits of the whole international 
system of the post-Cold War era, with China and the US as the central figures 
(the so-called G2). Although there is an argument that seeks to go beyond the 
US-Chinese competition narrative (Wickett et al. 2015), it is also true that this 
structure has made the ROK’s security discourse restricted in terms of being 
materially practised beyond verbal articulation. 
The two Koreas’ geopolitical position between China and the US can be the 
archetype that simultaneously shows the power of materiality (geographical 
position) and discourse (a structure constituted by power politics; Hobbesian 
culture). As Scott A. Snyder (2015) aptly described, ‘the defining characteristic of 
Korea’s geography has been the curse of living in a bad neighbourhood where 
regional rivals have historically used the Korean peninsula as the stage for 
military conflict’. Regarding the discursive facet, Evans J. R. Revere, former US 
State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, introduced a dialogue that he had with a Chinese academic:  
He said, ‘This situation that we have here describing China’s posture towards North Korea is not really about Korea. It’s not really about the Korean peninsula. It’s about you [US] and us [China]. […] We understand that, we know that they [North Korea] are undermining our interests in certain ways. We know that they have nothing but contempt for us. However, in the grand scheme of things, this is about the rising contention between the US and China. And if you look at it in that way, we need North Korea’. […] I thought that was a fascinating answer. (FPA 2016) 
What this excerpt suggests is clear. However much North Korea threatens 
South Korea, and however much the South securitises against the North, a 
fundamental key to the solution of the issue lies in Beijing and Washington 
(Glaser and Sun 2015; Niksch 2015). It is interesting to hear that Joseph S. Nye 
Jr., who is a leading exponent of ‘soft power’, concluded that the DPRK’s nuclear 
issue could only be solved by ‘hard power’: 
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If you think you can attract Kim Jung-un out of his nuclear programme, you’re kidding yourself. The only solution there is the hard power that the Chinese possess, which is their provision of food and fuel to North Korea. They’ve been unwilling to use that because of a fear of collapse of North Korea and chaos on the borders more than the fear of the North’s nuclear weapons, so one of the things you have to do with North Korea is to keep nudging and pushing the Chinese to use more of their hard power.  (Nye 2013) 
In a sense, this remark is a corollary of the security environment that has 
determined the Korean peninsula. Nye’s answer suggests that the DPRK issue 
should be solved by a combination of materiality (hard power: economic leverage) 
and discourse (South Korea and the US’s persuasion of China). Again, discourse 
and materiality are inseparable. The conjoined traits of the two facets can be seen 
everywhere in the ROK’s securitisation processes. 
 
 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
This research examined the security discourses of the ROK between 2003 and 
2013. It showed that ST’s framework—existential threat, referent objects and 
extraordinary measures—were not strongly sophisticated enough to be applied 
to the ROK’s security discourse. In the ROK’s case, the concepts of existential 
threat and referent objects were ambiguous mainly because of Seoul’s 
ambivalent perceptions of Pyongyang’s position and, accordingly, the South 
Korean extraordinary measures became intangible, a situation which have been 
exacerbated by the power politics. ST was also not able to tell us whether we 
should put the position of the securitising moves of the ROK in politicisation or 
securitisation. 
As noted before, Pyongyang’s nuclear threat itself raised the level of Seoul’s 
discourse to the securitising point, but at the same time Seoul’s lack of 
capabilities materialising extraordinary measures held it back from maintaining 
the securitising level. In that respect, South Korea’s security discourse is also 
distinguished from the concept of riskification, which ‘is identified based on a re-
theorisation of what distinguishes risks from threats’ (Corry 2012: 235), as the 
nuclear threat posed by North Korea can never be regarded as something a 
second-order security. In essence, South Korea’s security discourse on North 
Korea’s nuclear threat cannot help being inclined to securitisation. At the same 
time, however, it has also been institutionalised securitisation, which 
subsequently blurred the boundaries between politicisation and securitisation. 
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Nonetheless, ST functioned as a suitable framework that laid the foundation 
for a more rigorous analysis of security discourses. Because of the framework, 
today’s security discourse of the ROK could be challenged by the findings of this 
study. The framework also made it clear that the securitisation dilemma of the 
ROK cannot easily be solved. A principal focus of threats posed by North Korea 
might have been changed from a conventional to a nuclear-related one for the 
last couple of decades. However, the findings of this research demonstrate that 
even if the nuclear issue is resolved, insofar as the current form of North Korea 
exists, the fundamental logic of maintaining a securitisation phase in South Korea 
is unlikely to be changed. 
This becomes clear when one thinks about the pre-nuclear threat period of 
inter-Korean relations. During the period of the Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee 
and Chun Doo-hwan administrations, Pyongyang itself had to be seen as an 
existential threat, and thereby ‘anticommunism’ became a national mantra. Ever 
since the Soviet Union and China adopted a practical path instead of holding on 
to communism, and as North Korea isolated itself from the international 
community, the anticommunism discourse in South Korea abated accordingly but 
feelings of repugnance to the North’s regime remain. This has contributed to 
dramatising the level of existential threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear 
capability throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In other words, without solving the 
issue of elusive discourse in relation to North Korea, South Korean policymakers’ 
security discourse could not break free of the threat-urgency modality that gives 
an impetus to securitising move. In addition, the discourse power of nuclear 
weapons—the absolute weapon—has also fortified the securitising move. To 
conclude, a combination of the two discourses—rogue/impossible state (here, 
North Korea) and absolute weapon—perpetuate the current structure of 
securitisation. Within this context, the division between conservativism and 
progressivism continues. 
The securitising moves of the ROK wobbled. It suffered from triple distress: 
an abominable material power of nuclear weapons and the huge discursive 
impact of the weapons, the two Koreas’ incompatibility, and the inescapable 
geopolitics indicating power politics. Stated reversely, only when one of the 
causes of the distress founders, then Seoul’s securitising effort would be paid. 
Since this thesis is a single comparative case study of the Roh and Lee 
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administrations, perhaps it cannot provide generalised characteristics of the 
security discourses that can be applied to all of the ROK’s administrations. If the 
speech acts’ patterns are analysed in a more diachronic manner, or if the speech 
acts are dealt with in a more synchronic way, one might get a better 
understanding of how discourses relate to power and the system. However, one 
thing is for certain: without changing or transforming the current security 
discourse, the securitising actors as well as audiences may well be bogged down 
in the same reality. South Korean political leadership requires delicate handling 
of security discourse. As noted before, the role of South Korea’s president is 
influential, at least in terms of forming domestic discourse. Nonetheless, however 
delicate it is, South Korea’s security discourse is likely to be limited to the current 
level of securitisation in the short- to mid-term future, ceteris paribus. 
The term discourse ‘incorporates not just language but practice too’ (Burr 
2003: 63); one does not have to confine speech acts to talk or language. 
Discourse, therefore, needs to be seen as a part of social practice that is 
determined by or determines the international system (security reality). In this 
regard, this study took hold of the analyses that range from micro-linguistic traits 
(securitising actors’ speech acts) to macro-structural elements (discourse as 
social practice and its position within the context of geopolitics). The ROK’s 
securitisation and its security discourse should be understood in both contexts. 
Only then can one evaluate how credible the discourses are. 
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